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ABSTRACT
A discussion of relations between tlrie United States and Indj
is dependent, on an investigation into the structure of super power
relationships, because only from such relationships, can there issue
any real threat to the national security and power positions of any
country. The two countries' policies towards each other have been
primarily influenced by other concerns. Each has had different per-
ceptions of the key issues in world affairs. A consideration of major
trends in world affairs is essential for they profoundly influence
not only what the United States does on the subcontinent but also
how Americans view their role and responsibilities in the world.
Accordingly the major variables in this analysis would be a) units
comprising the system, b) environment surrounding the units, c) rela-
tionship between the units and the environment, i.e., inputs and out-
puts. Conceptual tools like national interest, foreign aid and balance
of power have been frequently used.
We shall be using the Systems Analysis approach to the study of
Indo-U.S. relations. This paradigm has its limitations in the sense
that it cannot account for certain intervening variables between the
onset of an environmental distxirbance, and the formation of a national
decision. We shall however make some intuitive projections by focusing
on a few historical trends
.
One of the ironies of international politics in the time period
under study i.e. 1965-75, is that India along with many other countries
ii
comprising the non-aligned community, worked endlessly for detente, but
when it came, it was found to be not an unmixed blessing. It aroused
the suspicion that detente between big powers would not necessarily mean
world peace. It led to fears that great powers while relaxing tensions
among themselves, might like to pursue their global objectives through
perpetuation of tension in other regions.
There are superficial similarities between the political systems
of India and the United States, but there has been a psychological rejec-
tion by the United States of India, and a corresponding inability in the
United States to accept India as a country worthy of serious attention.
The work discusses the differences in the economic and social
perspectives of the two countries and the contradictions in their politi-
cal beliefs. It also discusses in the paranthesis the basic impulses of
India's foreign policy and its evolution, the decline of non-alignment,
and the ritualistic allegiance to it, the obscuring of India in the
world arena by China and the effect on India of the end of the bi-polar
confrontation in the world.
iii
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INTRODUCTION
A Study of relations between India, and the United States, is
an attempt to take a close look at the paradox of relationships be-
tween two countries, their divergent perspectives, and common
aspirations, which through a perversion of circumstcinces have been in
discord.
Foreign policy is an instrument by which nations conduct their
relations, but it is a dependent variable to be explained by certain
independent variables, such as strategic considerations, ideologies,
economic conditions, super-power positions, and others. Thus an
examination of foreign policy issues alone is not always useful for
gaining an insight into relations between countreis. U.S. foreign
policy towards a given country has derived its logic not in reference
to that country as such, but in reference to one or more super-powers.
The basic thesis of this work is that Americcin foreign policy
towcurds India, must be understood in the light of the universal ap-
plication of the grand strategy rooted in the structure of super-power
relationships. U.S. policy towards India is merely the application
of this global strategy, which has nothing to do with India specifically,
except in so far as India is seen as an available instrximent, or an
unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strategy.
Relations between the two countries were first conducted under
cold war conditions, and then against a background of a decline in
biopolarity, and a weakening of the Soviet and Western alliance systems.
1
2India with no foreign policy experience, soon after independence, was
forced to discover and further her national interests, in a fast and
changing international environment, through the policy of non-
alignment . ^
The universal application of American global strategy, in re-
lation to India, is unrelieved by the presence of any particular
factors that may have significance for the American elite. There is
no influential group in the domestic policits of the U.S., as in
relation to Israel, that would make for any modification in respect of
India. Americam foreign policy towards India, is consequently exclu-
sively governed by its universal grand design; no particular factors
inherent in India, other than India's own attitude towards the
structure of super-power relationships , seem so far to have had any
bearing on Americcui foreign policy.
That both India, cuid the United States have been political
democracies over the post-war period has been largely irrelevant to
American decision makers. It will be the second thesis of this work
to prove that U.S. foreign policy has been one or Realpolitik, designed
basically to serve its own national interests , its own national se-
curity and power position, its own economic welfare, and the preserva-
tion of its own socio-political patterns, not to their tramsfer to or
maintenance in other lands.
^Norman D. Paler, South Asia and United States Policy , Boston;
Houghton Miffline Co., 1966; also see william J. Bamds, India ,
Pakistan, and the Great Powers , New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972;
Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India." Foreign Affairs , July
1971; Internview with Professor Howards Wriggins, India Abroad, October
1, 1972, p. 2
3Ideology has been made use of abundantly in the pursuit of
power, and importantly for support mobilisation, both at home and
abroad. The same Realpolitik basis of U.S. foreign policy also explains
why its basic framework is derived from the structure of super-power
relationships , because only from such relationships can there issue
any real threat to the national security and power positions of the
country.
U.S. foreign policy has been made use of abundantly in the
pursuit of America's national interest, cuid because of its power posi-
tion in the world, it affects every coxantry in the world. In its
implementation the U.S. has been quite adamant with its allies,
ruthless with its foes, and both scornful and stem fowards neutrals.
India has been the recipient of the fury of this global strategy, as
applied to the sxibcontinent of south Asia.
However in its application to India, U.S. foreign policy has
often encountered a stiibbom resistance, rooted in the country's
self perception as a potential major power in its own right, by virtue
of its own size and distinct civilisation, moderated from time to time
by realisation of its capabilities. It has been the determined
opera-
tive policy of the U.S. since the end of World War II, to see that
no
new centers of power other than the United States shoudl arise,
and
that the U.S. remain the sole subject of international politics, while
all others continue or be rendered as objects. This policy has
been
reluctantly modified, only to accomodate those powers that
despite
American opposition have overcome it by demonstrating
primarily by
the acquisition of appropriate military capabilities,
that their claims
4to being subjects in international politics, cannot be denied any
more since they now possess the capacity to injure the interest of the
U.S., if not directly, at least in regions proximate to it.
Indo-D.S. relations need therefore to be examined in the con-
text of the persistent Indian aspiration to be a subject of inter-
national politics, but lacking in capabilities and the U.S. aim to
render other countries as objects in the pvirsuit of its national in-
terest. It is in this dynamic interaction that the explanation lies
for the state of Indo-U.S. relations at any particular period rather
than the personal cinimosity towards India on the part of specific
Americcui leaders or the personality characteristics of this or that
ambassador.
India's weaik capabilities were a decided limitation in playing
a major role in the world. She atten^Jted to overcome this limiatation
by a political mobilisation of other Asian and African nations, and by
assuming for herself for sometime the leadership of the bloc of non-
aligned nations. In the process, it came to be viewed by American
decision makers as a claimant to a subject role in international poli-
tics .
The Americcui decision to arm Pakistan, has to be seen in the
light of this perspective. It served the double purpose of eliminating
India's claim to a siibject role as spokesman of the thrid world, and
removing it as an obstacle to American policy, towards the Soviet Union
and China. We shall see in the subsequent chapters that a study of
relations between the United States and India must include Pakistan.
An allusion to Pakistan will therefore be made very frequently.
5Having once neutralised India militarily from its dominant
position in South Asia by building Pakistan up with massive military
aid, the U.S. could then act as if South Asia was of peripheral stra-
tegic importance. But this peripheral nature of the region, was not
inherent in the region, but the result precisely of American action.
We shall also see as the work proceeds that American foreign
policy on the subcontinent is based on two main pillars. Military
parity between India and Pakistan happens to be the first pillar.
The second pillar has been economic aid, through which the United
States tried to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a dominant
position of influence in India.
Economic aid became an important element in American foreign
policy towards India in the later half of the 1950 's and in the 1960's.
Even though on a per capita basis, India has been at the bottom of the
list of foreign aid recipients among new nations. This aid has been
extremely important to India, in providing resources for general econo-
mic development. However, one feature of American aid policy is highly
significant. Even while extending aid to India, the U.S. has seen to
it that another centre of power is not created in the world, with a
claim to a sxibject role; significantly on a per capita basis, India
was provided only half the economic aid given to Pakistan.
Apparently in respect of South Asia, the American aid program
was oriented more towards sustenemce, than the rapid development of a
new independnet centre of economic power. Half of the American aid
to India consisted of siirplus agricultural commodities. In its origin
6the commodities aid program was designed to relieve America's own pro-
blems of accumulating surpluses. The United States absolutely refused
to have anything to do with building heavy industry, which Indians
recognised as essentail to their economic independence, military se-
curity and political sovereignity. Once early in the 1950 's Indian
officials had been laughed out of the State Department, when seeking
help to build up the steel industry in India; later in the early 60 's
they voluntarily withdrew their assistance for the Bokaro steel pro-
ject, when opposition in the U.S. Congress proved to be stubborn.
However demands on American resoiarces for the Vietnam war, the
resulting political txirmoil, the increasing salience of the racial
issues, the sumulative urban deterioration, and the increasing crime
rate, all these began to seriously impair the U.S., ability to exercise
its power and influence all over the globe. The U.S. now moved towards
bringing its commitments into balance with resources and capabilities.
Economic aid to underdeveloped countreis met with opposition in Congress
and outside. Aid weariness set in as regards India. It was obvious
that the U.S. has lost the stamina and the resolve to engage in com-
petition with the Russians in the Indian economic field. Near the end
of the period the U.S. seemed reconciled to a reduced role in the sub-
continent, but this was not equivalent to withdrawal.
Nixon's 1971 foreign policy report stated:
"we will try to keep our activities in the area
in balance with those of the other major powers
concerned. The policy of the Soviet Union appears
to be aimed at creating a compatible area of stability
on its southern borders , and at countering Chinese
communist influence. The People's Republic of China
7for its part has made a major effort to build a
strong relationship with Pakistan. We still do
nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese
interests in the area. We are equally clear that
no outside power has a claim to a predominant in-
fluence and that each can serve its own interests,
and the interests of South Asia, by conducting its
activities in the region accordingly."
In the aftermath of the Bangladesh war, India had created a
new strategic environment, and stood forth as the hegemonic power in
the STJbcontinent. American anger at India was well founded, since
India had destroyed the first pillar of American foreign policy towards
South Asia, so deligently maintained over the previous two decades,
and also had rendered diabious some of the more recent assumptions about
the place of South Asia in the Nixon engineered international order.
Importance of India to the United States
Just how important to the United States is India? Is it vital
to national security that the subcontinent not be hostile towards the
United States? Or is it a matter of indifference? Or is the area im-
portamt in some other respects? Should we treat India and Pakistan
differently, or is their future linked in a way that they are to be
treated similarly?
It is hard to answer these questions with any precision. India
is obviously somewhere in between. Furiihermore , the iit^^ortance of South
Asia depends partly on conditions elsewhere in the world. For example
hostility between India and Pakistan is vital to American security, but
not a threat to national security, if the United States enjoyed friendly
relations with the Soviet Union and China. The view that India and
8Pakistan are vital to American security was set forth by Defense
Secretary McNamcira in March 1966:
"South Asia has become, through a combination of
circumstances and geography, a vital strategic
area in the present contest between the expansion-
ist and non-expansionist power centres. In friendly
hands or as non-aligned States, South Asia can
be a bridge between Europe and the Far East, and
a major physical barrier to the southward ex-
pansion of Red China and the U.S.S.R. ; in hostile
hands, it would seal the long term hopes of
building a free Asia coalition, able to provide
adequate coxinterweight to ein expansionist China.
This judgement however overstates the importance of South
Asia. American interests are pcirtially a fxinction of the interests
and activities of other countries. It seems unlikely that either
the Soviet Union or China has the capability of taking over a sub-
continent, and so organising the area that it would meike a positive
contribution to Soviet or Chinese power rather than be a drain on
their energies or resources. To be literally vital would mean that
the U.S. could not sxirvive if a nation beccime friendly with her
enemies and hostile to her.
A Sino-Soviet-South Asia axis hotile to the West, would re-
quire the settlement of the Sino-Soviet, the Sino-Indian, cind the IndO'
Pakistani disputes, plus rapid enough economic progress in South Asia,
so that the two countries would contribute to such a grouping. These
developments however seem so unlikely to msike it unwise to base
American policies on preventing them.
2Testimony of March 30, 1966. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 :
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representa-
tives p. 269.
9As far is known South Asia contains no natiiral resources that
cire truly vital to the West. Nor is it vital in terms of communication
routes. The Middle East Ccin be reached from Europe and the Mediterranesin
,
and Southeast Asia from Australia cind the Pacific. Even if India and
Pakistam were actively hostile to the West, they could not prevent
Western vessels from crossing the Indian ocean. While it is fool-
hardy to regard South Asia as vital to American national security, it
would certainly be a serious mistake to regard the area as being of
little or no concern. The futiire of the Western position in South-
east Asia and the Middle East is not bright, which increases the
importance of South Asia. The United States has moral and humanitarian
interests in the political, economic and social progress of India aind
Pakistan. These considerations are related to U.S. interests in a
sound world order, although the motivations are distinct.
A development seriously adverse to American interests would be
if South Asia were to descend into chaos as the result of internal
upheavals dues to frustrations over the lack of domestic progress, to
political strife or insurgency, or because of new cind more serious
conflicts between India and Pakistan. Violent change and intense
national rivalries stimulate outside intervention. A chaotic situation
in South Asia could lead to deeper involvement or intervention by
outside intervention. A chaotic situation in South Asia could lead
to deeper involvement or intervention by outside powers. That the
actions of each outside power might be motivated as much by a desire
to keep other powers from improving their position, as by a desire
to
10
enhance its own position. One need not overdramatise the dangers
inherent in such a development, to conclude that it is worth trying
to forestall chaos and avoid intervention. This was clearly de-
monstrated by the struggle in East Pakistam.
There is also a growing, if yet imperfect recognition that
the rich nations of the world in general, and the U.S. in particular,
have a real stake in building a more just and less dangerous world
commiinity. American policies in Asia have been the product of diverse
considerations. India has been seen as an iit^joverished country
struggling bravely, but probeOaly futilely to govern itself through
democratic institutions, for which the Americans have felt obligated
to assist. American aid of all kinds has totalled $10 billion dollars
since independence, more than to any other nation so far.
J
Policies towards any country or area has to be considered in
i
the light of global policies. American relations with India are in-
evitably affected and sometimes shaped by some larger considerations.
There are some basic interests, which America did seem to have in the
region. First they were interested in seeing that politics in the area
has cui opportiinity to remain autonomous, and as coherent as they can
be. The massive American aid to India, was also occasioned by the
recognition of the great stake which the U.S. has in the stirvival
of the developing nations of the non-communist world. Secondly since
the economic difficulties of the region were and are massive, they
figured that it ought to be the role of the wealthy countries to make
some contribution towards easing those economic scarcities, which are
I
-
.
11
acute
.
Besides, India is big in size and has many things in common
with America. Both countries value democracy, and democratic insti-
tutions. Both consider liberty an important value to be cherished.
Both are interested in creating a new world order in which people could
pursue these ends in a manner they consider most fit.
Why this Period (1965-75 )
Periodisation is always a hazardous task in international
politics. In this case it is possible only in reference to super
power relationships, which lends logic and structure to American
foreign policy actions towards India cis well. Several factors have
influenced the author in choosing this decade for study. First, it
would enable us to view India's foreign policy from two perspectives,
the phase of non-alignment and the changing phase of the seventies.
Not much work on the later period of Indo-U.S. relations has been
conducted. Besides this decade has been significant in the evolution
of Indian and U.S. foreign policies. The Bangladesh war and the con-
equent splitting up of Pakistan, the nuclear explosion in May 1974,
some crucial settlements with the neighboxiring countries, the challenge
posed by the oil crisis, and some positive turns with the United States,
preceded by a period of ups and downs, were some of the developments
which enabled India to demonstrate, or reassert the validity of its
foreign policy ideals.
The United States also had to recast its role in the world.
The basic conceptual framework of Nixon's foreign policy involved
12
essentially a traditional balance of power approach, but more
Bismarckian than Mettemichian. Unlike the static Metternichian
balcuice resting on a conservative ideological laniformity , the
Bismarchian balance was based on movement and flexibility, on taking
by sxirprise both friends and enemies alike. This is why the organi-
sational set up requires such contraction of decision making, and the
exclusion of institutionalised bureaucracies, both from the action
of foreign policy and from the making of foreign policy. India and
the U.S., then were faced with new realities of the seventies.
Major Irritants
The United States enjoyed great prestige in India as indepen-
dence dawned. However anti-American feelings began to mount due to
U.S. policy towards China and Indo-China, and its stand on the Kashmir
question, its limited economic assistance in the early days, always
extended with strings, its failure to appreciate the Asian view point,
cuid to take cognizance of Asian sensibilities and inept propaganda.
Indo-American relations have been characterised by sharp
fluctuations, rather than consistent hostility or cooperation. This
suggests that the two coxmtries' policies towards each other have been
primarily influenced by other concerns, which their governments regard
as more important. Each has had different perceptions of the key
issues in world affairs. A newly independent India accorded a high
priority to anticolonialism, and freedom from Western influence. The
United States was ambivalent on colonialism which it saw as a waning
13
force. American leaders wanted the cooperation of a revived Western
Europe, but also saw the need for Asian independence, so that its
people could have a stake in its own future, and thus not be vulnerable
to extremist forces. Independent Asian countries co-operating with
the West, rather than independence as such, was the American goal.
There are certain impediments to the development of Indo-
U.S., relations which should be noted. First there isusually a super
power complex in the American mind, when she is dealing with a country
like India. In the past serious differences arose because of the
policy of the U.S. administration to encourage some neighvours of India,
like Pakistan for instance, to get stronger in order to fight the
so called "Tide of International communism.
"
The major obstacles in establishing closer linkes between India
and the United States were the divisions of the cold war, the uncondi-
tional U.S. support to Pakistan, India's closeness to the Soviet Union,
her faith in non-alignment, and her opposition to militiary alliances
sponsored by the United States. Even after the doctrinal rigidities
of the cold war have dissolved and non-alignment has become respectable
in the United States the two countries have no come closer. What has
kept them apart is the fundamental psychological cleavage between them
which came into bold relief in 1971 when Nixon gave unconditional sup-
port to Pakistan. Since 1971 marks a watershed in the relationship
3r.S. Gupte, "A Survey of INdo-American Relations till 1964,"
International Review of History and Political Science , August 1969,
vol. 6
14
between the two countries, the crisis in the siabcontinent in that year
and its impact on India's ties with, the United States are carefully
traced in this work.
Another airea of difference is the Indian Ocean, where under
the Anglo-American agreement a military base is being set up in Diego-
Garcia. India like all the non-aligned countries which are situated
on the littoral of the Indian Ocean is against the setting up of mili-
tary bases or great power military rivalry, and competition in the
Indian Oceem.
Then American feel that American aid in India has been a sour
experience, because of Indian pride. They resent what they see as
Indian ingratitude. While the U.S. has given India billions of dollcurs
in foreign aid, India has refused to act like a poor relation, cind in
fact has never hesitated to lecture her benefactor particularly in
regard to the conduct of war in Vietnam. India on the other hand has
viewed the assistance as a source of humiliation to her, and of poli-
tical leverage to the United States. The see food grain assitcince as
motivated chielfy by a need to dispose of American sxirpluses. They
protray aid in such cireas as power, and emphasis American unwilling-
ness after 1962 to provide air support (in co-operation with the United
Kingdom) , in the event of a new Chinese attack , its unwillingess to
provide large quantities of arms, or the factories to produce them,
as additional evidence. India must be protected, but not allowed to
4a. P. Jained: India and the World , Delhi: D.K. Publishing House,
1972
^The Boston Globe, February 5, 1975, p. 27
15
protect itself. American opposition to nuclear proliferation, supports
this Indian argument.
India's negative attitude towards basic American policies
"
such as the development of mutual security arrangements is matched by
a running American criticism of the basic Indian policy of non-align-
ment, which Americans mostly describe as neutrality or neutralism.
Indo-U.S. policies towards Pakistan have been poles apart, and since
relations with Pakistan have been the major concern of India's foreign
policy, these disagreements have been particularly vexing. The China
policies of India and the U.S. have also been divergent. The Nixon
administration clearly believed that a working relationship with
Peking is much more important, than any American interest in the sub-
continent.^ Both countries placed a high priority on peace, but had
sharply differing judgements about the best means of achieving a
measure of stability in Asia.
U.S. military aid to Pakistam, and her action during the 1971
crisis, led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary
aim of the U.S. is to prevent India's emergence as a major power.
They look upon this as one element in a general American opposition
to the rise of other power centres capable of limiting the hegemony
of the United States. Such a conclusion flies in the face of all
^See K. subrahmanycim, "U.S. Policy towards India," China Report
,
vol. 8 March-April 1972; Baldev Raj Nayar, "U.S. Policy," Seminar
,
Jan. '73; Major General D.K. Pandit, "Can India be a major Power?"
The Overseas Hindustan Times, Feb, 15, 1973
16
evidence of American support for European and Japanese re-construction,
as well as support for European unification. These facts make little
impression on many Indians, who Ccin find no explanation for what they
interpret as consistent American opposition to India's efforts to
develop its industrial cind military strength, and to play a prominent
role in Asia.
It is interesting to note that democratic Presidents have been
more xinderstanding towards Indian policies than have been Republican
Presidents. Cordial relations between India and the U.S. were at its
peak during President Kennedy's administration.
An End to Antagonism
Given this litany of complaints and misunderstandings , the
question frequently asked is, whether there is any prospect for im-
proved relations? Even if an appraisal of the respective interests
of the two countries reveals no reason for active hostility. Perhaps
their aim should be no more than the absence of antagonism. Or are
there considerations which suggest that a more fruitful relationship
should be appropriate, and if so what would be its broad outline?
Both countries should guard against excessive expectations, and to
eschew ambitious goals as they grapple with these issues over the
7
next few years.
Fortunately there are now cleau: indications that both the U.S.
"7Arthur Lall, "Change and Continuity in India's Foreign Policy,"
Orbis, No. 10 Spring 1966
17
and India have reconsidered many of their past assumptions. In the
case of the U.S., the new era has already had some effect in Southeast
and Eastern Asia. In India's case, there is a new situation in South
Asia, which she has to face. Even if India's economic development
Improved substaintially
, economic development would require external
support. During 1972 India's assurances of self reliance reflected
the euphoria attendant upon a great victory as well as a deficint re-
action to the cut off of American aid; it also involved a great degree
of self delusion. A drop in food production, industrial stagnation,
and a large foreign exchange gap for the fifth five year plan (1974-79)
,
soon brought this reality home. The Soviet Union has shown little
eagerness to increase its support. Western Europe and Japan are
willing to continue their assistance, United States' attitude is the
question mark.
In a joint commiinique issued in New Delhi on October 29, 1974
there was a promise for a new era of co-operation, based on equality,
mutual respect and understanding.® The Communique was released at
the conclusion of Secretairy of State Kissinger's three days of talks
in New Delhi. It professes the United States' appreciation of India's
policies in the siabcontinent , and acceptance of India's reaffirmation
of the peaceful nat\are of her nuclear policy. Kissinger's recognition
of India as a major power was well received in India.
Methodology
While allusions to authors of some important books will be
Q India News, Nov. 8, 1974, p. 2
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made, the study will depend to a large extent on facts collected
from newspapers, parliamentary debates, activities in the Foreign
Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress, speeches and remarks made
by officials of both countries, and on some articles from leading
journals
.
We shall be using the Systems analysis approach, since we
shall be focussing on the environmental antecedents and effects of
policy decisions. Because systems analysis can reveal relationships
among variables that may not be intuitively obvious, we shall also
focus on historical trends, and intuitive projections, to determine
the importance of variables thus indentified. The paradigm, as
applied in this study, is limited in that it is unable to account for
many of the intervening variables, e.g. the organisational setting of
the decision makers, their information network, and ideosyncratic
features of key individuals, between the onset of an environmental
disturbance and the formation of a national decision.
Specifically for our purpose, the analysis consists of (a) unit
comprising the system, (b) the environment surrounding the units,
(c) the relationship between units and the environment, i.e. inputs
and outputs. Through the flucturation of demands and supports, the
environment first affects each unit and ultimately the whole system.
Direction of Chapters
In chapter one we shall deal with the change and continuity
in the foreign policies of India and the United States. Here we shall
deal at length with the environment surrounding the two countries.
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The fluctuation of demands and support, and the consequent changes in
their foreign policies.
Chapter two shall discuss the U.S. policy on the subcontinent
at length, and Pakistan as a major determinant in the INdo-U.S. rela-
tions. We shall discuss the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965, and 1971, with
reference to U.S. reaction to them.
Chapter three shall deal with the economic cooperation be-
tween the United States and India. We shall trace the kind of aid
that has been advanced in different sectors, and its impact on the
Indian economy. Unless the economy of a country is sound and not
dependent on other countries , it would not be able to adopt an inde-
pendent foreign policy.
In the fourth chapter we shall examine some of the irritants
in Indo-U.S. relations, like the Indian Ocean, the explosion of the
Bomb by India, the C.I. A. auid the Indian reactions to it.
We shall then conclude our work with am evaluation of the
foreign policies of the two countries, stressing the point that foreign
policy disucssions cannot be reduced to a neat formula. A certain
policy is relevant to a given historical period. Changes in the
foreign policy of a super power can have its impact on the foreign
policies of other coxintries too. A foreign policy is not made in a
vacuum but is a response to certain inputs. Besides it is one thing
to construct a foreign policy model, it is another to have an actual
policy. This will thus be a macro study of the foreign policies of
the two countries.
CHAPTER I
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE FOREIGN
POLICIES OF INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Foreign policies operate in a world of sovereign states, and
thus would have to depend heavily on the elements and manifestations of
power of the concerned states, their national interests, and the wider
interests of the international community. It is more than a truism to
say that the formulation of foreign policy is essentially a choice of
ends and means on the part of a nation in an international setting. It
is necessary to have a broad end or goal which will give a sense of pur-
pose or direction to foreign policy. The states in international re-
lations are guided by the concept of a permanent and universal goal,
namely that of "national interest
. The minimum essential components
of the national interest of any state are security, national development,
and world order.
Foreign policy is never determined by a single factor, or set
of factors, but is the result of a number of factors, which affect the
formulation of policies in different ways under different circumstances.
Some of the factors are relatively stable and have to be taken as given
by the makers of foreign policy, and therefore can be regarded as the
more basic or unchangeable determinants of policy than others. Geo-
'"George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy
,
(New York, 1962),
Ch. 3
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graphy, economic development, political tradition, the domestic and
international milieu, are the more variable institutional factors,
and even the personal role of statesmen are no less important in the
process of decision making. The basic determinants of foreign policy
vary in importance according to circumstances, and it is important to
lay down some general rule regarding the relative importance of each
of these factors, or a scale of priorities, which the leaders must
permanently adhere to in the making of policy decisions. •
Power politics hcis become an overriding conception in inter-
national affairs. Hans Morgenthau contends that "international politics
like all politics is a struggle for power." since power relations
change, the relationsip between units in the international system is
bound to change too. A given policy decision is therefore relevamt to
a given historical period or to a certain pattern of relationship which
is liable to chemge. So the environmental inputs help shape foreign
policy decisions. If the outputs are predominantly supportive the
primary tendency of the system gets strengthened."^
If we describe the power of a state as its ability to exercise
restraining or directing control to make amother state do what it would
otherwise not do, it will be clear that mere influence is not adequate.
Power is distinguished from influence by its reliance on external pres-
2
Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations , (Calcutta, 1966), p. 27;
Alan James, "Power Politics," Political Studies , Vol. 12, 1964, pp.
307-26; Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society , (New Haven, 1950), p. 76
According to them power politics relies on force, coercion and sanctions
3
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life , (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 353
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sures. i.e., force, as a background threat; influence is distinguished
from force by its preference for achieving a desired end without the
actual use of force. India's power in this sense was marginal, as she
still had not developed her nuclear potentialities.^
Professor Morgenthau has indicated the three sources of power
as, raising in the states an expectation of benefits, i.e., expectation
of military and economic protection, creating in them the fear of dis-
advantages, e.g., loss of economic and military aid, and nourishing a
sense of common interests, by the preservation of a way of life followed
by two nations, say democratic or communist.^ Diplomacy is also impor-
tant in the prosecution of a successful foreign policy, for it is through
a mature diplomacy that the expectations and benefits or the fear of
disadvantages and the recognition of a sense of common interests, may
be appropriately developed in an age when resort to force is fraught
with grave consequences to peace and civilisation itself. States are
tending to use means besides force to influence others to raise in them
the expectation of benefits and the fear of disadvantages, and in parti-
cular to create a sense of common interests. Economic aid until recently
was an important tool of foreign policy with the United States. However,
the colossal economic expenditure in Vietnam, the energy crisis, and the
economic interdependence of states, is making the U.S. aware of the im-
portance of trade as an instrument of foreign policy.
The art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in
^Now however India too is a member of the nuclear club.
^Hans Morganthau, op. cit.
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finding out what is most advantageous to the country. Governments
talk about peace and freedom, and international goodwill, but in the
ultimate analysis a government functions for the benefit of the country
it governs. National interest has to be promoted through foreign policy.
The protection of territorial integrity and political independence is
the national interest of every state. For the economically underdeveloped
countries, economic development becomes an equally important national
6interest
.
In the game of international politics, the key point to remember
is that each state in the state system is the guardian of its own se-
curity and independence.^ Each state regards the other state as a po-
tential enemy, who might threaten fundamental interests. Consequently,
states feel insecure and regard one another with a good deal of appre-
hension and distrust, so the principal variable explaining a state's
conduct is the balance of power. In order to prevent an attack, a state
feels it must be as powerful as the potential aggressor. Disproportion
of power might tempt attack. Therefore a balance of power becomes the
prerequisits of each nation's security, if not survival, as well as for
the preservation of the system itself. Power has to be counterbalanced.
States thus have very little or no freedom of action; their range of
choice about the kind of foreign policies they need to adopt is de-
termined by external forces. As the distribution of power changes, so
does state behaviour and alignment. The foreign policies of states are
interdependent, so the general principle of action is that: "When any
^Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy
,
(Delhi: 1961), p. 28.
^Claude, Power and International Relations, p. 43.
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state or bloc becomes powerful or threatens to become inordinately
powerful, other states should recognise this as a threat to their
security and respond by taking equivalent measures individually or
jointly to enhance their power.
Unrestrained power constitutes a menace to everyone; power is
therefore the best antidote to power. States therefore pursue "balance
of power" policies as the chief means of deterring potential attackers
and assuring their own independence.
States however do not always do what they should do so we look
to other levels of analysis for alternative or supplementary expalana-
tions. We then come to the nation-state level of analysis, which relies
on a state's internal characteristics such as the political system, the
nature of the economy of the social structure for added explanations for
foreign policy of countries. States however do not make decisions,
certain men who occupy the official political positions make foreign
policy decisions. So along with the objective environment (national
and international) the policy makers* subjective perception has also to
be accounted for in a study of relations between two nations. We shall
not consider this point in much detail. It will suffice to say that
the state system level will be fundamental it cannot by itself suffi-
ciently explain the world politics of the post war era.
This brief reference to recent trends in international politics
is intended to explain some vital questions like: what are the sanctions
^John Spanier, Games Nations Play, Analyzing International Politics ,
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972). See Ch. 1 and 2 for a clear under-
standing of analytical approaches to the study of Internationa Politics.
Also see Arnold Wolfers, "Types of International Actors," in Romano Romani,
The International Political System , (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972).
25
which states like India have developed or can develop to safeguard their
national interests? Was the policy of non-alignment as practised by
India adequate? Will alliances with powerful states be helpful? What
motive or sense of common interest prompted the United States to send
assistance to India? Or what prompted the Soviet Union to sign a 20
year treaty with India? In what ways can such identity of common in-
terests as India has with major and powerful states be developed?
Indian Foreign Policy
The Nehru era. " In the bipolar world that existed until the late 1950 's
and early 1960's, United States and the Soviet Union sought as their
maximum objective, to enhance their respective strengths by taking over
the territory, population, and resources of 'the newly emerged nations,
or at least, the potentially stronger and politically more important
new states; their minimal aiim was to prevent these states from joining
the adversary's bloc.
For the new states, all of which were militarily weak and eco-
nomically and politically underdeveloped, non-alignment with either bloc
made tactical sense in the context of this postwar distribution. An
"in between" or third world postiire presumably allowed them, to maximize
their bargaining influence. Cold war was secondary to the new nations'
preoccupation with their own development cind modernization.
The Indian foreign policy has been a "protest against power politics
,
^Indian Official, "India as a World Power, " Foreign Affairs , Vol.
27, 1948-49, p. 550,
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under Nehru's stewardship, India attempted to play a quiet and persuasive
role through friendly efforts to ease the cold war tension. Her policy
of non-alignment, which was formulated in 1946-47, bore an inherent
implication of the rejection of some of the basic tenets of power politics.
"We propose," Nehru declared, "as far as possible to keep wawy from the
power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in
the past to world wars, and which may again lead to disasters on an even
vaster scale. Nehru's understanding was that the problems of the de-
veloping countries were peculiar and they required a variety of politics
different from power politics. It was therefore essential for developing
nations to stay away from global politics. He stated that "the problems
of Asia today are essentially problems of supplying what may be called
the primary human necessities. They are not problems which may be called
problems of power politics. "^^ Nehru decided to remain non-aligned in a
bipolar world to safeguard India's independence, and to maintain world
peace.
Whenever India saw that power politics was attempting to play
an undesirable role in certain parts of the world, she tried to steer
clear of it and to save the situation. At the United Nations, in 1947-48,
when the question of partitioning the Holy Land into Jewish and Arab
states was being considered, she withstood the pressure of the two super
powers and proposed a reconciliation formula in favour of establishing a
^^Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches,
September 1946-April 1961, (New Delhi: 1961), p. 2.
^^Dorothy Norman, Nehru; The First Sixty Years , Vol. 2, (Bombay:
1965), p. 463.
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federal syste.. It is true that she failed as as a consequence of
power politics Israel was brought into being but her efforts were in-
dicative of an approach which was different from one of power politics.
Years later, in 1960, when the Congo became a theatre of dis-
sensions, which, though apparently internal, were really a consequence
of international power politics, India did her best to save the territorial
integrity and political unity of the newly created states. She refused
to recognize the various factions in the Congo and thus repudiated the
game of power politics. Likewise her refusal to recognize the divided
states of Korea and Vietnam as also Germany emanated from this attitude.
By doing this, she was staying away from becoming a follower of either
the western or Soviet bloc.
India's attitude indicated an essentially new trend in inter-
national affairs which was different or away from power politics as we
shall see in subsequent chapters. It may variously be described as a
deviation from, a substitute for, or an alternative to, the traditional
power-oriented approach. Indian policy, for almost two decades, could
be described as an exercise in influence politics. It is not always
easy to make a discernible distinction between power and influence.
Lasswell and Kaplan have pointed out that "it is the threat of sanctions
which differentiated power from influence in general. ""'^ Thus, unlike
power politics which relies on force or coercion of sanctions, influence
politics relies on persuasion and reconciliation. As influence relies upon
persuasion, it is more responsive to liberal and moral values in inter-
12H.D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society
,
(New Haven:
1950), p. 76.
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national politics. This was especially true when a country did not ac-
tively belong to a bloc.
Owing to a variety of factors, India's policies hold a leading
position in the founding and development of the concept of non-alignment.
Even before it attained freedom in the middle of the year 1947. India
had become "a symbol and catalyst of self-determination."^^ for most
nationalist movements in Asia, as also elsewhere. After the Second World
War it was one of the first to attain independence. Its history, geo-
graphy, national interest, and leadership combined to produce a certain
policy in external affairs which came to be known as non-alignment.
The concept of non-alignment may be said to attempt a harmonious
blend of negative as well as positive elements. The so-called negative
elements envisage a course of refusal to take sides in any military line-
up of world powers. This is perhaps the hard core or the irreducible
minimum of non-alignment, and a state would not be recognized to be non-
aligned by the non-aligned nations if this condition is not satisfied. -"-^
Non-alignment was meant to keep away from bipolarity, the cold war,
ideological crusades, the arms race, and military blocs which were the
chief characteristics of the era following the Second World War.
It is this negative element of non-alignment which has been unduly
emphasized by the West and which has driven many of their scholars to use
the terms "neutrality" and "neutralism." It would lead to a better un-
13
See Paul F. Power, "Indian Foreign Policy: The Age of Nehru,"
The Review of Politics
,
Vol. 26, 1964, p. 257.
^^The Cairo Conference, held in October 1964, shows it clearly.
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derstanding if the legal aspects of this negative element of non-align.
ment were not lost sight of. Firstly, the neutral states, neutral in
the traditional legal sense, have accepted neutrality through, or as a
consequence of, the provisions contained in: (a) their respective muni-
cipal lavs-either in the constitution or in the ordinary law of the
land, and (b) international treaties and agreements.
Thus, the commitment to neutrality in these traditionally neutral
states continues, irrespective of governmental changes in them. The
status of neutrality of Switzerland and Austria, for instance, remains
everlasting and is not subject to change by governments.^^
The nature of the commitment of non-alignment is different; it
«
has no such legal foundations. Its basis is political. It can change,
and in fact has changed, with the coming of new governments.
Secondly, it is argued that keeping non-aligned in a conflict
is inconsistent with the principle of collective security as established
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, containing Articles 39 to 51."^^
It is submitted that a couple of factors weaken the validity of
such a contention. Morgenthau rightly points out that Article 27 (3) of
the UN Charter provides that the decisions of the Security Council require
the majority of votes, including concurring votes of all the permanent
^^he changes in the policies of Iran and Iraq are concrete examples
in point.
^%his was argued by Secretary Dulles and many others in the West,
On 9 June 1956, Dulles made his oft-quoted remark which characterized
the policy of non-aligned nations as "obsolete," "immoral," and "short-
sighted," and said that the UN Charter abolished such a position. See
New York Times, 10 June 1956, p. 24.
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member. By making such a provision the Charter leaves member states
free to exercise their discretion in case a permanent member is involved,
such a situation clearly permits a state to remain aloof or non-aligned.
Again for making the system of collective security effective, it is
necessary that agreement or agreements, specifying several details of
the operational aspect, should be concluded in terms of Article 43 of
the Charter. it is notable that no such agreement or agreements have
been concluded, and in their absence member states are left free to de-
cide their course of action. In both these situations the option to
keep apart is permissible. Thus what really happened was that the UN
members "embraced the ideal of collective security and left gaping holes
in its legal fabric. ""^^
When one passes on to the positive elements of the concept of
non-alignment, the preservation and furtherance of national interests
appears to be the most important, an effort which has traditionally
been considered to be an object of all international relations. National
interests of particular country are determined by geopolitical, economic
17
Art. 43 of the UN Charter reads as follows: (1) All members of
the United Nations in order to contribute to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments
,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security. (2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the number
and types of forces, their degree and readiness and general location and
the nature of the faiclities and assistance to be provided "
18
See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations
,
(Calcutta: 1966). p. 192.
Later on he makes a very interesting remark saying that the UN Charter
"did not kill neutrality, but rather sentenced it to die, staying in^-
definitely the execution of the setence.
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and other factors obtaining at a particular point of time.^^ That is
why the elements of national interest change with the variations in
national and international circximstances
. In defining national in-
terest the ideology of the leadership of a country perhaps exercises de-
cisive influence. The ideas of leaders of the non-aligned nations,
particularly some of their high priests, 20 ^ere shaped by the traditions
of their ancient civilisations as well as by the western liberal educa-
tion in which they had been trained during the formative years of their
life. This resulted in their taking an enlightened and a broader view
of their national interests. Therefore in determining their national
interests, they attempted a synthesis of nationalism and internationalism.
This enlightened national interest, then, is the most important aspect
of non-alignment; in fact its service has been considered as the aim
of non-alignment. Thus the position of non-alignment is that of a
means^l whose end is the fulfillment of national interest.
It is a situation in which Arnold Wolfers' concept of milieu
goals which are pursued when a state formulates its policies in the
existing "shape of environment," instead of attempting to defend or
increase possession they hold to the exclusion of others," has some
^^This explains varying voting behaviour of non-aligned nations on
some issues in the United Nations, a situation towards which some writers
have shown lack of appreciation.
^^For instcince, NcihrTi, Nasser, and U Nu.
^^It has been pointed out that "non-alignment is best considered
as a means to achieve the aims, and not as an end in itself." See A.
Appadorai, "The Foreign Policy of India," Foreign Policies in a Changing
World
,
J.E. Black and K.W. Thompson (eds.), (New York: Harper & Row, 1963),
p. 485.
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relevance. 22 claude points out that "the concept represents an invita-
tion to integrate the consideration of national interest and of inter-
national order, to examine the manner in which concern for the improve-
ment of the global environment may be fitted into a state's concern for
its own basic security and welfare. "23
That the concept of non-alignment should vitally concern itself
with world peace was very natural in view of the development of nuclear
weapons and the strains between the two block in the early years of
the postwar period and also in view of its objectives. India was
convinced that a war would imperil all chances of their development.
Besides Nehru was against the use of force in settling inter state dis-
putes. What gave added strength to his faith in world peace was his
conviction that progress, which was so essential for banishing poverty
and disease from new nations, was not possible until peace was stabilised,
Thus there was a direct connection between world peace and internal
progress. That is why peace and progress became the watchword or the
rallying ciry of non-alignment. However, even the non-aligned nations
are no exception to the convulsion of historical interests. They have
wavered xineasily between the enunciation of principles, which they are
unable, to enforce and the pursuit of national interests, which they
find difficult to justify. The sponsors of the Band\ang Conferences of
For a discussion see Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration :
Essays on International Politics , (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962),
pp. 73-76.
^•^See Inis L. Claude's review article of Wolfers' book in the
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, 1964, p. 296.
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Afro Asian Nations, (held in 1955) have become involved in actions
which do not indicate a high regard for their own principles. To quote
a few examples, China's agression against India in 1962: Indonesia's
involvement in open aggression against her Malaysian neighbour: U.A.R.'s
conflict with another Arab country, such as in Yemen.
In view of the economic and technological backwardness of the
new nations, Nehru, following a policy of non-alignment hoped for and
secured economic and other types of foreign aid from the countries of
the two power blocs. He declared that he would not accept foreign aid
if political strings were attached to it. The policy of non-alignment
also held that racialism and colonialism, in every shape and form
should be liquidated without further delay, coexistence should be uni-
versally adopted, effective steps should be taken for general and com-
plete disarmament, territorial and political integrity of countries
should be respected, the settlement of international dispute should
be attempted through peaceful means.
The Korean War transformed Indian non-alignment from a verbal
assertion into a global posture which served as an effective instrument
of power. The necessity for the United States to obtain United Nations
sanctions for its Far Eastern containment policy gave India, as leader
of the so-called Arab-Asian grouping of states a new importcince to the
West by playing a mediative role. As Indian delegates in the United
Nations increased their countries involvement in the diplomacy of a
global crisis and Nehru maneuvered his government into positions of
mediation between the Soviet and Western coalition, India's non-align-
ment evolved into a sophisticated means of influencing the decisions
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of other governments.
At the Geneva Conference in 1954 Indian influence was a re-
cognized though unofficial factor in the Indo-Chinese settlement, and
India representatives were accorded the pivotal positions in the Inter-
national control commission teams for Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In
1953 an Indian was named head of an international commission to super-
vise elections in the Sudan, thereby satisfying the demands for un-
partiality made by Britain and Egypt. Indian diplomacy was welcomed
at the time of the London Conference dealing with Egypt's nationalisation
of the Suez Canal Coit^any and might have helped in bringing the parties
to a settlement had not Egypt been attacked. The Bandung conference
of non-aligned countries, held in 1955, was a move initiated by India
to chanalize the resentment in Asia against the S.E.A.T.O. treaty. India
believed that the presence of the United States in Asia was a grave
threat to peace because it had the power to subvert the governments
of smaller states, set up puppet regimes, and maintain them in power.
The influence which India derived from establishing itself
firmly as a non-aligned state was exerted most effectively on the major
contenders in the bipolar struggle, the United States and the Soviet
Union
.
India was not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign
policy designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the
carving out of spheres of influence. She was not interested in exporting
ideologies, at that particular stage. In conformity with the objectives
of her policy, India sought friendship with every nation. She did not
allow past conflicts to impede her new links with Britain within the
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framework of the Coimonwealth, The problem of French possessions in
India, unlike those held by Portuguese, was solved in a civilized manner
by peaceful negotiations. India had similar relations with the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and other
European countries, both east S west, with non-aligned countries in
Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Africa south of the Sahara, there
existed special understanding and cooperation based on a common interest
in safeguarding freedom and a common struggle against colonialism,
neocolonialism, and racialism.
From the end of World War II to the present India's power—its
ability to influence the politics of other states—has rested chiefly
on certain intangible bases which are no longer adequate to support
24
all of its national interests. India's prestige which was based
during the past several years, has declined rapidly after the Chinese
military advances of the autumn of 1962.
India's postxire of non-alignment, which achieved its greatest
effectiveness in the 1950s, was not designed with the physical security
of the country chiefly in mind. Non-alignment as a defense policy
meant that India which refused to take sides might hope to escape in-
volvement in a major war. India's non-alignment can be compared with
the classical posture of a buffer state. With the help of the policy,
she maintained an area free from direct great power conflicts.
24
See Charles H. Heimsath, "Nonalignment Reassessed: The Experience
of India, in Hilsman and Good (eds.). Foreign Policies in the Sixties ,
(Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1970) . pp. 47-66.
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The declines in India's power, signs of which were noticeable
in the mid-1950s in Southern Asia and the Himialayan region, reached
alarming proportions by the 1960s. That decline was most clearly
defined by India's confrontation with China. In trying to re-establish
some of its lost prestige at home and abroad, the Indian government
sent its troops into Goa in December 1961, and liberated her from the
four centries old Portuguese rule. The Indian government demonstrated
at Goa that it was becoming more concerned with its prestige, i.e.,
its predictable power, among Asian and African states that with its
standing in the eyes of the non-Communist west.
India's reliance on outside military aid to defend its own
territory during the Chinese attack in 1962, and Indo-Pak war of 1965,
and 1971 emphasized its weakness cind cast doubts on the validity of
non-alignment as an instrument capable of protecting the basic national
interest of self-preservation. In terms of building military strength
in advance of an attack, India's foreign policy over the previous de-
cade was proved to be almost a total failure only partially offset
by the promises of future military aid from both the United States and
the Soviet union. Pakistan promptly took advantage of India's diffi-
culties by pressing for a favourable Kashmir settlement. While failing
in this Pakistan at the same time saw the possibilities of exerting
further pressure on India by negotiating a border agreement cind an air-
lines accord with China and by seeking to hinder large-scale military
aid from the United States to India. During the 1950' s, Indian leaders
had already become complacent about their country's new power position.
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NO vigorous new policies were being formulated to meet the rapid movement
of China into a position of dominance in Southern Asia. India appeared
to be depending on the United States and the Soviet Union to provide
the force necessary to contain Chinese ambitions.
Impact of Chinese war on Indian politics . The immediate Indian
reaction to the Chinese attack was one of bewilderment, even though bor-
der clashes were going on for three years, shock and also a feeling of
betrayal which was best expressed in Nehru's own words. He told the
Lok Sabha:
It is sad to think that we in India who have pleaded
for peace all over the world, and who have sought
the friendship of China and treated them with courtesy
and consideration and pleaded their cause in the
councils of the world, should now ourselves be the
victim of a new imperialism and expansionism by a
country which says that it is against all imperialism. ^5
There was soon a recovery in Indo-U.S. relations and in 1962
they reached a new peak with the Sino-Indian border war and the American
readiness to ship small arms. However, the Indians soon discovered that,
while the Americans were ready to assure India with air support against
any large scale invasion by China, they were ready neither to supply
it with modern supersonic jet fighters, which they made available to
Pakistan, nor move importantly to help India set up its own defense
industry to produce such sophisticated weaponry itself.
The United States was prepared to be India's military protector,
with the necessary complementary acceptance by India of being an American
J. Nehru, We Accept China's Challenge , Publications Division, New
Delhi, quoted in S.P, Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas , (New Delhi:
Delhi University Publisher, 1965)
, p. 184.
38
Client or protectorate, but was not ready to help India establish the
wherewithal to become an independent centre of power.
The immediate effect of the War of 1962, however, was to call
into question the basic tenets of India's foreign policy. Criticism
was strong in the country and in the Parliament. Nehru himself said
that India had been living in an unreal world, and that "we are growing
too soft and taking things for granted. But he clung tenaciously
to the old lines of policy: "We are not going to give up our basic
principles because of our present difficulties."^^ A Western observer,
A.M. Rosenthal, noted the spirit of the country at the time in the fol-
lowing words
:
For years and perhaps decades to come the fact that
on the morning of October 20, 1962, Chinese Communist
forces moved with power and planning into northern
reaches of the country that had lived the dream that
could never happen, will affect the thought and
destiny of India. So much has been happening since
October 20, so many attitudes are in process of
change that it seems sometimes that what went on
before in India is part of a different world and
different age. Time and events are racing through
the historical camera in India, changing the way
men think and act... The reel may slow and even may
become stuck fast for a while, but it seems im-
possible for the moment that it will even move
backward, that the lessons of the attack will be
forgotten, that India will ever be as she was before
October 20, 1962 28
The heaviest attack came in the Lok Seibha (the lower house of
Parliament) by the conservative Swatantra Party for the neglect of the
°J. Nehru's Speeches, Vol. IV, (New Delhi: Government of India,
1964) , p. 230.
27ibid.
, p.
28New York Times, 17 November 1962.
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basic national interest of security. n.G. Ranga, the President of the
party, appealed for large-scale military aid from the United States.
"HOW are we to become strong/' he demanded, "if we hang on to this non-
alignment?... Non-alignment has not served us, and does not serve us
any longer. The sooner we get rid of this the better. "^^
Mr. B.N. Singh, another member, argued that for a militarily
weak country like India who could not even safeguard its territorial
integrity, non-alignment was a "deception. " Another argument advanced
by many members in favour of alignment was India's financial inability
to pay for the arms. It was thus suggested that India should get free
31
aid through military alliance.
Strong sections of opinion in the country favoured carrying the
war to the finish with China. People like J. P. Narayan and C. Raja
Gopalachari were against negotiations until the "last Chinese soldier
had left the Indian soil." For the purpose they pleaded strengthening
India by whatever means possible, including all out aid from the West."^^
Disillusionment with non-alignment in the country was also caused
by the failure of the non-aligned Afro-Asian nations—whose cause India
had championed for so long—to give her any material or even moral sup-
^^Lok Sabha Debates, Third Series, Vol. LX, Nos. 1-6, Nov. 8-14,
1962, (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat), Cols. 158-159.
^°Ibid., Col. 489,
31cSee Frank Anthony's speech in the Lok Sabha , ibid., Col. 201.
-JO
Quoted in S.P, Varma, Struggle for the Himalayas , (New Delhi;
Delhi University Publisher, 1965)
,
p. 184.
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non-
port in her hour of need ^3 p^-^ .. Referring to the Failure of India's
alignment policy in this respect, Frank stated bitterly:
Non-alignment under the orientation we have givenxt has proved under the impact of war to be ^xllusxon... which has been dissipated by the Srstgust Of the breath of war.... ^at are the fSts
is hosLle,
.epal^^Se^-™^^
nfttered' ^""^
Asian countries which wefla tered ourselves were following our fine
sc^hir/^''^ ^'•f'* """"^M peculiar way sub-ribed to non-alignment. 34
Non-alignment was further said to have lost its raison d'etre
in the seeming failure of the Soviet Union to support India initially.
In fact, in the beginning it appeared to be taking a pro-Peking line.
Russian advice to India not to accept Western military aid and conduct
negotiations with the Chinese unconditionally came under heavy assault
as proof of Russian "betrayal." Mr. Anthony charged in the parliament
that China being the Soviet Union's only major ally, in a final crisis
the Russians will "pull the carpet from under us. "35
Even though greatly dismayed by China's action, Nehru personally
did not allow himself to be swayed by these popular sentiments. In
spite of the upsurge of emotion all over the
-country, of excitement and
33According to a New York Times report, out of the sixty Afro-Asian nations to whom India had presented her case and sought support,only 26 had given full moral support, and only Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia
and Lebanon had branded China as an aggressor. Nine others expressed
sympathy and seven had merely expressed their concern and suggested
ways of resolving
-dispute. Three remained uncommitted and the rest did
not reply. New York Times
. 22 January 1963
»
34Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit, , Col. 194,
35ibid., Col. 194.
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a.,er. He was able to ^i«ain ccpos... a.a oonna.nce. He „as wUXin,
to go to great lengths to establish friendship with the West but not
at the cost Of non-ali„.
„e was not ready to give up faith and
friendship of the Soviet Union.
g^iPectancy of a re-orientation of India's ool .V. It was com-
monly believed in this country that the shock of the invasion and what
appeared to most Americans a demonstration to India of the validity of
their view of the world's major problems will bring about a change in
India's policies, especially her non-alignment. The American press
made such categorical statements:
Nehru cannot shun and oppose indefinitely the Westernsystem of collective security without forfeiting itsprotection. A free ride for Nehru on the back ofNeutralism would be grossly unfair to SEATO countries
and others that have staked their treasure in the col-lective security system. The Prime Minister of India
could alter the course of history and give the free-dom of mankind an enduring impetus by acknowledging
that his theory of neutralism has been proved by time
and events to be impractical and dangerous, by re-
nouncing neutralism, by joining the collective
security system of the free world and urging other
neutrals to do likewise before it is too late. 36
The first step considered essential in this direction was the
removal of Menon who had become in American eyes the symbol of all anti-
Western policies of India. The subsequent statements of Nehru, came
as a surprise to many. The best exposition of this view can be found
in a dispatch from New Delhi by Rosenthal. Writing under the title,
"Nehru's Two Battles" he said:
India's policy in a day to day practice was a three-
36philadelphia Inquirer , 6 November 1962. Quoted in N. Palmer,
South Asia and United States Policy
, p. 268.
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Legged stool, ivo legs are gone... the belief
that T i""^
'^^^ the beliefIndia could defend herself without aidfrom the west. Now the Prime Minister te^Jers
sL- . n^^''
leg... the hope that one day theSoviet union will be able to shake off itscommitments to Peking and back India. Thishope has produced some strange, and toWesterners and many Indians, disturbing poli-tical acrobatics on the part of Mr. Nehru.
d;;^ "^^^ ^° ^^^^ differencerawn between the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates It hurts to see a man who announcedthe end of his illusions cling so hard to thedream that Communism itself is of no importance. ^7
However, most of Nehru's "acrobatics" were explained by Rosenthal
and others as the result of his own personal convictions which others
in India did not^share: "Prime Minister's wistful attachment to the
soviet union doe^ not reflect the real temper of the country nor remove
the fact that Peking's attack forever changed the psychology and posture
of India. "-^^
According to others, India's policy of non-alignment was believed
to have been wrecked "militarily if not politically...."
"ultimately if
India is to continue to function as a huge, non-Communist "show case"
in Asia, it will need more foreign aid to compensate for the diversion of
its capital into building a war machine." The real rationale of non-
alignment has been that India could exist without the vast arms expendi-
ture that staggers so many "underdeveloped countries
... that is now a thing
of the past."-^^
37New York Times , 1 November 1962.
^^Ibid.
39Daily News (N. Car.), quoted in New York Times , 2 December 1962.
43
These views we.e based on two assumptions, i.e., the Soviet
union haa
.o.sa^en India and that exposure of India.s ^Xita^ weakness
had caused the non-aligned nations also
.enunciate he., and thus we.e
said to have vanished all hex "pretensions to the leadership of the
third world... The real indication of the collapse of India's non-ali^-
ment, however, was regarded to be the failure of the Soviet Union to
support her cause, it was believed that the basis of „uch of India's
foreign policy was the hope that in a conflict with China, the Soviet
union would support her. This cherished hope was said to have been
destroyed in the crisis of 1962.40
The American press gave extensive coverage to the Soviet Union's
inability to give explicit support to India in the initial stages of the
crisis and what was viewed as the resulting disappointment in New Delhi.
These were meant to be implications of Indians as to where their real
friends were. Both the context and content of India's non-alignment
had changed after 1962.
M.S. Rajan held the view that non-alignment is essentially a
peacetime policy (even though Nehru told the Congress Paliament Party
meeting that non-alignment was as good during war as during peace)
.
During a war, according to him, a nation is necessarily though not always
formally aligned with those who help it morally and materially and like-
wise aligned against the nation with which it is at war. Thus while
India was still unaligned between "blocs," it was aligned against China
40'New York Times
, 30 October 1962.
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and with the United States in her conflict with the former.^^
"Dual alignment" with Washing... ...
^^^^.^^
conflict With China, Indian non-alignment had a pro-Soviet bias and
to a large extent this was because Pakistan was a long-time adversary
Of India and an ally of the United States. Now that China had emerged
as a more formidable enemy, there was a shift in Indian non-alignment
in favour of Washington without moving away from Moscow, who not only
continued to give active support against China, even though initially
the soviet attitude seemed pro-Chinese. The Christian Scien.. Mon.-...
best described this new power alignment graphically: "china more adament
toward MOSCOW and belligerent towards India; Moscow more eager to
hedge towards India; India more amenable towards the West."^^
Shastri era
.
There are realities in the national and international
societies conditioning foreign policies to such an extent that radical
changes in their content and methods becomes virtually impossible. The
Shastri era was therefore distinguished from the Nehru era not so much
by radical innovations in foreign policy as by the further development
of trends whose origin could be traced in many cases to the last years
of Nehru's regime. To some extent continual adherence to the so-called
policy of non-alignment in both eras obscured alterations in the sub-
stance of India's foreign policy. But under the impact of events and
41M.S. Rajan, "Chinese Aggression and the Future of India's Non-
alignment Policy," International Studies
, p. 128.
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"Strained Triangle," Christian Science Monitor
, 13 Nobember 1962.
Werner Levi, "Foreign Policy: The Shastri Era," Eastern World
,
(London: September-October 1966)
, pp. 3-6. .
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oppositions criticism, as well as some questioning even within Congress
circles, doubts had arisen in official minds regarding the quality or
usefulness of the non-alignment policy. Throughout the Shastri era non-
alignment was stripped of its missionary connotations. It was applied
in a more modest geographic context. The government implied that the
improvement and fostering of good bilateral relations with nations in
the region of south and southeast Asia was more important than a great
expenditure of efforts on global and collective relationships. And
within two months of his appointment as Minister of External Affairs,
Swaran Singh visited Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, and other neigh-
bours. Many Indians expressed their conviction that it would be more
important for India to take care of immediate national interests than
of the world's moral welfare. Non-alignment tended to turn into non-
involvement. Foreign policy needs were not allowed to interfere with
internal economic developments, the scope of foreign policy was reduced
further. India was satisfied being No. 2 during the Shastri period.
This presumably meant loss of international status, but made India's
foreign policy more realistic.
Policy changes in the sixties and seventies . Throughout the
sixties and early seventies, the pattern of international relations
changed profoundly. Its most significant aspects were the substantial
lessening of tensions between the two super powers, and a loosening of
ties within the two alliances. The emergence of China as an independent
and undoubtedly major power made it even more difficult for the non-
aligned countries to adjust to the great changes introduced by the
detente and the ensuing local and regional disturbances. China has now
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risen from the ranks of the less developed covintries, and has now in
a sense defected from the group she once belonged to.
The East-West detente brought hesitation and discord into the
camp of non-aligned countries. They realized they were no longer need-
ed as the promoters of the detente; indeed they suffered from its
becoming a reality, and were frequently the background of new clashes.
After the Indo-Pak conflict in 1965, there was once again a
demand for a thorough reapparaisal of the Indian Foreign policy. As
a resTilt of the war all economic and military aid was suspended. Eco-
nomic aid from America was renewed but has been diminishing. Military
aid denied for about eight to nine years, is being replaced by trade.
During the 1971 South Asian crisis, the United States took an obvious
pro-Pakistan position. The Jan Sangh party was more than enthusiastic
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about friendly relations with the United States. However, the other
parties including the congress argued that the United States failed to
understand the delicate relations between India and Pakistan. According
to them if anything has plagued Indo-US relations it has been the
American bais in favour of Pakistan. The Jan Sanghees viewed the
postponement by the U.S. government of signing fresh agreements for
another two years under PL-480 in 1965, as due to political as well
as economic reasons. They believed that Pl-480 ad.d was also being
utilized for political leverage. They thought economic aid was being
utilized to pressurize India into submission on the Kashmir issue.
The Jan Sangh party even blame the PL-480 imports for the subsequent
'^'^Kishore, Jan Sangh and India's Foreign Policy, op.cit.
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neglect of
.,ri=uXtu.e in successive plans,
.s a
.esult P.-480
x^orts, Wheat crops haa
.eco.e un«..ne.ative an.
.a^e.s ha. tu^ea
to cash crops. India could have attained self .„ffc a -sufficiency much earlier
according to them if this was not so. "5
Non-ali^ent in
.
ch.nnin^context.
.on-alignment is a unigue
diplomatic Phenomenon, and has a great power of adaptability, since
the Signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of friendship in 1971, critics
have reason to Relieve that India is no longer non-aligned. The nature
Of the alliance between the two countries, is so vague, that it produced
conflicting interpretations and unnecessary confusion.^ whether non-
alignment survives the treaty depends upon what one means by non-align-
ment.
in the early sixties, the Soviet and American interests began
to converge on the Indian subcontinent. Responding to the China stimuli,
the united States and Russia began to worJc for stability on the subcon-
tinent; instability they felt would work to china • s advantage
. The
united States lost much of its earlier enthusiasm for the Pakistani case
on Kashmir and the Soviet Union began to discourage the strong Indian
belief that she could ignore Pakistan's interest in the Kashmir problem. ^7
The united States pressures too, if any, were towards a bilateral solution.
The stability which was hoped for did not follow, instead China stepped
Ibid.
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"^^^°-Soviet Treaty and Non-alignment," Internationalrta s
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48
into the Shoes of the united states and played the role of big brother
to Pakistan. «hen President Yahya Khan launched his offensive in East
Bengal, the Soviet Union had to choose between India and Pakistan to
balance off peace on the subcontinent. This brought to an end a phase
of soviet diplomacy which was irksome to India, and a great irritant in
indo-soviet relations. This was the phase when the Soviet Union was
trying to win leverage in Pakistan.
•
In signing the treaty the two countries showed a dramatic sense
of opportunity. The treaty says that "if either country is subjected
to an attack, the two countries will immediately enter into consultations
to remove the threat." By Article X India and the Soviet Union under-
took to abstain from "providing any assistance" to any third party that
engages in armed c6nflict with the other party. Soviet assistance to
Pakistan can therefore be treated as having come to an end. They also
agreed not to enter into any obligations with any other country which
is not compatible with the treaty.
The present situation was brought about due to lack of diplomatic
options on India's part. In the fifties India's non-alignment brought
her closer to Russia as a counter-poise to Pakistan's alliance with
America. The situation was further reinforced in the sixties after
the Sino-Indian War when expected American military assistance for de-
fense build-up did not materialize. The Soviet Union willingly agreed
to help build up India's defense structures. More recently the emerging
US-China equation showed a remarkable identity of power objectives in
the Bangladesh crisis. China was rather inactive throughout the crisis.
There was very marginal reaction. India was therefore left with no
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options, but to secure Soviet doHH^=is p litical support and deterrence by
entering into a treaty relationsip with her.
While China^s hostility towards India is an accepted fact,
A^nerica-s indifference had continued to annoy and exasperate Indians.
India's reaction to ;^erican indifference has had en»tional overtones;
this has been reflected in the campaign against the alleged CIA involve-
.^ent in India's internal and external politics. India was particularly
sensitive to M,erican attempts to undermine Indo-Bangladesh friendship.
It was argued that China and the US (focus was ^r. .on the OS) were
acting in concert, both internally and externally, to wea].en India with
a view to depriving her of the new political stature that she had achieved.
The Sino-OS equation was therefore depriving India of alternative poli-
tical options, and seemed to corrode India's internal body politics,
by raising the fear of CIA interference in India's domestic political
activities
.
However, such overt dependence on the Soviet Union does not
square with India's own political aspirations as a potentially great
power. Therefore, following Bangladesh's liberation, India's official
statement tended to play in a low key the theme of Indo-Soviet friend-
ship. She also reiterated her desire to establish normal relations
with China and the United states.
Indira Gandhi has on several occasions stated categorically
that India has not abandoned her policy of non-alignment. The ex-
foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh had repeatedly asserted that the
treaty explicitly recongnizes and appreciates India's policy of non-
alignment; to him therefore non-alignment remains fully intact.
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non-
The Indo-Soviet Treaty was a quick response to changes in the
global environment. The treaty, while exposing the irrelevance of
alignment 33 policy, has sharply brought out its relevance as a strategy,
in fact, that is what it has always been-a strategy, or in other words,
a rationale, for a policy rather than a policy in itself. The strategy
of non-alignment emphasized the independence of policy right from the
beginning. Politically this was the only choice open to countries which
had been under colonial domination. However many non-aligned countries
failed to maintain their independence because they were slow to develop
themselves. For economic development they had to depend on aid from
the developed world, and as such they increasingly came under the in-
fluence of those powerful countries from whom they wanted to keep aloof.
Non-alignment as strategy is not too relevant for a small country, for
its security always remains a function of the international system.
When the international system develops hegemonial conflicts and im-
balances, the security of small countries is threatened.
Asia does not exist as a homogeneous whole. Emotionally and
ethnically Asia is diverse. China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam form one
group. Malaysia, the' Phillipines, Singapore, and Indonesia fall into
another. Laos, Cambodia and Thailand form part of yet another group.
India could form the nucleus of another group. If India, Pakistan
.
. ^.
'
Afghcinistan
,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon could form a unit
and work together, there is a chance that the region may have political
stability and accelerated economic development. Even in this U.S.
economic aid would be necessary.
At no time since 1955, Nehru's policy of non-alignment excluded
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India
..o. ..vin, specUl poUUcaX relations with one the othe.
Powe. What wa. speci.icaXi, e.i..ea «as he. havin, ^peci.i. ^uta^
respect of the confXiot in West Asia (lse7, or in vietna.. o„ the
fo^e. xndia supported the .ra. countries in the United Nations on
the ground that Israel had taken the initial step in opening ar^ed
conflict. With respect to Vietnam, India always thought that the US
.ust unconditionally halt the boding in North Vietnam, it was ™ade
quite Clear in Ooa (1961,, in the China War ,1962,, the Indo Pa. War
(1965), and in the Bangladesh Crisi«? nci7iN ^y a n c xsis (1971), that non-alignment had
little to do with neutrality.
While global strategies and regional perceptions are important
moulders of the foreign policy of every country, in the United States
the President's personal views and predilections also can be intensely
Significant. Kennedy was perhaps the only American President who wanted
to divorce aid from politics. He held the view that aid flows should
be independent of foreign policy considerations. The State Department
had viewed aid as an instrument or foreign policy. Johnson used aid to
pressure countries for support on Vietnam and so did Nixon. After the
Kennedy era, aid took more the form of loans than grants.
Change and continuity in America: foreign pnUny Like other
countries, America has a particular way of perceiving the world and a
corresponding "operational code," which constitutes its "national style. "^^
47
T M ^^^^^^^^^^
analysis of the American style may be found in HansJ. Morgenthau xn Defense of the National Interest . (New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1951); Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
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-e.ica„ fo.ei^ poXi=,
,3 .asea on ..e
.ssu^.,on that the „a„„« i„
whicH poXi=.-:^..3 see t.e wo.X. an. aeane
..ei. ai. ,3 aec.aed within
the framework of a nation's political culture. ;^erican policy, li,,
Indian policy, derives fro. a set of attitudes towards international
politics, washington-s policy has been influenced by the values, beliefs,
and historical experience of American democracy.
For almost a century, the US isolated itself from the quarrels
Of the great European powers
, and devoted itself to domestic tasks. Self-
quarantine was the best way to prevent the nation from being soiled and
tainted by Europe's undemocratic domestic institutions and foreign policy
behaviour. Given such a profound inward orientation, the United states
turned its attention to the outside world only when it felt provoked.
Long-range involvement, commitments, and foreign policy planning there-
fore tended to be difficult.
The American attitude was further characterized by a high degree
of moralism and missonary zeal stemming from the nation's long consider-
ation of itself as a unique and morally superior society. The United
States was the world's first democracy committed to the improvement of
the life of the common man. However inspite of her zeal, pragmatism has
dominated American policy, it has been part of the nation's experience
that when problems arose, they were to be solved by whatever means were
at hand.
U.S. identification of Russia as an enemy was partly the result of
Russian actions in Europe and elsewhere. U.S. attitudes affected U.S.
Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Kennan,
American Diplomacy 1900-1950 ; and Spanier, American Foreign Policy .
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behaviour patterns only after the n^i-^^r, v, ^ .y rr ation had become so engaged in the
war against communism. Once that had occnr-r-«H u"la;: n cur ed, however, American moral-
ism was transformed into mim-;^n+- =^4.- ^litant anti-Communism. American policy, for
instance, put off any political settlement with Russia until after Com-
munism had "mellowed.-.that it changed its character, since Co^unism
was the enemy, then America has to oppose it everywhere-at least where
counterbalancing American power could presumably he effectively applied-
regardless Of Whether the area to be defended was of p.i^ary or secondary
interest to U.S. security. Almost equally indiscriminately, the United
States supported any anti-Conununist regime, regardless of whether it
was democratic~a Franco, a Chiang Kai-sheic, a Diem or Thieu, to name
but a few among many. Above all, the issue of foreign policy tended to
be posed in terms of a universal struggle between democracy and totali-
tarianism, freedom and slavery. Thus at the beginning of Cold War,
president Truman stated the issue in Greece as follows: "Totalitarian
regimes imposed on free people, by direct or indirect agression, under-
mine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of
the united States.
.. "-although Greece, for all its political and strategic
significance, could hardly be classified as a democracy. Presidents
after Truman followed his precedent, as American commitments became
virtually global.
In the wake of Nationalist China's collapse, the Truman Admini-
stration was attacked for being "soft on Communism." The subsequent
conduct of the Korean war provides a good example of the influence of
anti-Communism upon foreign policy. Truman could not sign an armistice
that accepted the pre-war partition of Korea, for this would allegedly
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represent that North Korea was lost to communism a peace without victory
and would mean risking a Democratic defeat in the coming 1952 Presiden-
tial Election. Truman was trapped. He could not extend the war without
risking greater escalation, casualties and costs, nor could he end the
war. The continuing and frustrating battlefield stalemate was a major
factor in the Republican victory in 1952. Only President Eisenhower,
who as a war hero could hardly be accused of being an appeaser, could
sign a peace accepting the division of Korea.
Similarly, when in 1960 it became popular "to stand up to
Castro," presidential candidate Kennedy dr^atized his anti-Comm\inism
with vigorous attacks on Castro and suggestions that the Cuban "freedom
fighters be allowed to invade Cuba." When he came into office, he found
that the Eisenhower Administration had been planning what he had advo-
cated. Despite his own later uneasy feelings about the CIA-planned and
sponsored invasion, he felt he could not call it off. So with some
changes, he permitted the operation to proceed despite misgivings that
turned out to be correct. It was a hvimiliating personal and national
experience for the Administration and, ironically, left Kennedy vulner-
able to the accusation that he was unwilling to stand up to the Communists
because he would not use American forces to eliminate Castro. Thus,
as the situation in Vietnam proceeded to worsen later in 1961, it is
not surprising that the President would introduce American military
"advisors," particularly when the Bay of pigs had been quickly followed
by inaction at the time of the erection of the Berlin Wall, and, in
Laos, by the agreement to form a coalition government.
An additional result of the fear of Communism was the patho-
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logical domestic proportions it reached. "Reds" were seen not only in
government but in the universities, labor unions, churches-everywhere.
Communism was portrayed as an all-powerful demonic force seeking to
subvert and destroy the American way of life.
In view of these happenings, it is not surprising that critics
of America's most agonizing war, the Vietnam War, see the American inter-
vention in terms of this continued anti-Communism, even though the bi-
polarity of the Cold War days has passed. ^^^^ policy-makers char-
acteristically regarded the Vietnam war as essentially a "military" war
in which superior firepower and helicopter mobility would enable America
to destroy enemy forces. The political aspects of the war, above all
the basic land reforms needed to capttire the support of the peasantry,
were by and large ignored, and therefore no South Vietnamese
. GoYemment
could win popular support. Indiscriminate use of air power and artillery
fire, which destroyed many southern hamlets, did little to help create
the peasant support needed to win a counter revolutionary war. Instead
of examining the political reasons indigenous to South Vietnam, the
policy-makers told themselves that the reason it could not be won was
primarily military. Thus the optimistic faith that, with America's i
great power and missionary zeal, it could improve the world was replaced
by a mood of disillusionment in the wake of the Vietnam War.
The concept of a bipolar world and the iron curtain so sedulous-
ly fostered by Washington in the 1950 's and 1960 's has been replaced
by that of a multi-polar power structure and co-existence. The United
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For some recent criticisms of American "globalism," see Fullbright,
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states has had to give up its t„o-decade old efforts to contain the
soviet union and China behind a .ilitazy shield and co:^ to ter^ with
them. The pattern of multi-polarity that Washington itself has en-
couraged to emerge has deprived it of some of its earlier ability to
manipulate world politics all by itself, it now requires the concur-
rence of MOSCOW before it can act effectively, as was demonstrated in
the crisis in west Asia in October, 1973. In south Asia the United
States found itself unable to act effectively in the war between India
,
and Pakistan, in 1971, except within the larger pattern of the detente
with the Soviet Union.
The United States wanted to create its own balance of power
and tried to make the small nations of Asia believe that without U.S.
support, they would become pawns in the power game of the Soviet Union
and China. It believed that -the American presence alone provided" the
cementing common link in this fragmented region/^ and warned that if
pulled out of Asia, disunity, weakness, and insecurity would follow.
The criticisms frequently leveled against the contemporary
role of the United States in the international state system seem to
focus on the charge that the nation remains unsocialized by that
system—that is, it has not yet internalized the state system's norms
of behaviour. The United States still has not learned that it not
ominpotent; nor has it given up its moralizing and crusading habits.
(new York: Vintage Books, 1967).
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Meaning the U.N. Charter.
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It si^l,
.oes Have the
.esou.ces
to support exten-
sive ,o.ei^
.o^it^ents ana
.eet p.essin, ao^.tic neea.. vUtna.
-
seen as a tragic product of an inaiscri.inate anti-Co^unis. that
has led the nation to over-extend itself i = ,«el
.
It IS also seen as a sober-
in, experience that will result in the reduction of ^erican co^it^nts,
a concentration on urgent ao:„estic problem., and. generally, a ™ore
restrained international behaviour. In brief, the United states will
finally be socialized," shedaing eootional preaispositions and patterns
Of behaviour derived froa its long abstention from- the state system.
ae united States, as we suggestea earlier, is essentially
an inwara-orientea society that concentrates on domestic affairs and
welfare issues and considers foreign policy burdensome and distracting.
Therefore in order to arouse the public to support external ventures,
the struggle for power and security endemic in the state system haa to
be aisguisea as a struggle for the realization of the highest values.
Because, from the beginning of its existence, the Unitea states has
felt itself to be a post-European society-a New Worla standing as a
shining example of democracy, free.dom, ana social justice for the Old
f^^"^^**' ^'^°qance of Pow^-, steel. Pax Americana: Eugene JMcCarthy, ^e^imit^^f_Power. (New York: Holt, Rinehart a^d Winston,'
H:p,:iL^res^":6:;.'"='"' <Balti:»re: The .ohn^
)^.=,f°',^°"f"'-'^* """^ power to have over-extendedItself. The British acted that way for many years, therench wasted
many years in Vietnam and Aleria when they could not afford it. Portugal,Netherlands and Spain, also had their colonies in Asia and monarchies
at home, the Dnited tates was aifferent in the sense it was a aemocraoy,
and always gave the image of being a great champion of freedom.
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«or.a-..,.e„..
^„
^^^^^^^^^^^
••Powe. pontics"
.is^uisin, it as
..iaeoXo,i.al politics -3
The «ai test of ^.iea's international
.ole has con,e afte.
Vietnam. »,.n po„e. politics was s.nony:.us with ideological politics
-
was easy to a leade. ana o.^ani.e various coalitions whose
.asic
task was to push bac. when pushed. One of the features of the post-
Vietna. ^od, incorporating the demand of "no „«=re Vietnam," i^ the
Nixon, or Gua» Ooctrine. The United States,
.ixon declared, would
regain a Pacific Power safeguarding Asia's peace. It would do so by
fulfilling its existing con^itMents, but these would not be interpreted
in a :»anner justifying the use of force to suppress don^stic rebellion.
The best defense against insurgency was to in^leaent preventive politi-
cal and econo^c reform; nevertheless, if internal revolts occurred,
the united States would provide ^terial and technical assistance and
training for governments it dee,«d worthy of help. Asian nations would
be helped econo,„ically to i^dernize the^nselves (although no large con-
tributions were promised) and encouraged toward greater regional col-
lective security arrangements. In short, the principal responsiblity
for Asian development and security would rest with the Asians themselves.
But this more modest role, or "lower profile" as it came to be called,
was not limited to Asia. It applied also to Latin America-where policy
53
J.H. Hulzinga, "America's Lost Innocence," The New York Times
^SSSiSe, 26 January 1969, perceptively analyzes the problems confront-ting the United States once it can no longer disguise "power politics."
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Shifted away fro. the Alliance for Progress ux.Oer African leadership
to a "partnership" role, which emphasized help primarily through giving
the southern part of the henusphere tariff preferences (if Congress
.greed)-had to Western Europe-where n»re military self-reliance was
stressed. The 1970s would then undoubtedly bring a significant reduction
Of American troop strength.
By the time Nixon came to power, a new initiative in Asia had
become imperative, il^ough Nixon had earlier indulged in witchhunting
communists, he recognized the realities of the U.S. weakness in Asia.
For the sake of saving face, for disengaging from the disastrous war
with north Vietnam, and for creating a counterweight to the Soviet Union,
he required the friendship of China. The main thrust of the U.S. policy
in Asia in the 1970s had been to seek accomodation with China, balance
the power of the Soviet Union and Japan, and maintain a dominant role
for the United States. Washington believes that in Asia in the decade
of 70s, there would be a quadrilateral balance hinged on the United
States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.
Another symptom of the new mood of playing a more limited
foreign policy role was the greater attention to be given to the
nation's domestic problems. Symbolic of this conflict was the new
found unwillingness of the Senate to let only programs labelled
"defense" pass unchallenged or to spend billions of dollars on weapons
when many Senators felt the money could be better spent curing America's
ills.
A change in American behaviour is thus the remedy. If America
abandons its cinti-Communism, and Rxissia could abandon its anti-capitalism
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there Will be no need for Cold Wars, interventions, large military
budgets. Of What utility would this prescription
.e if, i,
China Should attaok India, penetrating Indian territory deeply, of
What use is a reminder of ^^erica's limited power if, in the continuing
Arab-Israeli military conflict, the Soviets come increasingly to the
help Of the Arabs-perhaps helping them someday to defeat the Israelis
and Of course, even if America and Russia were not ideologically moti-
vated, they would just by reason of being great powers, militarily,
compete with each other, and have big defense budgets.
If the united states now contracts its overseas position,
whetherin the Far East or Middle East or even in Europe, and leaves
one or more power vacuums, the results for the continued stability of
the international system are, at the very least debatable. Can it thus
continue to play a major role in stabilizing the state system after
Vietnam?-that is the question. As a power socialized by the state
system, the United States seems to remain haunted by its past, in this
sense, America and Russia face identical problems.
Nixon initiated a new dialogue with Peking in 1972. At one
time it was Washington's deep concern for Pakistan that had kept India
low in U.S. priorities, and now it was Washington's desire to edge
towards China that made India a secondary concern. Nixon and Chou En-
lai had agreed to work for a detente in Asia. Nixon even claimed that
the week he was in Peking "was the week that changed the world. "54
The China-U.S. accord did not solve Asia's problems. Of course it
54The Times of India
, January 28, 1973.
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a,o„v Of the Viet„a.ese peop.e.The U.S.
.ialo^e with china aX.o helped
not ena the aggressive U.S. presence in Asia, it was after the ae-
tente came into beinq that thf» n cg e U.S. navy expanded its operations in
the Indian Ocean.
Conclusion
India's policy of non-alignment did have its advantages, even
though it was never intended to compensate for a military policy, m
military terms it brought the distinct advantage of leaving open the
possiblity of assistance from both the great powers. Besides non-align-
ment provided the re-inforcement by the great powers of Indian economic
and political objectives. During the past several years India has been
reappraising its international role. While the goals of non-alignment
and world stature continue to dominate the rhetoric and many of the
assumptions behind Indian thinking, a new awareness of India's role as
a potential trading partner and middle power in Southern Asia is emerging.
.
United States rapproachement with the USSR and China has led to
great policy changes within the United States. The fact that Indo-
American relations have been characterized by sharp fluctuations rather
than consistent hostility or cooperation suggests that the two country's
policies towards each other have been primarily influenced by other
concerns, which their governments regarded as more important. Each has
had different perceptions of the key issues in world affairs. A newly
independent India placed a high priority on anti-colonialism, whereas
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.p... o. co^un...
^^^^
^^^^
was however in the (aAr-i-;«^earlier years looking for areas of^ -uui agreement with
Moscow and Peking.
^
inaia also ha. its o™ national interests to pursue on sue.
issues as Kas.^.,
^^^^^^^^^^^
^ ^^^^
-rai rhetoric. The Unitea States viewed Znaian forei^ poii., as
pretentious and hypocritical.
conflicting approaches to the Midaie East and Southeast Asia
.ight have been surmounted if the United states had not extended its
alliance polic. to the subcontinent. Indians were furious with Eisenhower
and Dulles for providing :„ilitary aid to Pakistan. The „«i„tenance of
the alliance over the years despite Pakistan's growing co-operation
with Peking, culminating in the American action during the 1971 crisis,
have led a growing number of Indians to believe that the primary aim
'
Of the united States to prevent India's emergence as a major power,
aey grant that the United States does not want to see India collapse,
least the Soviet Union of China take advantage of the ensuing power
vacuum. U.S. policy towards India is that she must be protected, but
not allowed to develop the strength to protect itself. American un-
willingness to provide direct help for the heavy industrial facilities
designed to promote India's economic dependence, is cited as evidence,
inaia's suspicion of U.S. policies towaras Pakistan, China ana the Soviet
union on the one hand, ana the American dislike of India's closeness to
soviet Union (and ironically her earlier closeness to China) on the
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other hand have contributed the .est towards dividing the two countries.
Americans consider these arguments as based on an incredibly
inflated view of India's importance. Indo-A.erican clashes during the
struggle over Bangladesh are the :nost obvious, but there are others
as well. For example, in the mid-1960s, Mrs. Gandhi accepted the ar-
gument Of the world Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United
States that devaluation of the rupee, in coxnbination with economic
liberalization and increased American aid, would pull India out of its
economic difficulties. At some political risks, Mrs. Gandhi devalued
the rupee, only to be told by an America which bogged down in Vietnam
and less interested in economic development that it could not provide
the aid it had led India to expect.
Such disappointments, together with the American suspension
of military aid after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, led many Indians to
conclude that their country should look to a more reliable Soviet
Union for support. Moscow's need for a counterweight to China and its
relative disinterest
-in Pakistan make it a dependable ally, and an
important trade partner. The Nixon and Ford Administrations believe
that a working relationship with Peking is much more important than
any American interest in the subcontinent. Some officials think
that this requires the United States to keep in step with Chinese
hostility towards India by paralled support of Pakistan.
Only in the area of economic development has there been sustained
Indo-American co-operation. The outlook of the two countries on political
issues happens to be different. Nearly two-thirds of the aid has come
directly from the United States, whch also provided about one-third of
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as .een
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difficult,
.u. a„ ^..3y ^.,^.3,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
the countries a.e
.„.i.
an. p^cK sheex. Unite, states Relieves in sta.iXit„
^xitax,
strength, and leadership. Unlike United States InHH, ko , dia has a measure of
tolerance of co^nunis. because the world =o».unist powers have been
allies in her anti-colonialis., and have consistently supported her
Stand on many issues like Kashmir.
The ideological pre-o=cupations of the cold war and Washington's
crusade to .ake the ^erican way of life a universal «,del are things
Of the past. But the trans-ideological attitude the United States has
adopted as an expedient has not ^de the global kaleidoscope less con-
fusing, nor has it ,«de natters easier for developing countries like
India to work out their o«, solutions. India does not question the
wisdom of the detente, but she has her doubts about its usefulness to
India. "We are not sure," said Indira Gandhi, "if these flexible re-
lationships necessarily point to a more stable world order. Co-existence
by itself does not preclude policies, separately or in concert, which
are detrimental to the freedom and interests of third countries . "^^
The paradox of the relationship not in terms of real politik,
however is India's dependence on the United states even when she is in
total dishanoony with U.S. policy on Pakistan, China and the Soviet
Foreign Affairs. October 1973, New York.
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are no absolute frienaships
,
no indissoluble entities. There are
only evolvin, adjustments.
..e conte^orar. dile^ is that there are
no relationships based purely on ideologies, and there is a convergence
Of national interests on all international issues. This help the
two countries to evolve a :.anin,ful relationship, and balance ™tual
conflicts
.
CHAPTER II
U.S. POLICY ON THE SUBCONTINENT
After world war II, maia had become through a co:n.i„atio„ of
circ^stanoes and ,eo,raph„ a strategic area for the suooess of united
States post war containment policy In Asia, of course, India as a region
was not always given due importance by the ;^erica„ policy
.a.ers. Por
the united states then, India alone had the potential of helng developed
into an effective countercheclc to an expanding Connnunlst "empire", since
She was the largest democracy in Asia. Besides, America had a national
interest in building a stable and economically developed democracy. She
also had the material capacity to meet India's need for economic and tech-
nical assistance
- - vital for her economic development. Again, the secu-
rity of the subcontinent was almost unanimously considered Indivisible in
the united States. It was believed that only in cooperation can India
and Pakistan present an impregnable defense to China. Hence a reconcilia-
tion between these two countries became a primary objective of American
policy after 1962. Such a reconciliation was generally equated in the
United States with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Truman Administration
In 1945 when the World War II was over, the United States was the
dominant super power, having for the first half of this period a monopoly
of nuclear weapons.
In the first half of the post war decade, India was much too in-
volved in domestic tasks to pay much attention to world affairs. It was
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suspicious Of the united states as it was at ther same time favourably in-clmed towards a- t*.It. It was suspicious, because it correct-
1
„ ^
rectly percieved theUnxted States even at this earlvy stage as the successor to the British
-Perial policy of divide and rule in South Asia.
During the Roosevelt-Truman period the inHS. •P a, I dian image in the U.S
was probably the most favourable. India wa. «s seen as the leader of the
.oxe,
.ace. up
..3.0^ 3.^,,,^
presse.
.ost ^e.i.ans.
.ea.ers o. statu., o.
.a„a.a.Xa.
..^ ana
Sa^aa. Patel cont.i.utea sufastantiaXl, to the composition national
-,e. ;uthou,h the ^e.i=a„s «antea Xnaia.s
..ienaship ana „e.e anxious
to have the nation on their siae, thei.
.eaXpoliti. interests were aXso
now beco:„ing prominent, with Korea stanain, out as a seotor of oonfXict-
ing political judgement.
It was aifficuxt for India to shed off its distrust of the West.
This feeXin, was voiced Mehru in an address at CoXumbia anitersity in
October X947 aurin, his visit to the States. "The Vest has too .often des-
pised the Asian and the African and stiXX, in .any pXaces, aenies the.
not only equality of rights but even co^on hu^nanity ana UnaXiness. A
new era had dawned and countries of Asia and Africa did not intend to be
bypassed or to have their decisions made by Western powers. "1 However,
when China became Commuinist and seemed to pose a threat to the new
democracies of Asia, it seemed important that U.s.-India relations shouXd
be cordial.
New YorTltei: p?T:? SHHth^sii^ndU^eJ^ni^^
68
Un.o.tuna.eX„ ci.eu....„«.
^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^^
-.an to cXose to s...„a,a.,
..e cap.ta..
..e MaKara.aH, on Oo.o.e.
^e, X947.
.e,uestea that He al.owea to aooeae to the Xnaian Union
Neh^
.e...ea to accept the accession as ion, as the Musii. ^ationai Con-
ference, the iar,est poiiticai organization of Kashmir, woui. not asK for
accession,
.ora „o.nt.atten insisted that this was not re^i.ea the
independence Act of the British Parliament. The National Conference
having agreed to accession, Kahsmir's accession to India was accepted and
became legal and final.
The U.S. supported Palcistan, even though it was the Government
Of India, Which on January 1, 1948 brought the ^tter before the Security
council. The U.S. position was resented in India. It is difficult to say
as to What extent the U.S. position was due to India's proclaimed neutral-
ity.
India's neutrality which was spelled out by Prime Minister Nehru
in his speech to the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, was also
the cause of enstrangement
= "We have proclaimed during the past year that
we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to
do with neutrality or passibiity or anything else ... We have sought to
avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other. The
natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks on us with
favour. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be made to
vote this way or that way."^ This policy was not likely to win friends in
India s Foreign Policy, Jawaharlal Nehru. Selected Speeches September ,
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the U.S. But public opinion in the U.S was hiahl
neutral.> • " ^ incensed by Indianity, its refusal to take sides^ ij-ae , and its refn^ai 4-^
^ tus l to be 'counted as
-ena
, .....
_ ^^^^^^POUC. ana
.a.an
^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^m the Rules Committp** "i-u^ 1 • ,-x e., the legislative graveyard" of ™any Bills. The
-ult „as that the gift heca.e a loan,
.he Onitea states agreement to
-
.i.h inaig^ation in maia. In 1.3 heavy congressional outs .re
.ae
the proposea aia to Xnaia,
.ro„ ,iis ^luon to
.43.53 million, as a
the aaherence of PaKista:,, Thailana, a.a the PKillippines to SKATO pre-
sumably haa resultea in large increases in aia to those countries in 1555 ^
in 195e, again, aia to maia „as reducea fro. 585 million to ,65.88 million
because of her faille to ta.e a strong anti-Soviet stana on Hungary, while
axa to Bur^a ana Indonesia was increasea in 1957. probably of their anti-
Hussian sentiments in the U.N. aebate of Hungary. ^ some M,erican scholars
have tenaea to dispute, the contention that the Onited States was applying
a policy Of containment as much to India as to the Soviet Union ana China,
they have maintainea that military aia to Pakistan was merely part of a
global policy aaaressea to the Soviet Union, without any reference to maia.
1951, ^
^'^g^P^P^^tment of state Bull Pt in
, Vol. XXV, No. 627,' July 22,
Asia rfr_^f!!'r theory and Practice in Southern, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 140-145. '
^Ibid., pp. 214-216 and pp. 218-219.
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However, the then Vice-President m-
'
''"^^ "^^^-^ When he urged mili-tary a.d to Pakistan 'as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism ofJawaharlal Nehru's India'. The rise n€Aiie of another cen+-r-^» r.^xier entre of power in Asia,
no. under
.erican control checked
_raii.in, its po„er through
ann.n, Pakistan with abundant sophisticated weaponry.
-other point on which early differences developed concerned Com-
on October 1. i,.,
^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^
Then there were policy differences on Korea m^s. >, •J^ore . India having supported a
security Council Resolution of .une
.5, 1S50 refused to become a full
hedged participant in the u... Co™„and. when the ^erican co:.and crossed
the 38th paralled in Korea, despite Indian warning that this would bring
the Coimnunist Chinese into the war =„n ^, anti-Smerican feelings in India became
strong. Indians were critical n,. n oof the D.S., since they thought its China
policy wrong, its Kashmir policy hostile, and its economic assistance neg-
ligible. Indians were of course more concerned about Kahsmir and assist-
ance for economic development. The United states Administration too
realised the importance of India, to the free world and was not completely
indifferent to its needs.
When India was faced with a food shortage. President Truman
promptly responded to Nehru's requests for economic assistance and ship-
ments Of food, one million tons of surplus wheat was sanctioned to be sent
to India as a gift, and another million tons were to be sold.
Relations between the two countries however began to improve be-
cause of the special efforts of Chester Bowles, then American Ambassador
to India.
^
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The Eisenhower hdmini ^i-^.^^^^
(1952-60)" '
During the Presidential elections in 1952. the Republicans had
denounced the Truman,
.cheson containment progra. as too
..ild and ne,a-
liberate the people there. The Eisenhower administration had no desires,
however, to have another global conflict on hand. So it modified that
policy and tried to give it positive content through Military alliances.
The execution of the policy was entrusted to John Poster Dulles. This
meant that the system of defence pacts was to be extended. Soon after
taking office Dulles developed his doctrine of massive retaliation'.
He declared that "the protection of the free world should be primarily
based on America's great capacity to retaliate
. . . instantly, by means
and at places of our own choosing." This was a policy of 'brinkmanship'.
The liberal view about India continued to prevail by and large until the
second period opened with the establishment of Eisenhower's Republican
regime. Relations with India began to be seen in Washington as a part of
American's cold war strategy, and a hardening of the official attitude
was unambiguously demonstrated with the signing of the military pact with
Pakistan in 1954. Dulles did not imporve matters by making public pro-
nouncements of contempt for non-alignment. This was a testing time for
Indo-American links.
e
Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report
, New York, Harpers, 1954, on
380-399. '
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India, however, refused t-r, ^
alllanc
'° 'he ;^erica„ Militaryn. .e
..3...
^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
sxf.ea the p.e.3u„s o. coZ. „a. i„
.....
-c. t.at aist...ea
..e
.e,.o„a.
.....ee po„e. ana Xna.a. o«n posi-
tion via-a-vis Pakistan. Xn the Sp.in, o, »S4. the U.S. Oo.e^nent
announcea its aecision to ente. into a .utua. sec^it, a„a„,e™ent wit.
Pakistan ana extena to it .iiita.. aia.
.Ms was natu.aii, in p.„uance
Of
.oXste.in, the ..s. wo.iawiae ae.enoe syste. against China ana K.ssia
Th.s aecision was ta.en against the hacK^rouna o. Known Xnaian opposition.
Robert Trumbell reportea from New Delhi:
"''^ "^"^ °* affairs has so exer-
that ifl;; r^V''' ''''^^ free-there is no Z^tI the Karachi arms deal goes through, the U S
ti.i
have forfeited its position in Indi!, whatever'hat may be, and whatever that may be worth.
^
There was nothing more detrimental to lndo-0.s. relations at the
time than this decision of the United States to give military aia to Paki-
stan. Nehru's views were elaboratea in the maian press and on Indian
Platforms to the extent that the United States came to be regardea as the
main reason of maia's insecurity against Pakistan. The U.S. aaministra-
tion took cognizance of Indian fears to the extent of giving an assurance
that the anns aid would not be usea aginast maia ana that if Pakistan
did so the U.S. would rush to assist maia. An argument which did not
convince India.
7
New York Times
. January 10, 1954.
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cxose „op..Uo„ 3o..
^^^^^
coop..aUon between x„ai. an.
..^sia a.te.
.He e.ono.,.
xcax ana aipXonaUc
.ieMs. Xndia soon
..oa:„e a showcase of Soviet eco-
nomic assistance in Asia t>,^^«x . There were ever increasing educational and cul-
tural exchanges. Along with Russia Xn^^.y T:n K x , I dia spearheaded the struggle in
the anitea
.aUons to seat oo^un.st China,
.he Russian proposals
.o.
Powe..uX. i„aust.iaXi.ea ana scienti.ioail, aavancea nation havin, Benevo-
lent ai^s. The soviet leaders publicly enao.sea maia's position on Kash-
".ir ana Goa. m spite of all her efforts, maia coula not keep these
isssues out Of coia war politics, who. she haa to barter this Russian sup-
port ana vetoes in the Security Council for silence on Hungary.
John Poster Dulles sharply reacted to these sentiments of the
soviet leaaers, and in a meeting with De Cunha, the Foreign Minister of
Portugal, assertea that "Goa, Daman and Diu were Portugese." This angered
and infuriated public opinion in India and brought on Dulles' head a storm
Of protest and denunciation. It was referred to in some Asian countries as
"one of the greatest diplomatic blunders in history".
Theascendancy of leftist views in India's policy was also visible
8
See M.S. Rajan, 'India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other'sForeign Policy and Relations', International Studies vm m, „o 4April 1962, pp. 349-394. ' ' '
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in her disposition
.towards Chin;, t , •^ ^nma. in April I954 Tn^-;,
^ •
-l-ridxa signed a treatvOf fr.endship with Pe.i„,.
,3 a „suit of the treatv I .
ext.a-te„itoriaX rights in n.et and
"''^ "
* ""^ acquxesced in the extinction ofTxbetan autono.,. it was also in this treaty for the first f
-trine of
...^
India's enth.sias. over P,,,h^
^^^^^^^
events in H.,ar.. Moreover, the conoept of a
,eo,raphioai area of
_e
-e. on these principles of international oon.ot was s.oessf.llv
.hwartea
-erioan poliov. Hence India he,an to concentrate on the consolidation
Of a non-ali,„ea
.loc.
.ehr. was able to influence leaders li.e Cesser,
T.to, Sukarno and »cru.ah towards this concept,
.his new effort hv India
hardly more pleasing to Washington.
There existed a widespread misconception about the policy of non-
of applying a double standard to the two blocs. However for India, non-
alignment did not mean that the country must assume a position of equidis-
tance between the diplomatic positions of the two blocs, nor did it demand
a middle of the road diplomatic course between cold war contestants.
The U.S. position was that mere economic assistance is not enough.
The area must become militarily strong and must forestall subversion.
Charges of imperialism annoyed Americans. They feel that they have hardly
a colonial record such as the^Western Powers; that their entire tradition
has been anti-colonial and liberal. They had supported the Indian Inde-
pendnece Movement. Their motives, therefore, should not be questioned.
They have had no ambition to build an Empire. Their only endeavour is to
check the growth of communism in South and Southeast Asia. To make this
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possible, they seek allies everywhere it .
,H . ^° ^he Americanstherefore, that those who are not with f-h. t em against the Communists, are
against them and with the Communists.
THe „o.. eve.
.„,..„.3.
.......^^
^^^^^
.^n^n, . .
......
_
^^^^
proposition, but a stahi« ^r,^ ^ble and democratic India was the only next best thin,
-wards the end o. Eisenhower administration there were si,ns o.
relations. One
.actor which contributed to this was the retire-
ment o. oulles in 1., .ro. the scene. «ter hi., the inn.ence o. Senator
-l..i,ht. Chairman o. the Senate
.orei^n delations Co^ittee. who was a
stron, critic o. Oulles, increased considerably, and contributed towards
the betterment of Indo-D.s. relations.
India's new-found warmth for the D s at hhi= k"1= U.S. t s time was largely
the outcome of Chinese activities on her northern borders, and the sup-
pression Of Tibetan autonomy in 1959. m the end of 1959, President
Eisenhower visited India and the visit mar.ed the apex in Indo-American
relations during the period of his administration. In his mutual security
n.essage to the Congress in February 1960, after his return from India, the
President informed the House that of all developing countries, India held
singular promise and should get the major share of development loans.
In the post-Dulles period the United States Asian policy tended
to become more and more India-oriented. A greater emphasis was laid upon
the need to help build a stable and democratic India as the most effective
counterpoise to the growing power of China instead of the erstwhile system
of military alliances.
T.is
.o.i.icat.on o. „„Ue. state.s poUc, was caused
..e
^-^^^^^^^^
^^^^
^^^^^
nical advance in the fi i «^Ued Of nuclear weapons during the past decade had
resulted in a balance of i-<^Tyr.^ ,O terror, ^ak.ng nuclear war an untenable policy
.or .oth the
.nited states and the Soviet Union. Conse^.„,,,,
S.S shifted to economic and diplomatic
.eans fro. ^litary m the struggle
for allegiance of the uncommitted Afro-Asian nations.
The Kennedv-Jnhnc,^,, Era(1960-63, l.h^-M or'john.on
-.-Tnistr.t^nn,
Kennedys election to the Presidential post in 1960 was warily
welcomed in India. Hope of a hright new era of cordiality emerged with
the election of Kennedy as President. Even during his hrief two-year tern
Of office, Indo-American relationship had begun to ta.e a more cheerful
Shape. But the U.S. had unfortunately begun to be deeply involved in Viet-
nam, and Washington and New Delhi were speaking audibly with discordant
notes. There was, however still no open rupture, and Nehru and Kennedy re-
mained on warm friendly terms at the personal level. His first appoint-
ments were warily received. Chester Bowles became Under Secretary of state
and Prof. j.k. Galbraith, was appointed Ambassador to India. Events in
1961, however, tarnished the Kennedy image somewhat when the U.S. inter-
vened in Cuba. But, in other ways Indo-U.S. relations continued to improve
Kennedy was close to India and wanted to work for .world peace and coopera-
tion with Nehru.
India cooperated with the U.S. in Congo, Laos, and the U.N. The
Indian policy of neutrality seemed to be better appreciated, at least
awis-
T.e .OS.
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.,.,.3e e.ee. o.
.e.can poXie. o. a..., p^,.Stan
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........
created in India about American aid to Pakistan . .
, ,
,
and the consequent tension
xn Indo-U.S. relations, since India's attitude-^a was considered to be
major factor in the success of any American noi ^y p licy m the region, thedom of gaining Pakistan's friendship at the cost of .y : cn forsaking Indian good-
will began to be questioned.
At the same time it was also apparent thai- a™. •FPcire r at American military aid
to Pakistan was having adverse effp^+-= on r ^ •ects mdian economic planning and de-
velopment insofar as it necessitated India to divert her resources to mili-
tary purposes in order to maintain the military balance in the subconti-
nent. Chester Bowles also held American aid to Pakistan responsible for
intensifying differences between India and Pakistan. m view of the
adverse results of military aid to Pakistan, Selig Harrison suggested a
reorientation of American policy in South Asia in favour of an indirect
form of defense support implicit in economic aid to India rather than
direct military aid.
It was also felt by many that the United States would be better
Off as a practical matter to "cultivate friendly neutrals rather than seek
to enlist more allies. "^^ The first official endorsement of neutralism
came in the President's annual State of the Union message:
We support the independence of these newer or weaker
states, whose history, geography, economy or lack of
12
House Foreign Affairs Committee, MSA Hearings
, 1959, p. 670.
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^ ''^™ economic aid to underdevel-oped countries in general and India in particular X ,
aential
.as. Porce was set UP to
^ ^-l- a Presi-
The act was said to have marked a transition ffrom the "decade of defense"to the 'decade of development".
To meet the changed nature nf rr,^o Communist threat, it was declared
«.th the introduction of the .ct of isei that it is the purpose of th.
united States through foreign assistance progra. "to help make a historic
demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand inhand to the end that an enlarged conmunity Of free stable,.y ui. t , able and self-reliant
countries can reduce world tpncrionc = ^ • 9e sio s and insecurity
. However, there was
no change in the basic objective of foreign aid tnt d— o serve U.S. policy
interests in the Cold War.
The ineffectiveness of militarv ;,nir,=t y allmaces became more and more
apparent as the decade of the fifties drew towards an end.
.He Chairman
Of the senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. Pulhright himself
was one of the strongest critics of military aid to small underdeveloped
countries. In his opinion such aid to these nations undermined them polit-
ically and economically. He preferred comparable amounts of money to be
devoted to their economic development instead, which would contribute to
their political stability
.
cal Yelf1962 ."° """"'"'^ °" Foreign Assist.n.e Prcgra. fn. .h. ....
10J
Senate Foreign Relations Committee MSP Hearings, 1959, p. 189,
power impels them to remain outside ,
alliances" as „e did for more than ,
^"'^^"'Ung
the independence of these nationf- "T'^V'
communist's grand design!" ^ ^° '^"^
Phillips Tal.ot, assistant Secretary of state for Hear Eastern .
Co:»ittee during hearings on foreign Assistance Act for 1962-
,
our o„n national security „e have a ver. strong interest in developing
Close relations with these non-aligned countries and in helping them
strengthen themselves recognising of course that very often their views
on particular issues will differ from ours.""'
The year 1959 mar.ed the beginning of a new period of coexistence
in soviet-American relations, an aim towards which India had always worked.
Both the united States and Russia were by now great and satiated powers
With a common staice in the preservation of the status guo. But China was
neither. As a consequence on the one hand the U.S.-Chinese struggle was
Sharpened, and on the other a Sino-Soviet split came about openly. This
left the united States in direct confrontation with China in the Cold War.
in this struggle between the ijnited States and China, India was
explicitly committed to the American side because of an identity of na-
tional interest in opposing Chinese expansionism, with the intensification
13
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,
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of rivalry between India and ch,-n=C xna, the argu:„ent for greater economic aid
to Xndia-tHe bastion of democracy in .sia and the o„i, potential co.n-
terpoise to China-began to ass^e greater validity in the United States
It was President Kennedy who was
.est singularly aware of the potentiali-
ties Of India-China revalry and the lively effect of its outcome in the
in affecting that outcome. In his words:
Sd China'for thf '^'^"^'^ """i-ana he leadership of all Asia, for theopportunity to demonstrate whose way of life isth^
ITIII- Tt '^"'^ subti: tiL lo^dt may not be even admitted by either side
. . bui
'
it IS a very real battle nevertheless
. . Let th»r=be no mistake about the nature of the crisis-bott thedanger and the opportunity-and let there be no mist^eabout the urgency of our participation in this st^^gS."
The U.S. reacted to the emerging border dispute between India and
China with quiet satisfaction, since she was both worried and annoyed by
Sino-lndian friendship in the Panch-Sheel era. she considered the border
conflict as an eye-opener.
Following the Chinese invasion, the Indian government began to
demand large scale military assistance. India complained that American
military was not adequate. The Hindustan Times commenting editorially
on March 30, 1963, said: "Mr. Kennedy's only important failure in recent
months was his inability or unwillingness to revise U.S. policies towards
India and Pakistan sharply enough to expect maximum benefit from the Chi-
nese attack. Had the U.S. government capitalized on the Indian people's
response to Western assistance in their hour of need, it could have a
15
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Harrison, India and the United States
. New York,The Macmillan Co., 1961, p. 63. '
staunch friend for the doubtful loss oft an uncertain ally, instead U.S.
attitude wavered between sympathy for India ;,n^y r and concern over Pakistan's
reactions thus creating doubts in ..r,^g m one country without removing them in
the other"
in March 1963, Nehr. sent two personal emissaries to the a s
Xob.y for .ore military assistance,
.t the same time aia for another
steel .ill „as sought. Xn.ia asKed for a Billion dollars of military aia.
While the U.S. was committea toamere 60 million. The U.S. terms were
Clear. Settle the Kashmir problem and aid would come. Chester Bowles
flew to Washington to plead the Indian case. «ter Kennedys assassina-
tion Bowies discussed the matter with his successor President
.ohnson.
The President promised his decision within a few weeKs. General Maxwell
Tanor who visited India also held out promise of increased aid. The
military assistance promised by President Johnson also did not come through,
India was greatly disappointed.
After Nehru
On May, 1964, Nehru died. This was the end of an era. At the
time of his death, the U.S. position in Asia had considerably weakened.
The united States viewed with concern the political situation in Asia.
The S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. were in shambles. The U.S. had become very
deeply involved in Viet Nam. This conflict in Southest Asia had almost
split the SEATO allinace and had caused great divisions in the ranks of
both Democrats and Republicans. With most of its Asian allies in revolt,
the U.S. position in Southeast Asia was extremely delicate. The U.S. has
also discovered the simple fact that economic assistance "buys" very little
political influence and establishes a r.i..-ix relationship that is both prickly
and counter-productive. U.S. economic aid has be.n . •e declining since thelate 1960 's.
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The China polic, i„
.He 1,50-1960
.e.aae. was a source
..rotation
.o xnaia,
..o. l,eo-lS,o was a sou..e o.^
....^.action
and from 1970 onwards appeared to threaten India This na...-i-nis kedness to Chi-
nese strength, oa.sed the detente between the U.S. and China, left
X.d.a in the position of re,uirin, Soviet support, xhat support ,i.en in
abundance ran counter to ^erioan interests in South
.sia and in the Indian
Ocean, and hence became a source of friction.
m the subsequent chapters, we shall follow the course of Indc-
American relations after 1965.
Pakistan as a Oeterminant in
United States Policy TowardT-Ehr^coni-.- n.n^
Relations between India and the United States we have seen so far
are entangled in a complex web of interrelationships between the two coun-
tries themselves and Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China, and are contin-
uously conditioned by the distinctive roles these countries have played
in South Asia and the world cormnunity. While reacting to the cross-pres-
sures of great powers, the middle powers themselves determine the environ-
ment to which superpowers must respond. Acting in pursuit of their own
goals they create conditions and problems to which the great powers must
react. Here we shall focus out attention on Pakistan as the "environment
16
A point made by Anwar Syed, in the context of China-Pakistan rela-
(I T ^"-f, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cord i.i..(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974). ~
determining actor/' on the subcontinent. „e shall try and find out how
from time to time PaJ^istan's behaviour in the region, and in the inter-
national system, has helped the United states determine its policy in
South Asia.
Initially South Asia received little attention from the policy
makers in Washington. The world was then (after 1947) confronted by cold
war between the East and West. Since' South Asia was comparatively free
from immediate tensions, Washington could afford to confine her first phase
of policy towards the subcontinent during 1947-53 to pious and friendly
gestures of good will and a modest amount of economic aid and assistance
under "Point Four;" no major diplomatic or political or military involve-
ment was necessary or contemplated.
A major challenge to any intimate association between India and
the United States was America's relations with Pakistan and the problem
of Kashmir. The United States insisted on India agreeing to a plebiscite
even before Pakistan vacated the agression. The Indian government thought
that the United States had taken "a strangely narrow view" and felt dis-
tressed that it referred to the Kashmir cirsis as a Hindu-Muslim conflict
and seemed to accept the Pakistani view point that Kashmir should go to
Pakistan. The United States never condemned the Pakistan agression.
India suspected that the continued U.S. support to Pakistan was
tied up with the American hope of acquiring military bases in the Pakistan-
held portion of Kashmir adjoining the Soviet Union and China. She believed
that this was the reason for the major role the United States took in
shaping the U.N. policy on Kashmir. When the United Nations sent military
observers to Kashmir to supervise the ceasefire, Washington managed to
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include seventeen ^erican nationals in the tea. of thirty-six U... ob-
servers, xndia.s suspicion of U.S. motives was strengthened when the two
military officers whose na„es were suggested by the U.N. Co^ission for
Kashmir for appointment as plebiscite administrators were ;^ericans. Gen-
eral Bideu Smith and Admiral Numit? i-h^ 1=4-4.x z, the latter wanted to induct 3,000
U.S. soldiers into Kashmir.^^ Ever since 1948 when the United States
failed to endorse India's position on Kashmir in the Security Council, the
issue of Kashmir and the question of U.S
.-Pakistani alliance hasbeen in-
tertwined in Indo-a.S. relations. By the early 1950s the American policy
of containing Soviet and Chinese influence was fairly, well established,
and the United States accepted Pakistan as an ally in the process of
building anti-communist coalitions in Asia and the Middle East.
One of the major thorns then in Indo-American relations was the
system of military alliances built by Dulles in Asia. When U.S. policy
makers began to give serious thought to regional defense arrangements for
the Middle East and for South Asia, Pakistan's geographical location gave
it a special strategic significance. Since West Pakistan borders on the
region surrounding the Persian Gulf, her geographical location made her
an object of special interest and significance-when the United States was
embarking on collective security arrangements, to deal with the "menace"
of international Communism.
Nehru could not endure the U.S. policy of regional military pacts;
India like most of the Asian and Arab countries was not convinced of "any
imminent Communist threat," and secondly Nehru was not prepared to give
17
The New York Times
, Aug. 14, 1949.
up his policy Of non-ali^ent which haa the hle.sin, of both Moscow and
Peking in those days.
Dulles found a completely different and favorable climate in Paki
Stan. Pakistan in her ,uest for security, in the context of unending
Indo-Pakistan tensions had been eagerly looking for "allies" and •friends
President Eisenhower gave the military pact a garb of respecta-
bility and said that the United states was concerned over the weakness
of the defensive capabilities of the countries in West Asia, and was
therefore complying with the request from Pakistan for military aid.
When Nehru protested against the pact, Washington replied that India
might also take military aid from the United States. The U.S. plans for
regional pacts had great attraction for Pakistan. In 1954, a military
pact was signed between Pakistan and the United States. In 1955, Paki-
stan joined the Western sponsored Bagdad Pact. India protested to this
move
But surely nobody here imagines that the Pakistan govern-
ment entered into this pact because it feared some imminent
or distant invasion or aggression from the Soviet Union.
The Pakistani newspapers and the responsible people in
Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined
this pact because of India. -^^
Indo-American relations further deteriorated by the establishment
of SEATO over India's open and strong opposition. India's opposition to
the alliances was further intensified by the fact that they had balked
Indian attempts to designate a "no war" area in Asia. To counterbalance
Western influence in the region, and Western economic and military sup-
port to members of SEATO—in particular Pakistan—India sought to
^%ehru, Speeches
, Vol. Ill, 1953-57, p. 377
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cultivate close cooperation with the Soviet Union and Red China. ^»
Nevertheless, there was nothing more detrimental to Indo-U.s.
relations at the time than this decision of the United States to give
military aid to Pakistan for its anti-Indian designs. The New YorK Times
correspondent Robert Tru^ull noted the effect the proposed American
action would have
:
If the Karachi arms deal goes through, the U.S will
bHorthfJo'^" it may
President Eisenhower himself was aware of the reaction it would produce
in India. In his announcement of March, 1954, he stated:
I can say that if our aid to any country, including
Pakistan, is misused or directed against another in
aggression, I will undertake immediately
. . . appro-
priate action both within and without the United
Nations to thwart such aggression. 21
In a personal letter to Nehru he assured that the action was not directed
in any way against India and that if "your government should conclude that
circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual
security legislation, please be assured that you request would receive my
most sympathetic consideration. "^^
Nehru dismissed the American aid offer since it was common know-
ledge that India would not militarily align herself to any power. He
19See M.S. Rajan, "India and Pakistan as Factors in Each Other's
Foreign Policy and Relations," International Studies , Vol. Ill, No. 4,
April 1962, pp. 349-94.
20New York Times
,
January 9, 1954.
21
Department of State Bulletin , March 22, 1954, p. 447.
describe, ^.e.ican ai. to Pakistan as an "anti-XnCian
, anti-.sian ana anti-
Pa^istan in the Kash.i. dispute and de^ the withdrawal of ^erican
officers from the ceasefire line. According to him:
Stat^^^''i°''
^^^^^^^ of the Unitedtes army cannot be considered neutral in Kashmir'2!
Nehru's views were elaborated in the Indian press and on Indian
Platforms to the extent that the United States came to be regarded as the
main reason of India's insecurity against Pakistan. Later on Nehru mod-
erated his views to a considerable degree. He could believe, he said,
the motives of the United States in giving aid to Pakistan, but he could
not be sure of Pakistan' s. design. Speaking in the parliament, he stated:
Spokesmen of the Pakistan Government have on various
occasions stated that their objective in entering in
a defence aid agreemnt with the U.S.A.
. . . is to
strengthen Pakistan against India. We have repeatedlypointed this out and emphasized that the U.S. defence
aid to Pakistan encourages the Pakistan authoritiesm their agressiveness. ... We welcome the assu-
rance given to us by the United States authorities
but agression is difficult to define, and Pakistan
authorities have in the past committed agression
and denied it. In the context of this past experience,
the continuing threats held out by Pakistan and
Pakistan's interpretation of the latest agreement
with the U.S.A., it is difficult for us to ignore the
possibility of Pakistan utilizing the aid received
by it . . . against India. 24
The United States, on the other hand, assumed that this aid could
not constitute a threat to India simply because of her relative size and
strength against Pakistan and if despite this relative weakness Pakistan
Nahru, India's Foreign Policy
, p. 476. These charges were borne
out by the official and unofficial claims made in Pakistan to American
support against India after the signing of the alliance.
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was to launch an aggression against India, American infiluence could bring
it to a quick end-an argument which did not convince India.
Speaking before the General ^sse^iy on October 6, 1954. the
Indian a^assador, Krishna Menon. regretted the fact that the Manilla
Pact had adversely affected the climate of peace brought about by the
Geneva settlement:
"
pe'rfo^'th"
understand the great hurryto rform this operation when there had been aggres-sion trouble and war in Indo-china for eight yeS
" settlement was negotiated, thafS^reshould be an agreement of this character. Nothingpositive was gained by this agreement because iHoesnot appear that it can be an instrument of greatpotency, but it can do a great deal of harm. 25
Nehru regarded SEATO as an attempt to recreate spheres of influ-
ence in southeast Asia. India also contested the fact that the organiza-
tion was a regional body within the definition of the U.N. charter because
some of the signatories were not geographically situated in the region.
India disapproved of these alliances, because they directly affected her
internal development, and obstructed her attempts to designate a "no war"
area in Asia.
What led the U.S. and Pakistan to enter into the arms agreement
and allinaces? What did they really expect of it? The U.S. government
was convinced of the desirability, of building collective security organi-
zations in Asia, to contain Communist power. U.S. officials also believed
that the 250,000 man Pakistani army had considerable potential for the
defense of the northwest frontier of the subcontinent until outside forces
25u.N. General Assembly, 9th Session, Official Records, October 6,
1954.
.arrivea, provided it could ao^i.. an ade^ate and assured supply of
.odem ^utary e^lp.ent.^^ ti„e the United states had no ai.
bases between Turkey and the phillipines, and bases in Pakistan ,or even
the right to land on airstrips in war tine, would extend ^erica's power
to strike at the U.S.S.R.. thereby adding to Soviet air defense problems.
While neither the arms agreement no.- .1 ,r the alliance provided for military
bases in Pakistan, the possibility of acquiring such facilities were
Obviously better in an allied nation than in a neutral one. The United
'
States had little choice but to accept those nations willing to join such
security organizations. Besides the political support that was expected
to accrue from allies as compared to neutrals was regarded as important,
particularly their votes in the United Nations. In part this reflected
the traditional American desire for friends, but calculations of political
support were interwoven.
The reasons Pakistan pursued the course it did are less complex.
The primary goal was to obtain military equipment to modernize the armed
forces. Pakistan's leaders apparently also believed that being an ally
of the west would afford them some military security against India beyond
that provided by arms, and would help them in dealing with Afghanistan's
attempts to undermine Pakistan's position along the northwest frontier. '
Even for economic assistance, allies were heavily favoured over neutrals
by the United States. In return for these benefits Pakistan was willing
to abandon its policy of non-alignment or its policy of friendship for all.
26
Little seems to have been done in the way of pre-positioning
supplies for U.S. troops, nor was any serious attention ever given to
the defense of East Pakistan.
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one underlying p.oble. presented potential difficult, for u s -
Pakistani relations. Kac. country clearly understood- that it .ad ta.e„
on certain obligations and its allies
.ad done t.e sa„e.
.ut .otH thought
that an unspo.en and unsigned agreement going further was implied. The
united states thought that Pakistan was well aware it was expected to
pursue an anti-Indian policy, it surely was not to adopt a pro-Indian
stance. These different underlying assumptions were later to cause .uch
troxible.^^
western ar^s aid and the Indian defense build up following the
Sino-lndian war forshadowed for Pakistan a seriously adverse shift in the
balance of power. Ayub tried to offset India's growing strength by chang-
ing the orientation of their foreign policy. Pakistan remained formally
aligned with the west, just as India remained formally non-aligned, despite
changes in the substance of the foreign policies of both countries. During
these years Pakistan took the initiative In altering th6 power relation-
ships affecting South Asia, and its moves culminated in the second Indo-
Pakistani war in 1965.
The decision of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in
December 1962 on a second installment of $120 million worth of arms for
India, the joint U.S .-U.K.
-Indian air defense exercise in 1963, and the
long-term agreement to supply arms when Defense Minister Chavan visited
the United States in April 1964 confirmed Pakistani leaders in their
earlier fears regarding a major shift in American policy and the decline
27U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Hearings Mutual Security Act Extension
. 83rd Cong. 1st sess., 1953, pp.
720-21.
in Pakistan's influence on the United States. Now Pakistan began to ex-
plore the possibility Of forging links with China, to court Afro-.sian
states, and to put additional pressure on India to co.e to a settlement.
Pakistan did not try to diversify its military procurement program. Its
armed forces were stable at roughly 225,000 men between 1960 and 1965,
and its defense outlay rose by only 30 percent; Indian forces increased
from 535,000 to 869,000 men and defense spending roughly tripled in this
period. Peking looked like the best bet for Pakistan, for the Soviets
appeared too closely tied to India. There were also the special U.S.
facilities in West Pakistan, directed against the U.S.S.R. which circum-
scribed Ayub's maneuverability with Moscow. Ayub may still have been
concerned over Soviet designs in Afghanistan. Thus it was not until
April 1965, after the fall of Khrushchev, that Ayub made an official visit
to the U.S.S.R. and the relations began to improve. ^8 Ayub's efforts to
improve relaitons with China and to put pressure on India were to be under-
taken without cutting Pakistan's ties to the United States. 29
India emerged from the war with China a scarred nation, with its
self-confidence undermined. Communal violence between the Hindus and
Muslims had increased. Political and communal tensions inside Kashmir
were growing. The Indians were resentful over Pakistan's ties with China.
The government announced in December 1964 that the state would be more
closely integrated into India. In January 1965 the ruling party in Kahsmir,
28
Ayub's conversations with Soviet leaders are discussed in Friends
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,
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29See Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of
Pakistani Fears and Interests", Asian Survey , Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1964,
pp. 746-56.
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the National Conference,
.erged completely with the Congress party.
Indians were also roused by Ay... 3 visits to Peking in March and to Mos-
cow in April. They also saw Pakistani machinations behind Sheikh Abdul-
lah's meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers in Jann;,r.. . ^'^yj.e nua y; and rearrested
Abdullah as soon as he returned to India in April.
President Ayub's visit to China early in 1965 and some of his
remarks there were viewed with concern in Washington, although Ayub was
careful in the course he followed on the Viet Nam issue. In April 1965
the united States cancelled an invitation to President Ayub to visit
Washington-officially it only postponed the visit, but the effect was the
same. Since the United States did not feel it could receive Shastri after
cancelling Ayub's invitation, Shastri 's visit was postponed too, which
annoyed the Indians even more than the Pakistanis. Washington was getting
out of touch with, leaders of both countries at a time when their mutual
hostility had reached a kindling point.
On April 8, 1965, a disputed border claim over the Rann of Kutch
that the two countries had been unable to settle during the 1959 negotia-
tions, turned to large scale shooting. The clash put the United States
in a difficult position and cast growing doubts on the wisdom of providing
military aid to two hostile neighbors.
Many Indians feared that concerted Chinese and Pakistani moves
"^°Kutch, formerly a princely state, was part of Gujarat state by
1965. Since 1947 India had claimed the entire marsh. Pakistan had not
accepted India's interpretation of the boundary, saying that the boundary
ran along the middle of the Rann or approximately along the 24th parallel.
Some 3,500 miles of territory was in dispute. In 1965 both coiantries were
moving their forces forward to make good on their border claims, and each
blamed the other for the initial clash.
were liXeX,. since the H.n„ of K.tcH fi,hti„, followed so closely upon
.yub-s Visit to Pe.i„,. ana visits chou En-lai ana Poreign Minister
Chen Vi to Pakistan. The Soviet position not only seeded to e^ate the
two countries, but raised doubts about India's ability to retain Soviet
support on Kahsmir.
AS soon as the fighting began, charges were made that the Paki-
stani forces were using American equipment, of which India soom claimed
to have photographic evidence. Opposition leaders cited the U.S. assur-
ances that Pakistan would not use the arms supplied by America against
India, and now the United States apparently was unwilling even to repri-
mand Pakistan immediately and publicly, much less prevent or take positive
steps to halt the Pakistani action. The Indian government was caught in
the middle; it obviously wanted the United States to reprimand or restrain
Pakistan, but saw more danger in denouncing the United States as an enemy.
All this came about soon after Shastri's visit to Washington was
postponed, and his domestic opponents argued that this showed how little
stature and influence he had in the United States. The whole affair
brought to the surface once again the underlying Indian annoyance at being
equated with Pakistan. The United States wanted to avoid choosing between
India and Pakistan in view of its extensive interests in each country.
The administration was also running into more trouble with Congress. Many
members were irritated that the two recipients of U.S. military aid were
not fighting each other.
31Pakistan also claimed that India was using U.S. equipment in the
fighting, but the small amount of U.S. arms apparently used had been
purchased by India in earlier years and not acquired through the aid
program.
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The outcome of the Rann of Kutch episode left Pakistan dangerously
overconfident and India dangerously frustrated. The outbreak of war sig-
naled an important failure of U.S. policy in the subcontinent, m telling
the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 8 that the United States
had suspended military aid to both. Secretary Rus3c said no new conunitments
of economic assistance were being made, and only those shipments already
underway under past agreements were allowed to go forward:
Now this will not be well received either in Pakistan
or m India but we cannot be in a position of finan-
cing a war of these countries against each other.
Nor can we be in a position of using aid under cir-
cumstances where the purpose of the aid is frustrated
by the fighting itself
. . .
Our problem has been and obviously we have not
succeeded, to pursue policies with Pakistan and India
related to matters outside of the subcontinent and
at the same time try not to contribute to the clash
between the two within the subcontinent. This is
still the shape of the present problem. 32
American inability to prevent the use of American military equip-
ment by either party only served to highlight the irony of United States'
aid policy in South Asia. The only effective measure it could possibly
take was to suspend all aid to both nations, treating the ally and the
neutral thereby on an equal footing.
The patterns of alignment in South Asia have always been compli-
cated by the Indo-Pakistan regional disputes. India and Pakistan have
always moved in the extreme opposite direcitons—if one turns to Wash-
ington, the other tries to move to Moscow and Peking.
-JO
-"^U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assis-
tance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966 , 89th Cong. 1st session,
pp. 18-19.
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Both Pakistan and Washington reaped some advantages and some dis-
appointments fro. their alliance. Between 1954 and 1965 Pakistan received,
on a grant basis, .ore than one billion dollars worth of weapons, military
training and advice. The United States had given a total of $3,713.8"
million in economic assistance to Pakistan, in the form of grants, loans
and agricultural commodities. ^ 3 At least till 1961, the United States had
the satisfaction of having Pakistan's firm support in the Cold War. Paki-
Stan opposed China's admission to the United Nations, and ignored Moscow's
offers of expanded trade and economic assistance, and even denounced Soviet
"colonialism" in Eastern Europe. The United States could maintain a strong
political presence in Pakistan. -^"^
Pakistan also received a measure of American support in her dis-
putes with India. 35 This was just an act of reciprocity in exchange for
Pakistani support in the Cold War. However a radical shift in the align-
ment of forces occurred, and changed the nature of the Cold War when the
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian conflicts developed. American interest in a
plebiscite declined, and Washington favoured a division of Kahsmir that
would leave Srinagar and the areas providing access to Ladakh with India.
When in the Sino-Indian border clash of 1962, the U.S. gave India military
aid, the alliance with Pakistan became a notably complicating factor for
American policy in South Asia. Pakistan's objections to aid to India did
not subside in spite of repeated American assurances that such aid was
33see op. cit.
, p. 34.
34See op. cit.
, p. 35.
^^ibid.
96
directed only against China and that it in no way ^alifled or di:„ini.hed
American commitment to Pakistan. -^^
Officially the United States government tried for an agreement
between India and Pakistan in the belief that only cooperation between
them can effectively resist Chinese inroads in Asia. In the absence of
an agreement like this, any closer American cooperation with India would
entail a breakup of the alliance with Pakistan, which the United States
would like to avoid. Nevertheless Indian official opinion held the view
that the united States was more sympathetic to Pakistan. Mr. Gandhi told
American newsmen during her visit to the United States in 1964 that the
United States was losing much good will in India because of Washington's
favoritism towards Pakistan "in- the Kashmir dispute". ^'^
India in Soviet Policies
Broadly speaking, Soviet policy towards India went through three
varying stages. In the first phase, it was conditioned by Stalin's overall
hostility towards the capitalist world. Stalin treated India as a colony
of the Anglo-American monopoly capital.
The latter half of the fifties could be termed as a period of big
friendship in Indo-Soviet relations.^® The post-Stalin Soviet policy to-
wards India endorsed an attitude of cultivating ties with India, and Indo-
Soviet relations grew in all the major areas of foreign policy operations
—
economic, political and cultural. Krushchev also supported India on the
^^New York Times
, November 21, 1962.
^^New York Times, April 22, 1964.
Kashmir issue. In fact, this served three
.ajor interests of Soviet
foreign policy in the region, it increased India's dependence upon
soviet Russia and thus provided a major base for the expansion of Soviet
ties with India; it served as a lesson to the erring Pakistan; and lastly,
it served the Soviet defense interests too to some extent. Nehru visited
Soviet Russia, and Krushchev and Bulganin later toured India.
Because of India's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union,
she received greater attention in Soviet policies than say of the United
States. By its effective role as a peace pursuing power in the Korean
War, at the Geneva Conference of 1954, in the Suez Crises and in organiz-
ing the Bandung powers, Indian diplomacy had gained a certain stature in
Soviet eyes, and India had gained a considerable power position. The
Soviet policy makers seemed to have framed a policy of associating India
with the Big Powers for the solution of Afro-Asian and disarmament ques-
tions.
The Indians could now show that they were not without the support
of a superpower. They denounced American Cold War policies much to Mos-
cow's satisfaction, and supported Soviet positions on international issues.
At the same time, they obtained massive economic assistance from the United
States, since they did not want to become too dependent on Moscow. Mos-
cow was thus assured of India's backing at a moderate cost.
The serious setback Indian foreign policy had suffered with the
conclusion of the U.S .-Pakistani arms agreement increased receptivity to
Soviet overtures. Nehru hoped that improved relations with Moscow could
also serve as a warning to Pakistain and its ally that India had powerful
friends. In particular he thought it would be possible this way to get
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MOSCOW to Shift f.o. its general!, neut.ai position on Kash^. to a p.o-
indian stanoa, which would be valuable, given the
..s.s.u..s percent
membership in the Security Council.
During 1955 and 1956 those A:„ericans who had objected to the
alliance with Pakistan when it was established continued to argue that
the united states was alienating India. They maintained that a higher
priority should be given to ties with India, the .ey country in South
Asia. Since Soviet policy was not proving to be militarily agressive to-
the underdeveloped world, the United States should de-emphasize
military pacts and military assistance and give economic aid a higher pri-
ority. Even the administration had concluded that a shift in emphasis
was desirable.
Thus the united States and India sought to improve their relations,
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker played a major role in beinging the two
countries together. He presented American policy in a manner Indian -
leaders could appreciate, and explained Indian actions skillfully to Wash-
ington. His efforts reduced the distrust between the two governments,
leading them to understand their common interests rather than their dif-
ferences.
The two countries still differed on some issues. India .thought
that the United States was not going far enough towards seeking better
relations with the Soviet Union, and Nehru was strongly critical of U.S.
nuclear testing when India sought special U.S. economic assistance in 1957,
the administration regarded it as economically desirable and politically
feasible to provide the aid. A loan of $225 million was extended, the
first of many to follow. Nahru had always been dubious about too much
reXianc. on
.o.ei,n aia lest
.He lea.e.s o.
.ecip.ent co.nt..es
.e=o„e
.esponsive to t.e aono.s tHan to t.ei. o™ peopU. Vet Xnaia was
now forced to take the risk if -ii-e ^x xts development program was to be carried
out.
At the end of the first ten years of independence India and Paki-
stan had achieved a measure of stability in their relations with each
other and with the major powers. Indo-Pakistani relations were set in a
.Old of inactive hostility. a.S.-Pakistan relations appeared to be going
reasonably smoothly. Pakistan's military forces were acquiring the arms
they needed, and it felt a certain security despite the expanding Soviet
role in India and Afghanistan. The U.S. military relationship with Paki-
stan was not proving as harmful to relations with India as its opponents
feared, and the necessity and purpose of the continued arming of Pakistan
in view of the less threatening Soviet stance was not really questioned.
Indo-Soviet relations had cooled somewhat as a result of Soviet actions
in Hungary, Soviet annoyance over Indian attempts to further liberaliza-
tion within the communist bloc by urging upon Moscow a generous policy to-
wards Tito, and better Indian relations with the United States.
Thus the polarization that at one point appeared to be a distinct
possibility, with Pakistan, the United States, and (to a lesser degree)
Britain lined up against India, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China never
came about. While India wanted expanded relations with Moscow, it had
no intentions of becoming a partner of the Soviets. The United States
also supported Pakistan only to a point. Washington never really put
heavy pressure on India to compromise on Kashmir. In the late 1950 's and
early 1960 's, Washington thought that its interest in India's economic
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development was too important to ta.e serious ris.s by withholding aid
pending a Kashmir settlement.
The soviet policy of considering India as an important ally
against China received some cracks after India's poor showing in the
Sino-lndian border conflict of 1962. The 1962 event shattered India's
special position in Soviet policies vis-a-vis Pakistan and the Kremlin
therefore was seen reviewing its ties with Pakistan, which was growing
much too close to Mao's China but showing signs of coming out of the
Anglo-American alliances. Kosygin invited President Ayub Khan to visit
Moscow and the latter went there in April of 1965. Of course the U.S.S.R.
was concerned with safeguarding her own vital interests, not those of
Pakistan. She wanted "stability" in the subcontinent, and an end to Indo-
Pakistan quarrels, so that Pakistan instead of pursuing interests that
conflicted with those of India, would join India in serving the common
Indo-Soviet, and also American, interest in containing China.
In the extensive talks that Ayub Khan had with the Soviet leaders
he must have impressed upon them the necessity of adopting a non-partisan
policy towards the subcontinent. Within a fortnight of his departure
from Moscow the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the Rann of Kutch took place
and the Russians adopted a neutral, non-partisan posture towards India
and Pakistan on this occasion. Such a non-partisan attitude was further
confirmed during the Indo-Pakistan fighting in September 1965, which led
to the Tashkent Conference and the consequent emergence of Soviet Russia
as a peace keeping power between India and Pakistan.
The Kremlin changed its policy towards Pakistan with the rationale
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Sovie. tie.. Kos.,i„.3
„o..pa«i.a„ postu.. Haa a po.Uive o.,e«ive o.
.ai„.aini„, Soviet presence i„ .ot. countries a„a tHus
.eepin, t.e„ „it.
hi™ .athe. than aXienatin, one, as aia KH^shchev, o. aXienatin, ^th.
as StaXin aia. Un..r Mrs. Canahi, however, maia has a,ain re-e™er,ea
as a stron,, sta.Xe ana pro-Soviet power. Soviet poXic. towaras the sub-
continent was reviewea a,ain, which was cXearXy inaicatea in Soviet
Russia's Signing of a aefense pact with India in August 197X, ana its
positive heXp in the Xiteration of BangXadesh, after Kosygin faiXea in
his Objective of cuXtivating Pakistan with a view to weaning it away fro™
China
.
Besides in Juiy X97X it had become known that a Chinese-American
detente was coming about, and thus the earXier American coXXaboration
with India and the U.S.S.R. in opposing China had cXearXy endea. As
India prepared for another war with Pakistan, in which the latter wouXd
have China's support, she wanted a ciear-cut assurance of Soviet aid.
On August XO, X97X, the two governments signed a treaty of "frienaship"
incXuaing provision for mutual aefense assistance. From Moscow's point
of view this was a step towaras a more inciusive anti-Chinese coalition.
Sino-Pakistan Relations
In contrast to India's active involvement with the major powers,
40
In the mid-1960's, after the emergence of an Indo-Soviet-American
entente against China, Russia could only gain some influence in Pakistan,
and would not even impair her relations with India. Given Soviet and
American backing even Indian security would not be threatened.
102
X950.S. But
.e„.s..=
=Ka„,es i„ Pakistan, as wen as the Si„o-Zn..a„
dispute, were to aXter this. Various
.aoto.s We contributed to the
convergence of interests an. e.er,e„ce o. ciose relationships between
China ana Pakistan.- ^cn, these .a.
.e mentioned territorial pro.i.it„
China's neea for secure frontiers ana Pakistan's neea for national se-
curity, and their identity of interests vis-a-vis India.
Sino-PaMstan friendship started at the Bandung Conference in
1955. The Chinese .ay have sensed that because the primary motivation of
Pakistan's alliance policy with the U.S. was to acquire son,e protection
against India, ana not China, Pakistan was a harmless
.ember of the enemy
camp, and this way they could have directed their diplomacy at reducing
the consequences of Pakistan's membership in SEATO.
Because of Pakistan's obsession with the Kashmir question, the
KashMir issue had developea as a sort of testing grouna for any country's
policy. The Chinese had perceived possibilities of exploiting mao-Paki-
stan hostility to their own aavantage. at least in their public pro-
nouncements, the Chinese haa adopted a non-partisan posture between India
ana Pakistan on the Kashmir issue right from the beginning of their aiplo-
matic transactions with the two countries till 1964, when they came out
in full support of Pakistan on Kashmir. i^aia was now engaged in ter-
ritorial disputes with both Pakistan and China, each of which was allied
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to one of the super powers. Yet rather than seek a con, •cn mpromise settlement
fi- in .oth cases, maia's decision apparently
.eflecte. th.ee conclu-
sions: nrs., that it would
.e possible to induce the United States and
the soviet union to adopt essentially neutral positions in the Indo-PaKi-
stani and Sino-Indian disputes respectively,- second, that the antagonists
of both Pakistan and China were broader and deeper than the border dis-
putes, and that their settlement would not lessen the underlying hostil-
ity; and third, that India could afford the military burden of having
both neighbours as enemies. At this point we shall of course not elabo-
rate on these contentions.
In fact, the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and the subsequent American
military aid to India accelerated the process of Sino-Pakistan detente.
When Bhutto succeeded Muhammed Ali Bogra as Foreign Minister, Pakistan
pursued a policy of friendship with China with zeal. The most signifi-
cant achievement of Bhutto's stewardship was the near complete identity
of interests between Pakistan and China on the issues involving India.
In the Indo-Pakistan conflict of September 1965, China openly supported
Pakistan, and condemned India for committing aggression against Pakistan
and expressed its "firm support for Pakistan in its just struggle against
aggression" and warned the Indian government of "the responsibility for
all the consequences of its criminal and extended aggression. "^^
China's policy on Kashmir, like her policy towards India and
Pakistan in general, is shaped primarily with a view to serving her own
Quoted m Mohammed kyvh, "India as a Factor in Sino Pakistani Re-
lations," International Studies
,
January 1968, p. 292.
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national interests. Because nfo the geopolitical importance of Ladakh
the Chinese thin, that its inclusion in a frienai,. dependent PaKistal
«oul. serve their own national interests hetter tha„ its inclusion in a
hostile India.
Co™,entators referred to Pakistan's new China policy as '.flirta-
tion...
.hey said Pakistan was getting closer to China only to spite Xndia,
on the assumption that the ene.y of one's enemy was one's friend. Paki-
stan's relations with China have developed largely in response to her
security needs. They have been influenced to a large extent by her rela-
tions With India, from whom the main threat to her security has heen per-
ceived.
Relations Between India and Pakistan
India and Pakistan have had numerous disputes, some of which,
especially the Kashmir problem, as discussed earlier, have led to'a high
level Of tension and military conflict between them. Pakistani observers
see India as an imperialist power, entertaining grand expansionist de-
44
sxgns. Indian projections of post-independence Pakistan and her lead-
ers have been as deragatory. Nehru alleged that Pakistani leaders were
driven by the old communal hatred of India. Indo-Pakistan hostility is
rooted deep in historical experience and relations have remained tense
ever since independence, and Pakistan has constantly sought reassurance
against India from other quarters.
Relations between India and Pakistan entered a bitter phase after
44,
Anwar Syed, op. cit.
, pp. 17-25.
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the failure of direct tsiVc r^r. v ^.u-Ljre T: aiJcs on Kashmir in 1963. Paki^r^r.'^"J-
-fajcistan s reaction to
Xnaia-s ae.eat CH^.
.
^^^^^^^^^^^
Co,»ents in the press were gloating over India's defeat: India
was cut down to size.'. Once the conflict «as over and the Chinese pulled
bac^, Pakistan's delight gave way to frustration and anger over its in-
ability to take advantage of India's troubles to gain its demands espe-
cially on Kashmir. Their provision of :„ilitary aid ^ade Britain and the
united States special targets of Pakistani anger. This created a crisis
for Pakistan's foreign policy of alliance with the West. Ayub's objec-
tion to American arms for India were due to Washington's failure to con-
sult with him as promised before providing arms to India. The United
States had simply informed Pakistan of its intention to grant military
aid to India.
Besides American and Pakistani assessments of the Chinese threat
to South Asia were different. Ayub felt that the United STates misread
the extent of the Chinese military threat to the subcontinent. According
to him the Chinese aim was limited to just a border problem.
As the military balance on the subcontinent was shifting in India's
favor, Pakistan concluded that a measure of security had been lost in that
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was a staxe in it.
.e.ense
.uU.-.p.
....
^^^^^^^^^^
Uer that the United States could not control the use of ar^swt r m given to
Pakistan, so Pakistan was now usina o=g the same argument. Ayub wrote
P^ist^!47'°
"'^^^
-iftly and attack East
The decision of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in
December 1962 on a second installment of ,120 million worth of arms for
India, the joint U.S.-U.K. Indian air defense exercise in 1963, and the
long-term agreement to supply arms when Defense Minister Chavan visited
the united States in April 1964, confirmed Pakistani leaders in their ear-
lier fears regarding a major shift in American policy and the decline in
Pakistan's influence on the United States. Consequently, Pakistan's pol-
icy moved along several lines. it began to explore the possibility of
forging links with China, to court Afro-Asian states, and to put addi-
tional pressure on India to come to a settlement.
Pakistan did not try to cultivate the U.S.S.R. Peking looked
like the best bet, for the Soviets appeared too closely tied to India.
There were also the special U.S. facilities in West Pakistan, directed
against the U.S.S.R., which circumscribed Ayub's maneuverability with Mos-
cow. Ayub may still have been concerned over Soviet designs in Afghani-
stan. Thus it was not until April 1965, after the fall of Khrushchev,
that Ayub made an official visit to the U.S.S.R. and relations began to
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China saw its opportunity to take advantage of the Indo-Pakistani
quarrel, for making a friend of the enemy of your enemy is
-almost an auto-
matic response in such a situation. Friendly relationships with India's
neighbours was one way of isolating India as much as possible. There was
gradually a proliferation of Sino-Pakistani contacts and activities.'*^
India became growingly convinced that it needed military forces capable
of holding off Pakistan and China simultaneously.
The trend of events in the subcontinent was making it increasingly
difficult for the (West to maintain satisfactory ties with India and Paki-
stan, while countering Chinese and Soviet influence in South Asia. The
Chinese military danger seemed to be declining. Furthermore Western offi-
cials had hoped that Indian armed forces would retain their Western orien-
tation, but increasing amounts of Soviet arms were flowing into India.
These concerns paralleled earlier doubts in some quarters about
the validity of the reasons for the alliance with Pakistan. The United
States concluded that there was little choice but to continue moderate
arms aid to both covintries, trying to balance its interests in South Asia
as best as it could despite the renewed hostility.
The American government became increasingly unhappy as Pakistan
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expanded its ties with China. According to its assessment, Pakistan
should have made its military and even economic assistance to India con-
ditional on India's willingness to agree to what Pakistan regarded as a
fair settlement on Kashmir.
Foreign Minister Bhutto and the Pakitani press created consider-
able annoyance for some U.S. officials. President Ayub's visit to China
early in 1965 and some of his remarks there were also viewed with concern
in Washington. In April 1965 the United States cancelled an invitation
to President Ayub to visit Washington—officially it only postponed the
visit, but the effect was much the same. Since the United States did not
feel it could receive Shastri after cancelling Ayub's invitation, Shas-
tri's visit was postponed too, which annoyed the Indians even more than
the Pakistanis.
Indo-American understanding and cooperation were also encounter-
ing more difficulties. Washington was getting out of touch with leaders
of both countries at a time when their mutual hostility had reached a
kindling point.
Indo-Pakistan War of 1965
The continuing Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir erupted into
a large scale armed conflict in September 1965. The war was triggered
off by a rebellion by the people of Kashmir in December 1963 which was
occasioned by the theft of a sacred hair of the Prophet from a shrine six
miles from Srinagar. The holy relic had been in Kashmir for over three
centruies and news of its mysterious loss caused widespread and deep
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unrest in the valley.
Earlier on December 4, 1964, the Indian government disclosed that
it abolished the Special status of Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian
constitution. On December 21, 1964, the Indian President issued a procla-
mation under which he assumed the powers and functions of both government
and legislation in Kashmir. The Indian government's new move was accom-
panied by a declaration that the state's inclusion in the Union was com-
plete, final and irrevocable
.
Pakistan's reactions were naturally bitter. Her government pro-
tested and warned that "the consequences of such attempts to annex Kash-
mir in repudiation of international obligations, and in the face of open
and determined opposition of the people of Kashmir will be disastrous
.
President Ayub accused India of taking illegal steps towards the integra-
tion of disputed Kashmir territory into India. India's new move confirmed
the suspicion that Pakistan had been tricked.
Reactions inside the Indian-held Kashmir, which had been in a
state of unrest ever since the uprising over the theft of the holy relic,
were violent and widespread. The Plebiscite Front, the most powerful
political group in the State, described the new move, as "undemocratic
and anti-people." It warned that India's action was fraught with grave
dangers, and pointed out that "due to these steps the situation in occu-
pied Kashmir has already worsened to an alarming extent . "^"^ Abdullah
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appealed to the people of Kahs.i. to Mefeat the purposes of those who
are trying to tighten the chain of slavery on the Muslims of Kashmir-
You cannot achieve freedom by imploring anybody and in view of India's
present attitude you have to think how to face her effectively." Abdul-
lah was arrested, and this led to further agitation and popular uprising
in the State.
Before this incident, there was another military encounter be-
tween the Indian and Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch in April-May,
1965. The conflict was a battle over a piece of desolate land, which
Pakistan regards as a lake and India as a swamp, and which is of very
little intrinsic value to either. It has been a disputed territory be-
tween India and Pakistan since independence in 1947. The question was
not that of demarcating a well-defined border in the area but of agreeing
on its precise location. The disputed territory comprises an area of
3,500 square miles situated roughly north of the 24th parallel.
^^Ibid.
55
^The dispute pertains to the northern half of the area. On the
basis of historical facts and exercise of jxirisdiction, Pakistan could
claim to the whole of Rann of Kutch over which the former Sind province
(now West Pakistan) of British India exercised administrative control.
Pakistan however contented herself with a claim to the northern half of
the Rann. Pakistan also based her claim on the international law appli-
cable to areas which are of the nature of a landlocked sea or a boundary
lake. However at the time of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947,
India laid claim to the whole of the Rann. As the boundary between the
province of Sind and the princely state of Kutch was not clearly defined
during the British period, there was scope for claims and counterclaims
by two successor dominions. The result was that the Rann of Kutch re-
mained a disputed area between the two new states.
Ill
United States Reactions
in 1965 India was able to wear down a little bit the U.S. indif-
ference to India. Just before and after the war between India and Paki-
stan in 1965, there was a brief period when the United States was dis-
illusioned with isla^nabad. The United States postponed from July to
September 1965 the World Bank consortium meeting to decide on the extent
of aid to Pakistan and brought pressure on Ayub Khan not to get close to
Peking. But U.S. officials went to great lengths to assure him that aid
to India was not against Pakistan, Islamabad was unhappy about the U.S.
stand. Bhutto said: "...it is enough to say great disappointment was
felt in Peking about the American attitude. "^^
In response to the outbreak of hostilities the United States on
September 8, 1965, placed an embargo on the supply of all military equip-
ment to India and Pakistan. The embargo included commercial sales of
items on the annumitions list, all undelivered grant equipment and ser-
vices, and government to government military sales.
A U.S. Department of Defense publication noted that the embargo
hurt Pakistan much more than India because Pakistan did not produce a
significant portion of its armament requirements and did not have a ready
source of arms outside the free world. It was estimated that at the time
of the embargo, the U.S. was the supplier of about 80 percent of Paki-
58Stan ' s modern weapons
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The united States exerted heavy pressure to achieve an under-
standing between the two countries; all American aid to India and Paki-
stan was suspended until an understanding was reached and troops with-
drawn. This rein forced the Soviet bids for peace in the subcontinent.
Rarely if ever have the two major protagonists in the Cold War worked
nearly parallel to cool down a major world hot spot.^^
The six elected members of the Security Council cosponsored a
resolution on September 4, 1965 requesting a cessation of hostilities,
and reestablishment of the 1949 cease fire line.^° The atmosphere of the
crisis during these tense sessions in New York was emphasized by the fact
that Russia and the United States voted together, for the first time
since the U.N. was formed, on a question of war and peace in a major area
of the world. Both wanted the fighting to end as quickly as possible
and both were most anxious that China should not intervene in it. China
had given moral support to Pakistan from the outset, an official state-
ment from Peking on September 7 stating that "the Indian Government's
armed attack on Pakistan is an act of naked aggression. "^"^
Professor Syed makes an interesting statement in this connection:
There can be no doubt, however, that Chinese threats
had a significant impact on the political-diplomatic
front. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
would have preferred to come down strongly on India's
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side. Hed they been unencumbered by the Chinesefactor, they would have felt free not only to aidIndia but also to put a great deal more pressure onPakistan than they were actually able to do. 62
This statement is not far from the truth. Moscow and Washing-
ton's attitude stemmed out of their desire to keep Pakistan from being
dragged too far into Chinese influence, as best they could.
Moscow had followed a careful strategic line to make sure that
the Indian government did not react adversely to the Soviet overtures to
wards Pakistan. While calling publicly for peace and avoiding the use o
veto, Moscow made no effort to interrupt the flow of Soviet economic
assistance or to restrict arms aid to India. Work proceeded on the MIG
factory, the military pipeline continued in operation. Faced by the
Anglo-American embargo and the threat of Red China, New Delhi was more
dependent than ever on Moscow. The Indo-Soviet rapprochment gave New
Delhi a potential arms source in defiance of the Western embargo, which
was of far greater consequence than any supplies Pakistan could expect
from Peking.
American military supplies to Pakistan, which were suspended at
the outbreak of war, were never resumed on a grant basis. This amounted
to an effective disruption of Pakistan's military alliance with the
United States. Pakistan's growing ties with China did strain her rela-
tionship with the United States during this period. The intensification
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Of Pakistan's confrontation with India also called
-for a re-appraisal of.
American foreign policy.
The Emergence of Bangladesh
It would also be important to study the impact of the Bangladesh
crisis on Indo-U.S. relations. The sharp differences in the attitudes
of India and the United States and the inflexible positions they adopted
over the crisis in East Bengal in 1971 exposed to the world for the first
time the deep fissures that had existed for a long time while in the ties
between the two countries. Before taking a hard line, India made re-
peated attempts to make the United States understand her point of view
and her difficulties. There was no corresponding effort by the United
States to communicate with India. The steps taken by India to meet the
threat posed by the mass influx of refugees from east Bengal were in no
way directed against the national interests of the United States, a coun-
try geographically far removed from east Bengal, India's main concern
was to safeguard her national interests which she felt was threatened by
the unprecedented upheaval in an area close to her borders, and by the
presence of refugees in the sensitive border states in east India.
Bangladesh is the first country in the post-war world to emerge
after a secessionist struggle against its own government. Every other
newly independent state of Asia and Africa won its independence from an
imperial power. For two decades the Bengalis had been pressing for au-
tonomy against a West Pakistan dominated government. They resented the
attempts to impse Urdu as the Official language, the use of the region's
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foreign exchange earnings for the economic development of the West, and
their lack of access to the military-bureaucratic elite which dominated
the country. By 1970, the Bengalis were as united as a people has ever
been behind its own nationalist movement, Awami League and its leader
Sheikh Mujib Rahman.
Bangladesh was separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles
of territory over a country which since the hijacking incident in Febru-
ary 1970, denied the Pakistanis air rights and all land transit facili-
ties. For the Pakistani government it was a costly affair to crush the
Bengali movement and it proved to be impossible to prevent the smuggling
of arms and personnel across thousands of miles of largely unpatrolled
borders.
Finally Bangladesh became independent through the direct military
intervention of India. India had much to gain by seeing its hostile
neighbor dismembered and much to lose (a permanent refugee burden) by
doing nothing. Moreover it had the military capacity to intervene suc-
cessfully. It was thus in India's, interest to stress the virtues of
"self determination" over Pakistan's emphasis on the right to "national
integration.
"
The United States, China, and the Soviet Union were fearful that
their interests might be jeopardized by the civil war and an Indo-Paki-
stan war. The Chinese wanted a strong Pakistan to balance India. The
Soviets hoped to maintain friendly ties with both Pakistan and India.
The United States was content with the existing power balance in the
region and did not want to see it disturbed. And all three powers
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feared that their relationship to one another
.ight be seriously affected
by a south Asian conflict. The Soviet leadership, however, had .uch to
gain in supporting India in the crisis than by taking an evenhanded posi-
tion. The united States, since the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, had tried to
prevent a new war on the subcontinent, and to maintain friendly relations
with both countries. She tried to maintain equilibrium of influence with
the Soviet Union and China through a policy of "relief, restraint and
accomodation." This attitude was in keeping with President Nixon's 1971
foreign policy message in which he said:
We will do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and
Chinese interests in the area [the subcontinent]
.
We are equally clear, however, that no outside
power has a claim to a predominant influence
The State Department officials put it this way:
Our goal is stability in the siibcontinent
. We
have counseled both India and Pakistan to keep cool-
not to let tensions escalate in border areas that
lead to war. Stability means no war between India
and Pakistan
The thrust of U.S. policy indicates that Washinton viewed its
interests as best served by helping to alleviate suffering among the dis-
placed in ravaged East Pakistan and among the 7.5 million Bengali refu-
gees in India and by supporting the efforts of Yahya Khan to preserve the
unity of Pakistan.
A major side effect of U.S. policy towards Pakistan was to drive
U.S. -Indian relations to their lowest ebb. Any show of support for
neighboring Pakistan was regarded as hostility towards India in New Delhi.
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Slowly the bonds of friendship between the U.S. and India were dissolving.
The strains and irritations spawned as a result of
rebellion and repression in East Pakistan have been
obvious in recent months, but there is also now dis-
cernible beneath the surface a more basic shift in
attitudes here. Some degree of official annoyance
has always plagued relations between Washington and
New Delhi. And for half a year now, these customary
tensions have been exacerbated by President Nizon's
refusal to denounce Pakistan and by his eagerness to
repair communications with China—the two neighbors
that India fears and resents the most.
The Indians, in tnrn, have further frayed senti-
ments here by seeking strength in a new intimacy
with the Russians and by making a vigorous display
of their resentment of American conduct. ^7
Americans also contended that the Indians have been pro-Soviet for a long
time and despite their professions of non-alignment, they have been
deeply antagonistic to American positions on such issues as Vietnam, the
Middle East and arms control:
India is no longer referred to as an Asian "showplace"
of development by democratic means. She is no longer
talked about as the great "alternative" to totalitarian
prescriptions for economic progress. She is no longer
seen as particularly useful in luring other poor nations
from the temptations of Communism. .. .^^
Whereas China has been accorded almost big power
standing in the new American view of Asia—as a nation
with which the United States, the Soviet Union and
Japan must now share influence in the Pacific—India
remains merely an ovject of policy .^^
South Asia's progress is important to the United
States because "we cannot deny our humanitarian
interest in the well being of so many people with
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such exxgent needs," and because
"unresolved ene-
^InTjlTlT."''^'^. '^"^"^^ --^^ areavulnerab e to an undesirable level of foreign influence. "^0
Even though U.S. officials did not condone President Yahya's re-
pression Of the autonomy movement in East Pakistan, U.S. arms shipments
to Pakistan continued. The total value of commodities at issue was only
something like 2.4 million dollars worth, made under old licensing agree-
ments. Washington either did not realize the anger these shipments would
arouse in India, or probably did not care. The State Department says the
total shipment was worth 56.2 million, some senators said it was as high
as 35 million dollars.'^ However never before had the United States sac-
rificed so much of the good will of a friendly major country for so small
72
a consideration.
The Indians knew that U.S. military aid shipments to both India
and Pakistan-even those already afloat-were stopped in their tracks in
1965. Thus they knew the same could have been done this time, and the
deliberate decision in the face of Pakistani performance in East Pakistan
sent them up the wall.^^ The arms shipment to Pakistan was, as Senator
Frank Church said on June 22, 1971, "one more instance of our government
saying one thing and then Congress and American public learning later
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that the facts are contrary." The secret decision to give anus to Paki-
stan was believed to have been taken by President Nixon himself in June
1971. The Nixon administration publicly announced in June 1971, that it
intended to continue economic aid to Islamabad, although the Aid Pak Con-
sortium wanted aid to be withheld till a political solution to the con-
flict between the two wings of Pakistan was found.
The explanation was that it was a bureaucratic muddle. The State
Department officials were told by the Office of Munitions Control that
all military shipments for Pakistan had been delivered, that meant deliv-
ered to Pakistan officials in the United States. State Department offi-
cials assumed it meant delivered in Pakistan, and proceeded to assure the
American public that other shipments to Pakistan were halted. There was
still time to halt the shipments but President Nixon decided not to do it;
When this confusion surfaced, negotiations with the Pakistanis
already were well advanced for the use of Islamabad as the launching for
Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking.
What was so special about Islamabad as a point of
departure? If the Pakistanis would have reacted
badly to a blocking of the pipeline dribble, why
couldn't Mr. Kissinger have been rerouted from
Hong Kong or elsewhere? The point was, I bet that
Islamabad was by now in on the secret; if it had
been rendered peevish it might have leaked the
secret. The one thing the White House was deter-
mined was that there would be no leak.^'*
The Indians were also greatly irritated by the U.S. -inspired U.N.
effort to station observers of the refugee flow symmetrically in India
and East Pakistan.
'^^Ibid.
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This is the same old pernicious game of equating
India and Pakistan.
When hundreds of foreigners belonging to so many
different nations have been going to the refugee
camps unhindered for the last four months and have
freely reported conditions existing there and what
the refugees want and hope for, it is sheer imper-
tinence on the part of the U.S.A. and the U.N.—
goaded by the U.S. A. —to want to station U.N.
observers on Indian soil. ^5
It is already clear that during the Indo-Pakistan conflict over
Bangladesh, U.S. policy was "tilted" in favor of Pakistan and against
India. But why did the President and Mr. Kissinger take the line of
policy that they did? The calculations that went into this policy beha-
viour come out of the geopolitical power struggle game playing that is
supposed to be Mr. Kissinger's main forte, and is by all accoxints a game
that President Nixon liked to play. Nixon and Kissinger had been play-
ing their geopolitical games in 1971-72 with a game plan aimed at re-
ordering all world relations through a series of bold and fast plays, the
boldest and fastest of them centering on China. The only key to a logi-
cal—if not a sensible or intelligent—explanation of the President's
policy regarding India-Pakistan and Bangladesh lies in his carefully-
nursed surprise strategy to rearrange American relations with China.
Professor Harold R. Isaacs suggests:
There are older cold war underpinnings and precedents
for a pro-Pakistan U.S. policy. Pakistan was a Dulles
type "ally" via the more or less extinct Cento treaty.
It provided the U.S. with staging bases, especially
for the U2s. It served in its own wobbly fashion as
the southern hinge of the bloc of non-Soviet-oriented
^^Quotes, taken from Lewis report to the Subcommittee, op. cit .
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Muslim states including Iran, Saudi Arabia, andTurkey The United States has been supplying armsand other aid to Pakistan for many years on thi^
account, aid which continued through Pakistan's inter-mittent flirtations and brief encounters with bothRussia and China.
The Pakistan connection as it turned out, became anasset and a key piece in Mr. Nixon's new China gameplan.
_
When instead of launching U2s Pakistan justi-fied m Mr. Noxon's mind all the treasure that hadbeen lavished on that country through the years
Indeed, the bloodied land of Bangladesh can be putdown in history as the first new common ground across
which the Americans and Chinese reached to shake handsfor the first time in nearly twenty-five years. India
might be finding its situation intolerable, but India
would have to wait. Nothing could be allowed to happen
'
that might irritate Peking, even lead it. . .to put off
or postpone the Nixon trip until too late for the cam-
paign season in America. So tilt we did towards Pakistan
in order to keep tilting towards Peking.
It was too bad, then, if this gave Russia its oppor-
t\anity to move in decisively to consolidate its own
South Asian position. It was too bad if India
—
having been explicitly told by Mr. Kissinger last July
that it could not count any more, as it could in 1962,
on American help against China—seized upon the proffered
Soviet support against the newly-forming Pakistan-Peking-
Washington axis.''
Keeping the American eye on the Peking ball meant in
effect tiirning the American eye away from the plain
facts of West Pakistani oppression and repression in
East Bengal; the flouting of national election results
by President Yahya Khan; the contrasting democratic
character of Indian politics and the intolerability of
the situation created for India by ten million refugees. '^^
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During the weeks of the India-Pakistan crunch, all reports made
it clear that the President's feelings about "tilting" towards Pakistan
were very strong. He kept calling Mr. Kissinger "every half hour" to
see to it that the bureaucrats did his will or suffered his wrath. Pre-
Anderson White House reports described an angrily aroused President dic-
tating countermoves against India. This
"don't-stand-there-do-something"
approach was climaxed by the dispatch of the Enterprise task force into
the Bay of Bengal just as the fighting ended.
It is certainly plausible to suggest that Mr. Nixon
had already staked so much, politically and emotionally,
on his Peking game plan that any threat to it was
enough to drive him up the Oval Room. He got mad at
bureaucrats who were not tilting fast enough to suit him."^^
In August 1971 India suspected that Pakistan was coordinating
her major diplomatic moves with the United States. Whe found that the
United States was not interested in helping India to send back the refu-
gees. In India there were many prophets of doom who said that the country
would suffer defeat if Pakistan made a lightning attack and lamented that
Islamabad had the military backing of powerful countries.
As regards India's role, the Nixon administration branded India
"as the aggressor in the war." In an unusual press briefing on December
7, 1971, the White House spokesman narrated how "the United States Govern-
ment was actively promoting a political settlement," it was further dis-
closed that "the United States had wrung several concessions from the
Pakistani government and had conveyed this information to New Delhi
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before the outbreak of hostilities; ,et accor.in. to the. Xn.ia attache.
Pakistan without justification." The White House defended the U.S. deci-
sion "to pin responsibility on India for the warfare. "^^ m an earlier
statement on December 4, a high U.S. goverr^ent official who spoke with
the authority of the government cormnented that "we believe that since the
beginning of the crisis Indian policy in a systematic way has led to per-
petuation Of the crisis and deepening of the crisis. "^^ Henry Kissinger
saidt "Moscow is seeking to humiliate Peking by demonstrating that China,
a supporter of Pakistan, cannot prevent Pakistan's defeat.
Indira Gandhi the Indian Prime Minister thought that only the
united States was in a position to restrain Pakistan and help India to
solve the refugee problem. She even went to the United States to inform
Nixon of the grave situation in South Asia, to find out to what extent
he was committed to help Pakistan. During their discussions lasting
three hours and fifteen minutes spread over two days, Nixon and Indira
Gandhi made a sustained effort to understand each other's points of view.
She did not doubt his desire to find a solution, but she saw that he was
unable to shed his set notions about India and Pakistan.
Nixon indicated to her that the United States would cut off mili-
84tary axd to Pakistan and asked India to be patient for a couple of
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months. Kissinger had earlier in October 1971, told Indian leaders that
the united States wanted at least a year's cooling-off period during
Which India should stop supporting the guerrillas. Washington's anxiety
was that there should be no major conflict in South Asia which might
affect Nixon's visit to China, or his chances in the presidential election
in 1972. When Indira Gandhi returned to India on November 13, she in-
formed some of her cabinet colleagues that she believed the United States
did not want to get involved in an India-Pakistan war. She gave the im-
pression that before making any moves, India would await the outcome of
the new diplomatic efforts by some of the countries she had visited. '
"
But less than a fortnight after her return, economic aid to India was
cut off on the excuse that U.S. public opinion "which had become impa-
tient over India's refusal to defuse the situation" had to be assuaged.
When the war began on December 3, 1971, President Nixon granted
an urgent request from Pakistan for substantial quantities of military
aid. It sent the "Enterprise" to the Indian ocean. William Rogers
called the Pakistani ambassador for a lengthy conference on December 4,
but did not contact the Indian ambassador to hear his version. Acting
under Nixon's instructions, Washington suspended a little over a third
of the U.S. economic aid to India on the ground that such help might be
used by New Delhi to carry on the war with Pakistan. A report in the New
York Times from Islamabad on March 30, 1972 said that Pakistan military
sources disclosed that the air forces of Jordan and Libya had provided
appeared from this statement that the stoppage had no connection with
the east Bengal crisis, nor with the assurance given by Nixon to Indira
Gandhi
.
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-erican-.uilt co^at planes to Pakistan
.u.in. the wa. and t.at see of
the. continued to regain in Pakistan in March, three
.onths after the
'
ceasefire.^^ The White House conde^ed India's use of the ar.ed forces
as unjustified and as a .ove that could lead to international chaos.
Kissinger told a visiting British statesman that he regarded India's in-
vasion^of east Bengal in the sa.e light as Hitler's occupation of the
Rhine.^^ Nonetheless, the White House denied that it .as anti-Indian:
The U.S. efforts in the United Nations to brand India as the
aggressor were frustrated by the Soviet Union. Nixon siad that he re-
greted the failure of the Soviet Union to join the vast majority of the
menUoership of the United Naitons who called for an immediate ceasefire
and withdrawal of forces. Both the United States and China working in
harmony and with the enthusiasm of a new friendship, made bluff manoeu-
vres against India's land and sea frontiers. The U.S. and China "found
themselves as co-belligrents.
. .when they backed Pakistan.
.
."^^
Washington put pressure on India and the Soviet Union asking them
to end the war. Nixon was reported to have felt that his visit to Moscow
planned for June 1972 could be endangered if the Soviet Union continued
to support India. During the Bangladesh crisis the United States suffered
two diplomatic defeats. The first was its failure to persuade Pakistan
to reach an agreement with Bangladesh and the second its inability to
avert the war between India and Pakistan. There was disappointment and
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bitterness in the United States over "this disaster to American prestige
and posture throughout the democratic world. "^^ jaxnes Reston had re-
marked that the President supported Pakistan because he saw "in the sub-
continent the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union." He
said that the war had encouraged a close relationship between Washington
and Peking just before Nixon was to visit China, a desirable result from
the point of view of the United States. Nixon had feared earlier that
a prolonged war in South Asia might cast a shadow on his Peking visit.
It turned out that the brief war was beneficial to the United States in
cementing its relationship with Peking and discovering common ground.
India now felt that she was no longer a service applicant
approaching the rich nations for aid with an empty bowl in hand. She
informed Washington that her relations with it could be normalised only
if the United States recognized her dominant position in South Asia. She
said that the turmoil in the area was a legacy of the big power politics
from the days of John Foster Dulles.
Soviet Russia and China on Bangladesh . Within about a week from the
adoption of the ruthless suppressive measures against the freedom fighters
in East Bengal by the Pakistani rulers, President Podgorny wrote a rather
strongly worded letter to the President of Pakistan "with an insistent
appeal for the adoption of the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed
and repression against the population of East Pakistan" and requested him
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to adopt nethods of peaceful political s.ttUmenf of the issue. '° This
was indicative of the Soviet s^pathy for the East Bengali freedom
fighters, indeed Pravda ohose to describe the resistance struggle in
East Bengal as a "partisan war" almost the same week.^l Moscow's aban-
don:.ent of post-Tashkent Soviet non-partisanship in the Indian subconti-
nent was evident in the coverage of Bangladesh news in the Soviet press
right from the beginning.
Amidst such developments India's Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran
Singh, visited Moscow in early June. While the government of India uti-
lized the refugee issue to justify its military action against Pakistan,
the Soviet government used it for showing its support to India on the
Bangladesh issue. In a joint statement issued by Gromyko and Swaran
Singh in Moscow on the occasion of the lattter's visit to Soviet Russia,
the Pakistan government was asked to take "immediate measures" to end
"the continuing flood of refugees into India" and backed political solu-
92tion of the problem. In what amounted to a semi-official cognizance of
the Bangladesh government, Isvestia listed "Acting President of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Bangladesh, Sayed Naztul Islam" among the leaders who
had sent their condolence messages to the Soviet government on the death
93of the Soviet cosmonauts.
When the prospects of a political solution of the Bangladesh
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crisis became increasingly bleak, at this ti.e Gro^yKo paid a sadden
visit to New Delhi and surprised Mrs. Gandhi's friends and foes by sign-
ing the Indo-Soviet Defence Treaty.
soviet policy on the Bangladesh issue must have had some consid-
erations for scoring an ideological edge over Mao's China too. The
Soviets seemed to have rightly guessed that with their deep-rooted in-
volvement in Pakistan the Chinese were unlikely to support the freedom
struggle in East Pakistan.
Considerations of pure and simple power politics must have also
weighed heavily in the Kremlin's mind. As the Soviets were dealing with
both their global rivals-China and the U.S.
-on the Bangladesh issue,
they were in an enviable position of smashing their rivals' influence not
only in the subcontinent but also in the world at large. As the objec-
tive of Kosygin's policy was to check American and Chinese physical inter-
vention in the possible Indo-Pakistan war, he provided a shield to protect
India by signing the Indo-Soviet Defence Treaty. Indeed, the American
intelligence reports after the conclusion of the Indo-Pakistan war dis-
closed that the Soviet Ambassador in India, Mr. Nikolai Pegov, gave secret
assurances to Mrs. Gandhi that the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet would not
allow the U.S. Seventh fleet, which was on the way to Dacca, to intervene
in the war. The Soviet ambassador had also promised that in case China
attacked across the Himalayas, the Soviet Union would open diversionary
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nor. than anything else it is geopolitics that has brought impor-
tance to Pakistan in Soviet policies. The very possiMlity of Pakistan's
aisintegration in the wake of the Bangladesh Movement and the inability
of the Pakistani government to disengage itself fro-n China, whatever the
fate of the Bangladesh movement, had weakened the very base of the geo-
political compulsions in Soviet Pakistan policy. Pakistan's reliance
upon the Chinese shield was largely to protect East Pakistan from India
and the Soviets might have imagined that once the East Bengalis separated
themselves from West Pakistan, Pakistan's reliance on China too might
diminish, under these circumstances, for the same geopolitical reasons,
Russia favored a friendly Bangladesh economically and culturally tied to
India.
Since the Bangladesh movement at this stage was led by pro-Moscow
and pro-Indian Mujibur Rahman's Awami League Party, the creation of Bang-
ladesh would not have been in China's interest, in fact. East Pakistan
was a strategic link for China's political influence in Pakistan itself,
because of Pakistan's reliance upon the Chinese shield for protecting its
eastern wing fom India.
When the Indian government recognized Bangledesh, Peking radio
termed it as an Indian act of "expansionism" and compared the Bangladesh
government with the Japanese puppet government in Manchuria, which was
"recognized by the German and Italian fascists only." Its attack on the
Soviet Union was more blunt; it accused Moscow of "trampling on the norms
95
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Conclusion
in this chapter, we l^ave seen the kind of games that nations play.
Great powers are afraid to tamper with a small state that enjoys the pro-
tection Of a great power, for fear of generating a larger conflict. When
a balance of power prevails, the smaller powers make themselves its bene-
ficiaries, by aligning on the heavier side. When the balance is even,
the great powers would actively seek the allegiance of smaller States.
In the present context of detente between the great powers the smaller
states have lost their sway over them.
CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF INDIA AND
THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
The united States has been the largest donor of aid to India
for relief, rehabilitation and development over a long period of time.^
Economic assistance to India consisted of grants, loans ^ and agricultur-
al commodities. In the United States aid has been looked upon as an
instrument of foreign policy and has made an enormous contribution
to her national security. Initally American aid policy in Asia was
based on her politico-military rivalry with Russia and China. United
States policy has been to assist India in maintaining her democratic
institutions. India has received $10.8 billion in economic assistance^
of which AID $3.8 billion Public Law 490 food products $6.2 billion
and low interest developmental loans, $639 million and wheat loan
$244 million (1947-1977)
.
Over the years bilateral relations between the two countries
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h.ve resulted fro. ti,„e to ti.e in so.e differences. Paradoxically,
the acceptance of aid from the United states has itself been a source
of friction. Expression of gratitude, on the Indian side, especially
in recent years, has been ™.ted. Instead a desire to assert indepen-
dence despite receipt of aid has been evident.* Insistence on proper
use of economic assistance by the U.S. government is considered as
interference, and Indian government officials are all the time heard
saying that "pressures have to be resisted."
The direction of the Indian economy towards state control of
heavy industry, has not been well taken in the United States. The capi-
talist system was regarded in India as unsuited to her needs, and hence
American criticism of dominance of the public sector in Indian planning
was considered unnecessary.
The political implications of the aid has been more serious.
In the fifties, American aid was unduly dominated by considerations of
cold war, which India found highly distasteful.^ During his visit to
the United States in 1949, Nehru made it very clear that India was not
willing to make any changes in her foreign policy in return for any
economic advantages that the United States may offer. In 1953, heavy
Congressional cuts were made in the proposed aid to India, as a reaction
against India's policy in the Korean war. In 1965 again aid to India
4
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was reduced from 585 Allien to S65.88 Allien because of her failure
to take a strong anti-Soviet stand on Hungary.' m 1957. the Advisory
committee on the Mutual Security Program endorsed the View;
So,^?ri;^
assistance programs, a higher priority
should be gxven those countries which have joinedthe collectxve secvirity system. 8
India was never too happy about these political attachments of
economic aid, and Nehru insisted that India would never receive aid
with strings attached.
The Russian economic aid to India added another complicating
factor to India's economic relations with the United States. When in
1953 the Soviet Union started on a program of economic aid to non-Com-
munist countries, India was chosen to be the largest recipient of aid
outside the Bloc. Economically, the Soviet aid was far more appealing.
It was mostly in the form of loans on very generous terms—2 to 2.5
percent interest, which was almost half the rate of World Bank and Ex-
port-Import Bank rates. It was repayable in local currency or local
commodities over a period of ten to thirty years. Very low prices were
allowed for commodities for which the loan was to be spent, whereas
high prices were allowed for commodities which the Soviet Union bought
in repayment. At times, the loan was completely or in part cancelled
before it was repaid. In contrast to the United States, who imposed
conditions on the efficient use of loans, the Soviet Union professed
"^Ibid., pp. 214-16 and 218-19.
QReport to the President by the President's Citizen Advisors on
Mutual Security Progrctm, (Washington, D.C.: 1957) p. 120.
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to have trust in the judgement of the receiving government,
.^iie
most American aid went to the less popular private sector, the Soviet
aid was Channelled for heavy industry, which was laying the foundation
of the future industrialization of the country and was closely identi-
fied with its national aspirations. Consequently it made a much greater
impression on the recipient country, m addition, the Soviet Union
laid great emphasis on the fact that no political strings were attached
to Russian aid. At the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in
Cairo in 1958, the Soviet representative described Russian economic
policy in very attractive terms:
We are ready to help you as brother helps brother.
We do not ask you to join any blocs—our only condi-
tion IS that there will be no strings attached.
^
The Soviet economic policy in India was upsetting to American
policy makers. There was the danger of Indian economy becoming unduly
dependent on Russian economy. Moreover, the training of Indian youth
in the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian technical personnel in India
could facilitate the spread of Communist ideology among Indian intel-
lectuals, who Americans feared already had a leaning towards the left.
Cold War and U.S. Aid
The second world war brought about a radical change in the
stiTucture of international relations. In Asia, the post-war years
witnessed a ferment among the Asian peoples long held under colonial
bondage. This ferment led to national uprisings, and there was a demcind
9Department of State Bulletin , March 1958, p. 470,
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for independence everywhere which, eventually, had to be conceded by
the colonial powers. Preoccupation with Europe and with the military
containment of communism caused the United States during the inunediate
post-war years to neglect almost entirely the economic, social and
political aspirations of the Asian peoples. Only after the fall of
China to the communists in 1949 did it begin to assume some primary
responsibility for the security and well being of the Asian nations.
Like the united States, the Soviet Union had no vital strategic
interests in South and Southeast Asia during the period immediately
following the end of the Second World War,when the Colonial Powers were
in rapid retreat. However, the spectacular growth of communism in the
area and also the revolution in China gave impetus to, and conferred
enormous prestige on, the communist cause in Asia.
After 1953, the main objective of Soviet policy in Asia was
to widen the potential areas of friction between the new nations of
Asia on the one hand and the United States and the West on the other.
At the same time through constant attack on colonialism and unequivocal
support of nationalist movement, the Soviet Union won the sympathy
of the newly emerging nations of Asia and also materially advanced its
position in that area. The communists took every opportunity to de-
noiance colonialism and made every effort to link the United States with
it.
The war in Asia had ended with the dropping of the first two
atomic bombs upon Hiroshima amd Nagasaki in Japan in August 1945. Until
1949, the Truman administration scarcely thought of Asia at all out-
side of its special interests in China cind Japan. Its major concern
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was the rehabilitation and defence nf = k.*-a a r o a battered and weakened Europe.
After the capture of power by the co^unists in China in 1949,
the U.S. government acted increasingly on the assumption that the com-
munists Who were firmly in power were expansionist and hostile to the
united States, it therefore took the decision to extend the containment
policy to Asia, basin, it, according to Secretary of state Dean Acheson,
on "objective possibilities" and on the identity of interests between
the people of the United States and the people of Asia. The most strik-
ing feature of the containment policy as extended to Asia was the ab-
solute determination of the United States to protect what it considered
to be its "defense perimeter" running from thealeutians via Japan to
the Philippines.
The outbreak of the Korean war in the early stages of the con-
tainment policy led to a reassessment of U.S. policies in Asia. The
North Korean attack demonstrated the need for local military defences
to forestall similar attacks. The United States, therefore, pursued
a policy designed to protect the freedom of the non-communist nations
in Asia by creating sufficient defensive strength to deter aggression
and prevent subversion. And U.S. military policy in Asia after the
outbreak of the Korean conflict was based on the assumption of communist
determination to laiinch military aggression at anytime, anywhere in
Asia.
10
The attack by North Korea upon South Korea in June 1950 was re-
garded as the opening move by the Soviet Union in a series of military
agressions likely to occur anywhere in Asia. It was believed that the
Soviet Union had chcinged its policy radically from one of peaceful
penetration cind siabversion to one of open warfare. Yet this interpre-
tation was intrinsically implausible at that time and has been
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American security was g.owi„,iy
.„
relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc and between
each Of these two countries and the ^ss of countries located chiefly
in Asia and .frica which forced the unconnHtted neutral group." Be-
sides the united states had to face the fact that the underdeveloped
'
countries of Asia were li.ely to be strongly ten^ted to accept Soviet
economic assistance if they were unable to obtain aid for their economic
expansion from the United States.
Representative A.S.J. Camahan of Missouri states:
The^underdeveloped countries have natural resourcesthat we need. As a matter of fact, that is one ofthe reasons why I think that we must develoo thatportion of the world which has at least twolthirds
of the world's population and has, in terms of
natural resources, the greatest untapped and un-developed raw materials that are known.
. .Through
the economic development of these areas... we will
assure ourselves of two things: source of raw
material and ^he development of markets for our
own products.
William Benton, a former Senator from Connecticut, in an address
before the Economic Club of Chicago on 8 April 1959, spoke of the omi-
nousness of the Soviet economic threat. He said:
discredited by subsequent events. According to it, the Soviet role inthe outbreak of the Korean war was one of acquiescence rather than in-
stigation, resulting from a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and
capabilities. New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 12-19 March 1956.
^^U.S. Senate, Congress 85, Session I Committee on Foreign Relations,
Report of the Special Committee to Study Foreign Aid Program, The Role
of Foreign Aid in the Development of Other Countries (Washington, D.C.,
1957), p. 74
12U.S. House of Representatives, Congress 85, Session I, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1957 (Washington,
D.C., 1957), p. 403.
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The gravest threat to the Western world in theemerging Soviet economic challenqe is lht\ .
rating program of Soviet econoSc aid,^d^f
2e PlIvx'^aT'^'' handled... The Rus^ia^^are p aying for big stakes and they know whatthe stakes are.
..The promise help without the
i:;:^os"s!?3^°"^'^'°^^
^^^^ united States
The soviet point of view was clearly expressed by Khruschev in
the Twenty-First Party Congress:
Our country builds its relations with all stateson principles of complete equality and collabora-tion without any conditions of a military or poli-tical nature... The Soviet Union gives aid onfair commercial principles. The Socialist coun-tries help the underdeveloped nations to createtheir own industry while the United States seeksto sell consumer goods which have no sale on
the home market.-'-'*
The Soviet Union was determined, as Khruschev told a group
of visiting U.S. Congressmen, to "win over the United States... in the
field of peaceful production.
.. (and) prove the superiority of (its)
system. "ISNeedless to say, the object of Soviet aid and assistance to
the underdeveloped nations of Asia was to make sure that they stayed
outside the U.S. sphere of influence and, if possible, to put them
under Soviet influence and obligation.
»
The shift in Soviet policy attracted the notice of Secretary of
State Dulles who chid the Soviet leaders for "picking" the less developed
areas of the world as "targets of their guild" after having been "baulked
^^ Address by William Benton before the Economic Club of Chicago,
8 April 1959.
14
. ^Ibid., Vol. 106 (1960), p. 15325.
"^Ibid., Vol. 105 (1959), p. 5601.
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in their efforts to extend their influence by force • „e' l . H wamea his
countrymen that thev must "^r^y act on the assumption that the present
soviet policies did not mark a change of tactics. "16
in Offering assistance to the underdeveloped countries of Asia
<and elsewhere, the Soviet Union seems to have heen guided hy two ma.or
Objectives, one objective was to convince them of the peaceful char-
acter Of soviet intentions, thereby encouraging their neutralist-
orientation; and the other objective was to demonstrate to then, that
it had more to offer than the West fpr their transition to a nodem.
industrialised society. It sought to discredit the excessively :„ili-
tary approach of the United states to the problems ofSouth and South-
east Asia as evidenced by the establishment of the SEATO. and by con-
trast, to emphasize the economic and cultural orientation of its own
attitude to those problems.
The foreign-aid program of the United States on the other hand
tried to achieve two main objectives: the first objective was an economic
objective to develop the economies and improve the standard of living
of the underdeveloped areas; and the second objective was a political
objective-to strengthen the forces of freedom and democracy, and to
weaken the forces of Soviet and other forms of totalitarianism.
The scantiness of the economic assistance provided by the
United States gave an opportunity to the Soviet Union to warn the Asian
nations against the harmful effects of western aid. It alleged that
l^Address by John Foster Dulles before the Illinois Manufacturers
Association, Chicago, 8 December 1955, Ibid., Vol. 106 (1960). p. 15329.
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the united States wanted to prevent the industrial development of
nations in order to keep the. in their traditional role as exploited
suppliers of food-stuffs and raw materials.
The soviet Union concentrated its aid mostly in the unconnnitted
Asian countries, which were on account of their appalling poverty,
memories of western colonialism, and eagerness to accorr^lish rapid
economic development, particularly susceptible to the Soviet offer of
help. Superficially it offered its aid without strings attached,
and traded on the fact that U.S. aid was concentrated in countries
which were a part of its defence program, "^^at the United States
offers is assistance, while we offer collaboration on mutually bene-
ficial conditions, free of political intent, above all any military
involvement
.
"-^^
Dulles then Secretary of State believed that the idea behind
the Soviet economic campaign was "to subvert and communize" the nations
that were its "targets."-^®
The ascendancy of the communists in Indo-China threatened all
of Southeast Asia and made urgent the creation of some machinery for
its common defence, thus making way for the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO)
.
In forging the SEATO, the United States believed
that through combined strength and vigilance it would be possible to
safeguard the region against open armed aggression. At the same time
it realized the need to respect the views and opinions of those Asian
17
^'New York Times, 4 January 1958.
18U.S.A., Congressional Record , Vol. 102 (1956), p. 3357.
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nations Bu^a, Ceylon, l„aia ana Indonesia, which preferred not
to join the regional security arrangement. As Secretary of state
John Foster Dulles said:
While we think of the danger that stems from inter-national communism, many of them (Asian states) thinkfxrst of possible encroachment from the West aS
wiS ihf''''' ^^''^^ associa;erth the regional security arrangement. That choicethe United States respected. 19 n
The prestige of SEATO has suffered owing to the unwillingness
Of neutralist Asian nations like Burma, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia
to participate in it. These nations look with suspicion on the SEATO.
They regard it as a cover for the perpetuation of colonialism. The
fact that SEATO has only three Asian states participating in it and
that there are five non-Asian states is another glaring weakness of
the SEATO, and this has lent some credence to the communist stand that
the alliance represents an outside threat to the peace of Asia. 20
The Eisenhower administration was so preoccupied with the mili-
tary aspects of the containment policy that it failed to take into
account the political repercussions of that policy upon its friends
and the "uncommitted" nations of Asia. The rearming of Pakistan as a
member of the SEATO, for instance, had disastrous consequences. It
alienated India and forced it to devote huge sums to a counter balancing
rearmament policy, thereby prejudicing its domestic development plans.
It also made Afghanistan look to the Soviet Union and be more amenable
19U.S.A. Congressional Record
, Vol. 102 (1956), p. 5497.
20New York Times, 11 April 1956.
142
21to Soviet influence.
Purpose of u.s. Aid
over the years since the Marshall Plan, the U.S. foreign aid
program has gone through many substantive changes as well as several
changes in name. But for convenience, it could be said that there have
been three phases: in the 1950's, "foreign aid was justified primarily
as a national security measure, needed to strengthen allies and to build
up low-income countries so that they would be less vulnerable to com-
munist invasion or takeover." it was seen as a relatively short term
undertaking.
In the 1960's-the second phase-the trend was more towards
strengthening a number of countries against internal subversion, but
there was also a trend towards development as a goal in itself. These
were seen to be economic, social, and political components of develop-
ment-all leading towards the target of self sustaining growth.
21_ .
Professor Hans J. MOrgenthau, however seems to feel that the
United States has paid an exorbitant political price for insignificant
military advantages in South and Southeast Asia, for according to him,
the SEATO has not added anything material to the strength of the West.
Besides being "militarily hollow and politically pernicious," the SEATO,
says he has imposed upon the United States additional liabilities, both
economic and political. The Asian allies of the United States have
made no bones about their intention to use the SEATO as a means to draw
freely on the treasury of the United States. Since whatever economic
and political support these allies receive can never be enough, they
are in a position to threaten the United States and to say that they
would look for support elsewhere. Pakistan, for instance, has repeatedly
complained that the United States has not supported it strongly enough,
and on this score, it has not hesitated to look for support elsewhere.
Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of Am. P.P . (Chicago, 111., 1962), p. 263.
22
Robert A. Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies
,
Brookings
Institution, 1970, p. 4
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As time went on, however i-i- y^^r^^r,., t became increasingly apparent that
so:. Of the less developed countries (LOC's) even if the. approached
self sustaining growth, were not undergoing the same development pro-
Large sectors of their populations were benefiting little, if at all,
from What was happening and income disparities were getting worse in-
stead better, in spite of vast industrial investments. In 1973, setting
the stage for the present (third) phase of the U.S. foreign aid program,
which has assumed a quite different focus, m a special report to
congress in 1975, the Agency for International Development (AID) des-
cribed the "new directions" in these terms: "Earlier development stra-
tegies assumed that economic growth would seen 'trickle down' to the
poor masses. In fact, while the large mass of the poor in some countries
benefited from development to some degree, many of the very poorest
were either no better, or even worse off than a decade earlier. Re-
cognition of these trends and their serious implications has led to a
shift in our development assistance strategy ... "^-^
AID thus pragmatically set about retooling itself to focus on
"the poor majority." U.S. bilateral development aid now related mainly
to :
Food and Nutrition; For example: increasing agricultural production
through digging wells and constructing dikes, providing new seeds,
providing agricultural equipment and technical assistance.
23
Implementation of the "New Directions" in Development Assistance-
Report to the Committee on International Relations on Implementation of
Legislative Reforms in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, July 22, 1975,
p.
6
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SSEulatiH^LSSdj^^ P..
^^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
r^laria ana in draining swa^s, provision of ^aicaX supplies, paying
sala^ Of a doctor; assisting faMXy guidance associations; training
counselors; providing contraceptives.
gducatio a^nd Hu^ Kesource
_OeveloHn^ Por exa:nple: training primary
school teachers; assistance with project for use of radios in education
in ^untainous country; provision of equipment for education; training
local officials in development management.
In other words, American economic aid has moved progressively
from programs with strong political and security overtones to a program
that is much more directly humanitarian in nature.
Why Aid to India
In the annual Congressional and public debates over what Americans
would call "foreign economic assistance" a variety of claims are put for-
ward to justify these expenditures to American tax payers. By helping
India's economic development it is suggested that the United States may
bring India into closer agreement with America's approach to current
international questions.
We will, of course, continue to seek common ground
with India on international questions. But we
know that such agreement carries no price tag.^^
Besides, American economic assistance program was conceived as
a moral obligation which, the United States, as the richest nation in
24
Chester Bowles, A View from New Delhi (Bombay: Allied Publishers
1969), pp. 135-142.
Ibid.
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history are duty-bound to assume,
in the Kennedy administration emphasis was put upon long term
economic aid to underdeveloped countries in general and India in parti-
cular. The President himself had long been a strong advocate of eco-
nomic aid to counteract Soviet influence rather than military aid and
alliances which he considered to be relatively ineffective instruments
of policy. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act marked the transition from
the "decade of defense" to the "decade of development." The annual
report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance for the fiscal year
1962 stated:
The United States' foreign assistance effort of the
1950s emphasized building up of the defensive strength
of the free nations. In the 1960s the program will
reflect the decisions made by the administration
and the Congress to place new emphasis on economic
and social development the first steps towards the
decade of development,^^
To meet the changed nature of Communist threat, it was declared
with the introduction of the Act of 1961 that it is the piirpose of
the United States through assistance program "to help make a historic
demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand-
in-hand.to the end that an enlarged commxanity of free, stable and self-
reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity. ^
7
This attempted use of non-political arguments in favor of aid
was caused by the realization that anti-Communism as raison d'etre of
United States
' foreign aid did poor service to American propaganda efforts
26
Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the
Fiscal Year 1961
,
p. 2
27
Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for the
Fiscal Year 1962, p. 2
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a re-
use
How-
in the cold war. People likp rv,o<.4.Pi ix e Chester Bowles had long advocated
w.t. SUCK ex.:.,
^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
co^unis.. need to feel hungry
.sians,
.uyin, f.ie„,3, etc.^«
.He
Of non-politicaX ar^nts was also induce. the success of soviet
economic policy which was largely f.ee of political connotations
eve. there was no change in the
.asic objective of fo.ei^ aid-to serve
0.3. policy interests in the cold war. To achieve this, the ad^nistra-
txon of the aid pro^aM was reorganized under a single centralized
authority-Aio-under the direct Jurisdiction of the Secretary of state
to tie it more securely with foreign policy objectives.
The failure of several countries to use aid productively and
achieve the rate of growth expected did dishearten several of its ad-
vocates. India did accept several economy-strengthening proposals
developed by the World Bank and endorsed by the United States. In June
1966 the government devalued the rupee and overhauled and liberalized
the complex foreign trade and exchange control system, enabling priority
industries to obtain vital imports. Agricultural development was given
new emphasis. Fertilizer procurement was increased 85 percent over the
1965 level and steps were taken to encourage domestic and foreign firms
in fertilizer production and distribution. India also proposed to
quadruple its rate of investment in family planning.
28U.S. Congressional Record
, 86th Congress, March 11, 1959, p. 3478.
29Proposed Foreign Aid Program
, Agency for International Develop-
ment, FY 1968, p. 120-21.
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The X9e2 Sino-lnaian «a. had fo.cea
, increased defense e>,enaiture
xn India fro„ 2.S percent of ,r=ss national product to an esti„.ted
four percent. The Indo-Pa.i.tan conflict in 1965 increased the drain
on India's limited resources and reduced those available for economic
development. As a result of the Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the United
States suspended new development assistance until stability in the sub-
continent could be reasonably assiired.
.
The soviet union negotiated an arms-aid agreement with India
in September 1964, which covered, among other things, the supply of
supersonic MIG fighters, missies, transport aircraft, light tanks, and
naval equipment on deferred-payment basis, as well as the building of
a MIG con5>lex in India. ^0 i^^ia was greatly impressed by this in view
of the refusal of the United States to supply India with some "high per-
formance" F-104 supersonic fighters. 31 These had been requested to
strengthen the defence capability of the Indian Air Force to enable it
to intercept enemy aircraft operating from bases in Tibet in the event
The Soviet Union is reported to have agreed later to supply Indiafour to submarines and several squadrons of sophisticated fighter-bombers,
SU-7, as well as several hundred air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles'
and five fighters or destroyer escorts. This caused heart-burning in
Pakistan, which contended that during President Ayub Khan's visit to
MOSCOW in April 1965, he did not press for the cancellation of existing
contracts for arms supplies to India on the assurance that there would
be no new deals. When President Ayub Khan visited Moscow again in the
latter part of 1967, he tried to persuade the Soviet Union to curtail
its military aid to India. Soviet leaders told him, however, that they
felt "India has to be able to defend itself against China." The Statesman
(Calcutta)
, 8 March 1968 and 15 April 1968.
^^The Pentagon tried to convince India that it could do without the
costly F-104s to match the Chinese air striking power. It was pointed
out that the fighter aircraft is possession of the Indian Air Force,
including Vampires cind Gnats, could be made more effective by fitting
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Of another Chinese attack.
Although the United State*; wr^„i^a b tes would not supply f-104s, it was
villin, to assist In.i.
, .^.tain extent in
.„i,ain, i.3 de-
fence potential. However, in contrast to the Soviet „nio„33
not «iiiin, to extend ^Xitary assistance
.e.on. t.e s^ o. ,eo ^iXion=4
to enable ^^^^i^to^^eet^p^^^^
them with side-winder missile*: n
ized that the importanrttiig for ^^eT^^""^"* °^ ^"l"the acquisition Wt foreign supfrsoSj ^? ™" =° ™<=hfacture planes of that v2iety ?he M?G^r.'' ^"^^^ '°give India a capability in ^ i^no^! ™s thus expected to
3 June, 1964.
P^^'-^^ ^° important field. Times_of_India (Delhi),
32It should be noted, however thai- =+• *. •
aggression on India in Oc;ober l962,^e UniSd s'Z T"'^^
Pu^IisS in th ^''^''^"^ ^^^2, which w" wide";
n^on
e American Press, led to the conclusion that the SovietUnxon was unwillxng at that stage to alienate China. But, wiS t^I
rch^ge" in f'^^-r^^^ ^^^^ ^™ the end of 1962!'i:dLtln ofLT^To ^"^^^^^ ^^^^^ available. See Pravda, 5 Novem-ber 1962.
34,The US Government agreed, in September 1964, to provide an im-mediate credit of $10 million for the purchase of defence artLSs
Tll7^r^.T' /""^"^^ services to be financed from this credit to thereplacement and modernization of plant and equipment in ordnance factor-ies. In addition, a credit of $50 million, as well as military grant
assistance for such items as air defence communication equipment for theborder roads, was also given to India. As this assistance was to be inJcmd, It was not possible to assess its value financially. The assis-tance was discontinued after the outbreak of fighting between India and
Pakistan in September 1965. Times of India (Delhi), 22 September 1964.
The prospect of continued American military assistance to Indiam the latter 's effort to meet the Chinese challenge became a matter
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The US Government had long held the vi*.wy xa n e that a second Chinese assault
on India's border was unlikely. Besides, it was not unmindful of the
repercussions in Pakistan that a higher volume of military aid to India
might produce.
Both the united States and the Soviet Union, have, however.
Offered
.nilitary assistance to India to enable it to develop its defence
potential, since the second half of 1964, when the United states decided
to adopt a "harder line" towards Co^nunist China, it has wanted India
to assure a leading role in South-East Asia as an instrvMent of the
anti-COTMunist containment policy.36 Hubert H. Huinphrey. the Democratic
Vice-Presidential nominee in 1964, states in an interview to the New
York Times: "The only counterbalance to the Chinese power is a coalition
of serious concern to Pakistan. President Ayub Khan was, however assuredby President Kennedy that the limited assistance which tl^e UnUed stated
wo^rbe"L'° f
-""not pose any threat to Pakistan and t^ft the"uld be no curtailment of the even greater US aid that had regularlybeen receiving. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (London, 1965), p. 664.
36 The US roving ambassador, Averell Harriman, during his visit toIndia in March 1965, assured the Government of India that if CommunistChina launched a nuclear attack on India, the United States would cometo Its rescue. Along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the Unitedbtates also agreed m a disarmament conference at Geneva in March 1968to give a guarantee of protection against attack by the nuclear Powers
to all nations that agreed to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
But this can scarcely be considered reassuring, for any help that the
United States might extend to India in the event of a nuclear attack
would come only after the damage has been done and not before it. What
has added to the perils of India is the possibility of Pakistan acquiring
nuclear weapons from Communist China. There is little possibility of
the People's Republic of China producing enough nuclear arms in the
near future that will give it strength enough to challenge on the
actual battle-field the might of the United States. It may, therefore,
have no hesitation to pass on to its friend Pakistan whatever nuclear
arms it has with a view to blackmailing India at second hand.
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Of powers with India as its main force. In looking at Asia we should
always consider the role of India, what we expect from her and what she
can provide. "37 similarly. Representative Frank S. Thompson of New
Jersey regarded India as "crucial" for Asia. He said: "If India goes
down, all Asia may go down, and if Asia is lost the cause of freedom
itself may be lost. "38 senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a
former US Ambassador to India, likewise felt it to be of the utmost
importance that India, the "largest Non-Communist nation", should
succeed. He pointed out that "a watchful Asia will compare the re-
sults in free India and Communist China, to see whether the living
conditions of millions of human beings are improved most effectively
through India's voluntary methods or through coercion of Chinese com-
mTinism."39 in fact most competent observers in the United States
appeared to hold the opinion that the success or failure of India in
emerging from the Asian revolution would, in all probability, determine
whether or not all of Asia would eventually fail under Communist in-
fluence .
3'^New York Times, 13 September 1964.
38
°USA, Congressional Record, vol. 104 (1958), p. HOC.
3^Ibid.
, p. 4613.
"^^India's greatest difficulty in meeting the demands of the "revo-
lution of rising expectations" is its inadequate food production and its
inability to derive from its agriculture the capital needed for industri-
alization and economic progress. This has compelled it to seek addition-
al foodgrains from other soxirces. In this respect the United States
has rendered invaluable help by supplying it with foodgrains over the
years under the P.L. 480 programme. However, the United States can no
longer be taken for granted as a supplier of food. One reason is that
America no longer has a surplus of foodgrains. Stocks have been drawn
down to such an extent that, for the first time since the Second World
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Like the united States, the Soviet Union also looks upon a
strong and independent India as an important means to frustrate the
Chinese attempt to extend influence in South-East Asia,
.s a matter of
fact, soviet strategy towards the underdeveloped areas in Asia and its
fear of Chinese predominance in those areas make it imperative for it
to maintain close relations with India. Moreover, by 1964, the rift
between Moscow and Peking had become so complete that the Soviet Union
did not hesitate to publicize what it had been doing to help India in
defending itself against the threat of another Chinese attack.
The united States views Soviet assistance to India against
the background of the deepening Sino-Soviet schism. Soviet aid to India
is exprected to increase Chinese discontent.
War, farmers are being asked to put additional acres under foodqrains in
frorin^-"'f -fitments. Also, demand for foSgraLsom I dxa has mounted much faster than estimated, so that there is ^^efeeling that P.L. 480 has helped to inhibit rather than enc^age sel^!sufficiency. The reluctance of the United States to continue indefinite-ly its role of supplying foodgrains to India became clear when PresidentJohnson authorized the shipment of only 900,000 tons of foodgrains toIndia after an "agonizing" delay of over a month after additional food-grams had been requested by India to tide over its food crisis. TheUS government also made it clear that it expected other nations to
match the American effort to meet India's food requirements. New York
Times
,
Weekly Review. 1 January 1967. "
"^^The original Soviet objective of seeking a diminution of Western
influence in Asia continued to engage the attention of Soviet diplomacym the sixties; but to this was added the objective of the containment
of Chinese Communist influence. In response to the new situation, the
Soviet Union further intensified its policy of extending moral and
material support to the non-aligned countries. It gave with a liberal
hand every kind of economic and military assistance to these countries
and made every effort to bring them closer to itself. It also avoided
taking sides in any dispute where one Asicui coxintry was pitted against
another. In the Afghan-Pakistani dispute over the Pakhtoon demand
for a separate state, it did not openly side with Afghanistan as it had
done before. In the Indo-Pakistani conflict of September 1965, it adopted
a posture of neutrality. It was, however, anxious to improve the
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in the fail of 1965, India faced the greatest drought. The
united states authorized a „0 ^lUon fertilizer loan in Oece^er 1965
to help India with food production in 1966-67.
. loan
,,,,
was authorised in early 1966 for the purchase of raw „.terials and
spare parts essential to economic development. 42 Puture loans were
made contingent on continuation of efforts to improve stability and
peaceful relations in the subcontinent and also on improved policies
designed to accelerate economic and social growth. 43
Although huge food shipments by the U.S. continued to "tide
India over," President Johnson in his Message on India Food of February
2, 1967, said that the United States was pressing not only for inter-
national coordination of food aid through the World Bank consortium but
also for a total comprehensive program of aided self-help in domestic
ui^ed°wLh^thr^/"''" "'^ "^^ ''^"^-^'^ ^° ^ =l°=-ly
as^^ll afin Lla °' °" ""^^ subcontinent'
42
PY i967!''p?°TS5
^^^^^^^^^ Program, Agency for International Development,
^^fter the fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in thefall of 1965, the United States concluded that future aid to India andPakistan must be related rather directly to progress towards securing
the peace between them, since without peace economic development is not
possible, and without economic development stability is uncertain.
America made this quite clear to both India and Pakistan. She suspended
all military aid the sales deliveries to both countries when the fighting
broke out last fall. Although she relaxed her policies slightly on sales
of limited and selected non-lethal military items, her embargo was other-
wise still in effect. Since 1971 war embargo has been total. Commodity
loans of $50 million for Pakistan and $100 million for India was due to
satisfaction with the progress made at the Tashkent Conference and there-
after. Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1966, p. 669.
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food production, with self-sufficiencvrr y as the goal. Commitments under
-0, PuBXic 4S0. an. B.po.t-x„po.t Ban.
,,,, ^^^^^^^
.43.1 ^lUon in aaaiUon to u.s. cont.i.„.,o„3 to inte^ationa. l.„ai„,
agencxes which also assisted in India.
These prospects dimmed, after the March civil disturbances
in East Pakistan, when an estimated nine million refugees fled to
.astern
India. The Indian Foreign Minister visited Washington in
.une and Prime
Minister Gandhi in November to convey India's position to the U.S.
government. The U.S. government decided to provide 350 million in grant
refugee relief assistance as well as a .20 million development loan to
help Offset the strain to the Indian econon.. By the outbreaic of
hostilities U.S. grant aid for the relief of refugees in India totaled
over
,89 million. Some $250 million more had also been requested from
congress for future refugee and East Pakistan relief programs.
However, when there was an outbreak of hostilities on December
3, 1971, the U.S. declared that India bore heavy responsibility for
this. AS the crisis deepened American sales of military equipment to
India was terminated, and economic assistance worth over $80 million
was suspended, 45 even though some assistance continued.
U.S. Economic Assistance and Pakistan
Under the pressure of the Cold War, the United States sought to
build up the military strength of its allies and potential allies though-
44.United States Foreign Policy 1971
, report by the Secretary of State
p. 113.
4^Ibid.
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give
out tH. „o.Xa. Pakistan the onX. county i„ sout.
..u
...e.ve
substantial ™iUta^ aia f.o. the United states. The decision to ,
."iUta^ assistance to Pakistan was ^ae in 1954, when the developing
Military crisis in Indo-china had raised the widespread fear that the
united States would sooner or later have to face a ^litary showdown
in Asia.
This decision greatly complicated America's relations with India.
This was, however, sought to be dispelled by President Eisenhower, who
declared that if the aid was misused or directed against another country
for aggression, he would "undertake immediately in accordance with (his,
constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the
U.N. to thwart such aggression."
The primary American objective in giving military assistance
was to strengthen Pakistan against the Communist menace - to contain
soviet expansionism as well as to deter any surprise attack by the Soviet
union. But the attention of the Pakistani government was more directly
focussed on the balance of forces in the Indian peninsula and notably
on the bargaining leverage of Pakistan vis-a-vis India on the question
of Kashmir. '^^
The attitude of the United States is somewhat different. It had
imposed an embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan and India after the out-
break of the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September 1965. This ban was
46Despite Eisenhower's pledge, no effective steps were taken by the
US government to prevent Pakistan from using US arms either in the Rann
of Kutch early in 1965 or during the Indo-Pakistani conflict in September
1965. India's protests against the use of US arms by Pakistan were
virtually ignored by the US government.
47The Government of India, however, seized upon American military
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to suppx, 3p„e pa..3
.o.
^^^^^ ^^^^^^
suppX, woula be treated separate!,, ana strictly on its ^rits.48
we have seen in the preceedin, chapters that President Ni.on
haa continued ^litary assistance to Pakistan even durin, the Indo-
Bangladesh crisis, since 1951 Paki<5-t-;,nx^DX akista has received a total of $4.5
billion aia fro. the United states, she has provided „„re than 200
million in relief and econonuc assistance to Pakistan since the e„a
of the oece^er 1971. The Onitea States has provided lar^e-scale
technical and economic assistance to Pakistan including program de-
signed to help proviae the foreign exchange necessary to i,^le„ent the
country's development plans. '^^
Magnitude of Aid
^" magnitude of American aid received is very
on'^Kashl^^^'n^ ^°
rationalize its refusal to accept the UN resolutionKashmir, USA Congressional Record , vol. 104 (1958), p. 832.
48
supplies'^of TJZ^^
""^^^^ military aid to Pakistan, with the ban onies lethal weapons, is regarded by Pakistan as a severe blow,
stipulation TJ"^ °" ^ ""^"-^^ ^^^^ The latterf "^^^terpreted as a device to keep Pakistan on a short leashso that the United States could veto the continuance of fresh hostilities
even if it could not prevent their outbreak. Pakistan reacted by boycottingthe meeting of the SEATO military advisers in April 1967 two days afterthe US policy was announced. During the same month, Pakistan, for thefirst time, publicly asked for the cessation of the US bombing of North
Vietnam. Ibid
. , 8 March 1968.
49Background Notes: Pakistan
. Feb. 1977, Department of State Publi-
cation 7748, Office of Media Services, Bureau of PublicAffairs
.
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large. During the first Plan period, the role of foreign aid was
quite n^dest. In subsequent years, however, the trade deficits widened
considerably, and there was a sharp increase in foreign borrowings.
Since the beginning of the fourth five year plan, however, there has
been considerable decline in the volume of her trade deficits and there
has therefore been a reduction in the utilization of external assistance.
Since 1968 the utilization of net assistance had declined by alnost
half. Table 1 gives the details of the inflow of foreign assistance
between 1968 and 1972.
Table 1
Inflow of Foreign Assistance;
Gross and Net
Items 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72
Estimates
1. Gross disburse- 1196 903 856 791 778
ments of which:
(a) PL 480 food 285 131 128 57 52(b) PL 480 non- 57 27 42 32 43food
(c) Other food 45 55 19 36 31
assistance
II. Total debt
servicing of 333 375 412 450 450
which
:
(a) Amortiza- 211 236 268 290 284
tion pay-
ments
(b) Interest 122 139 144 160 166
payments
III. Net flow of
assistance 863 528 444 341 328
(I-II)
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey, 1971-72, p . 59.
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The import of foodgrains during these years has al
a decline.
r ooagrams
:
Production and Imports
(million tons)
Iear Production Imports
1962-63 54.9 2.1
1963-64 66.9 0.7
1964-64 82.0 5.1
1965-66 72.3 7.5
1966-67 74.2 10.4
1967-68 95.1 8.7
1968-69 94.0 5.7
1969-70 99.5 3.9
1970-71 107.8 3.6
Source: RBI, Report on Currency and Finance,
1970-71, p. 69.
However in the past two or three years since 1971, the monsoon
has been inadequate over large portions of India. A few areas have been
completely without rain for even one full season, but in many areas the
rains have come late, have been sparse, or have not behaved in the usual
manner. Severe drought conditions in India have combined with other
factors to produce a situation that could be described as "an unprecedented
national crisis . " The food surpluses that India had built up during the
five good monsoon stammers prior to the liberation of Bangladesh were gone.
The upward swings on the production graphs during the green revolution's
euphoric years in the late 1960s were now pointing downward. Since 40
percent of India's electrical power comes from hydroelectric plants that
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depend on mini:aal water levels that are not always being maintained,
there has been an even more acute power shortage in the country than
was predicted, which has in turn curtailed production of fertiliser
plants and many other industrial enterprises. India's situation is
more desperate due to cessation of its long standing aid connections
with the United States.
Then too, because of the euphoria of the green revolution and
its hopes for "self-reliance, "tnerican assistance to India is at present
extended through the following three agencies:
1. U.S. Agency for International Development
This agency was created on November 3, 1961, to bring American
economic assistance under a unified administration. The USAID gives
both development loans and grants. Grants have been made for malaria
eradication, smallpox eradication, higher education, the National Pro-
ductivity Council, craftsmen training, dairy development, community
development, crop production, and a number of other projects. The
principal activities of USAID (agriculture, capital projects, education,
food resources and regional development, health and family planning,
labor and management ) indicate the comprehensive scope of its backing
for India's developmental efforts. The developmental grants do not
involve repayment.
Loans extended to India by USAID are repayable in dollars. In
order* to avoid an excessive foreign exchange debt service burden to
India, the terms of the loans are set at a long period. Repayment is
scheduled over 40 years including a ten year grace period.
2. Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) Program
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IS
con-
India has received large quantities of foodgrains, cotton and
other agricultural coxn^odities
, under the Pl-480 program. Almost two-
thirds Of all U.S. assistance to India since fiscal year 1951 comes
under the Food for Peace Program. The only difference between India's
purchase of foodgrains under PL-480 and normal commercial purchases
that the purchase is made in rupees nearly all of which cannot be
verted and spent outside of India. Eighty-seven percent of the sales
proceeds under PL-480 go towards the economic development of India.
One-third of the proceeds are given as grants, a larger portion is
loaned to the Indian government for development projects and 6-9 percent
of the total is loaned to private industry. The remaining one-eighth
of the total supports U.S. government agencies in India.
America's supplies of foodgrains under PL-480 on concessional
terms has helped maintain the stability necessary for peaceful and
democratic economic growth. In 1966 PL-480 was given a major overhaul.
The new program was designed to achieve a transition from sales for
local currencies to sales for dollars, effective from December 31, 1971.
Fertilizer : Apart from financing fertilizer imports, the United
States has provided large credits to help finance the construction of
two fertilizer factories at Trombay and VisaJchapatnam. The Trombay
plant commenced production in 1965 and the VisaJchapatnam factory in 1967.
The two factories presently produce gertilizer sufficient to increase
India's food production by a total of 1,350,000 tons every year. In
December 1968 the United States extended a loan to help finance an
expemsion program which would make Trombay one of the larger fertilizer
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projects in the world by 1972.
^SliS^^ltur^^^ The U.S. has helped establish
eight agricultural universities in ;.dhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, the Pun 30b, Ha jasthan, and Ottar Pradesh
Each received the cooperation of an E.erican agricultural university.
Apart from producing highly skilled graduates the universities are
playing a notable part in promoting agricultural research.
Exchange of personnel,
: More than 400 American agricultural
scientists and other specialists have served in India, sharing their
skills with their Indian colleagues.
irrigation: The United States is aided nine major irrigation
projects which by the end of 1970 were expected to irrigate nine
million acres. These projects, which received loans and grants totaling
Rs. 214 crores from rupees generated by the sale of PL-480 agricultural
commodities are: Bhadra, Chambal, Damodar Valley corporation, Hirakeed,
Kakrapar, Kosi, Mahi Right Bank Canal, Nagar junasagar, and Tungabhadra.
Five of these projects used construction equipment financed by a U.S.
dollar grant of $7.9 million. The U.S. has also made available Rs. 126
crores for minor irrigation projects.
Water resources development: Despite the successful conclusion
of these and other large irrigation projects, the need has become apparent
for additional and more widely spread sources of water and for better
utilization of the water sources available. One result has been the
proliferation of power pumps fed in many cases from hydroelectric or
thermal projects constructed with U.S. assistance. Forty thousand tube
wells and 200,000 other pxinpets were added to rural resources in 1970.
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I:^roved seeds
: .he U.S. has assisted in the development and
popularization of hybird :naize and hybrid ^owar. The Rockefeller
Foundation has played a leading role in this project. The United
States is also helping mdia in the breeding, testing, and popularization
of high-yielding varieties of rice, wheat and pulses.
Agricultural research
: Prom that portion of PL-480 sales pro-
ceeds Which is reserved for U.S. governn^nt uses, the Agricultural Re-
search service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture has extended 230
grants to finance research in 68 research institutions located in all
parts of India.
Education
: Engineering - The U.S. has provided equipment for
five engineering colleges at Guindy, Honerah, Kharagpur, Poona and
Roorkee. Grants from Pl=480 funds have helped establish 14 regional
engineering colleges at Allahabad. Bhopal, Durgapur, Jaipur, Jamshedpur,
Kozhikode, Kurukshetra, Mangalore, Nagpur, Rourkela, Silchar, Surac,
Tiruchirapalli and Warangal.
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur — This institute,
which graduated its first class in 1965, is being developed into one of
Asia's premier technological universities. A consortium of nine Ameri-
can universities aids it. Nearly 30 American professors serve on
the faculty. the faculty. The U.S. aid program has supplied a considerable
amount of equipment to the institute, including an IBM 1620 computer
system, one of the largest functioning in India.
Power development : In the field of power development India has
received more assistance from the United States than from any other
country. Thirty of India's power projects have been assisted by the
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unite, states, so.e p^o^ects t.. „„itea states
.as e.ten.ea loan,
in ^th aoUa.s an. xnaian currency ccve.in, eithe. thei. enti.e cost
or the .ajor part of it. ;^erican aia for the rest has heen lar,el,
xn loans and grants of „pees
.erivea f.o. the sale of agricultural
products supplied to India under the U.S. Pood for Peace <Pu.lic Law
480) program.
Transportation
: The United States has provided dollar grants
and loans totalin,
,317 ^llion to help India develop its transportation
system. In addition a grant of Rs :>n ^^^^^ ^yjT^T: r . 20 crores from PL-480 funds has
been extended for road building. U.S. aid to Indian railways totals
5259 million, ftn important U.S.-aided project is the diesel locomotive
factory at Varanasi. The factory has an annual capacity oi 150 loco-
motives
.
The united States has extended loans totaling $77.2 million to
three Indian firms to expand their production of motor vehicles. U.S.
grants totaling $2.9 million for improved navigational aids installed
at several airports to facilitate faster and safer domestic flights.
3. The Export-Import Bank
The Bank authorizes loans, guarantees and insurance for facili-
tate the foreign trade of the United States. The loans are in dollars
and are repayable in dollars. In determining interest rates, the Bank
considers its own cost of borrowing money. The current standard
Interest rate is 5.5 percent per annum.
Other Projects
The U.S. has been assisting in a number of projects designed
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has extended loans for assisting in several aspects of India's fa.il.
Planning program. The industrial projects which have received U.S.
foreign exchange assistance include a rayon tire-cord plant at Kotah,
and aluminum factory at Renukoot, factories manufacturing chemicals
and Plastics at Bo:^ay, Calcutta, Mettur and Thana, a paper mill at
Amlai, a rayon factory at Kalyan, a pulp factory at Fort Songhad, a
Plant manufacturing forgings at Poona, a bearings plant at Jaipur, a
coal mine ropeway at Jharia and two coat washeries at Dugda and
Patherdih. The U.S. is extending considerable assistance to India
in developing the country's mineral resources. Some half a dozen U.S.
experts are assisting the Geological Survey of India in conducting
reconnaissance geology of the potential phosphate bearing areas, de-
tailed mapping, chemical analyses and beneficiation.
Another major U.S .-assisted effort is the Orissa iron ore pro-
ject. This included the development of the Kiriburu iron ore mine in
Orissa, the development of the Visakhapatnam port to enable it to handle
large ships and the construction of railway lines to link the mine with
the port. By exporting several million tons of iron ore to Japan the pro-
ject helps India earn considerable quantities of foreign exchange.
Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement
On February 18, 1974, Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S.
Ambassador, signed the Indian Rupee Settlement Agreement on behalf of the
U.S. government in New Kelhi. India. This brief ceremony ended over
Slsee Hearing before the subcommittee on Near East South Asia of
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15 years of consideration of ways and
.eans of dealing with the rupee
question. Four American presidents had grappled with the proble.
and some even had special reports prepared. And in some respects the
final agreement reached is more favorable than the reconuaendations
proposed in some of the previous inquiries into the matter.
In its simplest form the agreement calls for the settlement
Of the Indian rupee debt owed to the United States. The agreement in
no way affects the dollar debt India owes and continues to repay
faithfully and on time. This agreement calls for a writing off of
a $2.2billion worth of the approxiamately $3.3 billion rupee account
to be made available for the Indian government for particular develop-
ment programs in specified amounts over a specified time period. The
remaining more than $1.1 billion worth of rupees is available to the
U.S. for its own uses in India and Nepal.
Changing Perspectives
Precisely because foreign assistance programs are so vital
to a nation '.s interest, they must reflect the current circumstances,
and not those of the past. They must respond to the ideas which move
men in the emerging nations, and also take account of the growing
wealth of other advanced countries. In a message to the Congress in
March 1967, President Johnson emphasized the six guiding principles on
which U.S. aid activities were to be based in the future. On the
basis of these principles he proposed the foreign Assistamce Act of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs
, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress,
2nd session, Jcmuary 29, 1974.
^
-^Department of State Bulletin, March 6, 1967, pp. 378-79.
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1967. T.e ^ct made it very clear that the development 30. was primarily
the responsibility of the developing countries themselves, it also
emphasized multilateralism, i.e.
, an effort to get other doners to
enlarge their cormnitments. The United States was also to encourage
regional economic development, through cooperative projects, like the
Asian Development Ban3c, by investing in areas concerning agriculture,
health and education. The Act was also to see that U.S. aid programs
have the least adverse effect on her balance of payments. Care was
taken to see that aid activities were efficiently administered.
It is evident that the U.S. was moving into a new era - one '
of emphasis on negotiation and transition to greater responsibility
on the part of her friends and allies. President Nixon later pro-
posed new legislation, dividing his legislative proposals into two
parts
- an International Security Assistance Act, and an International
Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act. The purpose was to
distinguish more clearly than in the past among the objectives toward
which U.S. aid is directed: her short term security interests, and her
long term development and humanitarian interests. ^5 The emphasis again
was on letting the lower income countries play more central roles in
solving their own security and development problems. In the case of
development assistance, this means working within a framework set by
international institutions to the maximum extent possible.
Because of the changed structure of world affairs ~ namely,
the greater strength of countries other than the U.S. ~ there was a need
^^U.S. Foreign Policy 1971, a report of the Secretary of State, p.
235, Foreign assistance programs have also been greatly slashed by the
Congress, from time to time.
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o. the part of the ^rican ,ove.™e„t to loo.
..^.^y i„.o Ker o™
self interest. The unite, states Is no longer the overvhel^„,i, pre-
do^nant economic power in the worla. she is now only the first a:.n,
equals
.
in the past few years Ainerioan national enthusiasm for the
Whole prooess of forei^ assistance has neatly di^ninished. The ordeal
Of the Vietna^se war tended to deflect attention fron, the prohle,.
Of M.oh Of the rest of the world, a„a has
.nade her question her own
capabilities, she is also preoccupied with the problen. of her own
domestic economy.
The cold war strategy of which U.S. forei^ aid policy was a
part has been discarded after the detente with China. The United States
has thus gradually adopted a new approach to foreign assistance that
takes into account the changes that have taken place in the inter-
national environment, and the valid cirticisms that have been made
of its own current programs. There has been a greater emphasis on the
role of trade and investment in the international development process.
The lower income countries are asked to expand their exports to be
able to afford the imports needed to promote their development efforts,
and to lessen their need for concessional foreign assistance.
^"^
Conclusion
These pages make it abundantly clear that American economic
and military aid has played a major role in the formulation of U.S.
56Department of State Bulletin
, February 5, 1973, p. 133.
57Department of State Bulletin
, October 5, 1970, pp. 369-78.
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policy. x„ .act it Ha.
.ee„ an i„.,_,„,
^^^^^^
successive aa^.i.t.ations in the last three decades have n«ae ,ood
use to manipulate world events Th^ r^v^. e programme of aid, despite its
humanitarian overtones sought to TPl^7 u • ^n lay the basis for the construction
of a system of societies open to Doli^-io^i m • •p ixt cal manipulation and to the
pressures of free enterprise. The economic justification for aid
was neatly dovetailed into the humanitarian and strategic aspects.
The united States has endowed India with an enormous amount
Of aid. Aid is a source of embarassement to the recipients who do
not want to recognize the inevitable strings behind it. it has had
a major influence on the course of U.S. relations with India, it has
conditioned India's response to world events. Despite the differences
over aid, U.S. economic assistance continued to be given to India.
Washington could not ignore India's geographical position, size, the
nature of her government and institutions. There was a vague but
natural sympathy in the United States for India. Most of the U.S.
aid has been given under bilateral agreements and not through inter-
national agencies, the United States has been able to exercise some
amount of control and use it as a political weapon, often forcing aid-
receiving countries to pursue policies favourable to it.
While hard-headed businessmen plan for the production of bigger
quantities of armaments, ignorant U.S. diplomats - like Bowles, Keating
and Moynihan in India - speak of peace. Ambassador Kenneth Keating
said in New Delhi in March 1972 that of the two basic considerations
that motivated the United States one was a purely humanitarian reason,
"a moral obligation to assist developing nations" and the other was the
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belief "that the world will be a mr.^^x ore peaceful place if each and every
nation can provide social iustice ;,nri ^: a d economic progress for its people.
India's relations with the United st^^c. uu r a ates became sour when
Washington decided to withhold the $87 fi n •xa rn ? .6 million economic aid that was
in the pipeline in December. 1971 onnicer, the ground that India attacked
Pakistan. Washington did not stop the aid in the pipeline to Pakistan.
The U.S. action ignored India's stand and held he. responsible for the
war in the siibcontinent
. The n q c4-=4.« rvU.S. state Department's bureau of public
affairs claimed that the aid was suspended because India did not comply
with the resolution on Bangladesh passed by the U.N. General Assen^ly.
Willia. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of state said in January, 1972 that
if Washington were to provide very substantial amounts of foreign aid
and the aid receiving nations got involved in warfare, aid would go
down the drain. In India's case he said, "we have stopped foreign aid
for the moment and we are going to take a hard look before we renew
aid." With evident sarcasm Rogers said that he was pleased that Indira
Gandhi had said "they are going to do more in terms of self-sufficiency.
The United States weary of aid programmes, had been looking for
an excuse to cut off aid to India. Senator Everett Jackson, a senior
democrat, said in January, 1972: "I think we have spent enough and got
very little in return. I am willing to drop India." U.S. displeasure
with India was shown when the WorldBank's assessment of India's require-
ment of $1,250 million for 1972 was not accepted by the United States,
although all members of the consortium had approved it. After the gross
indifference shown by Washington, New Delhi did not want U.S. AID to
operate in India and tihgtened its stand on the use of PL -480 funds.
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xn 1973, x„.i..s attitude change, ana a satisfactory solution for the
disposal of the accumulated PL-480 funds was found.
As far as India was concerned n c;^u a, U.S. aid as a normal way of
supporting econo:„ic development came to an end in 1971, although the
Planning Co„Mission envisaged that under normal conditions India would
require some Mnd or other of foreign aid till 1980. Massive economic
aid seems like a thing of the past, and its effectiveness as a politi-
cal weapon has been blunted. l„ the 1970 's aid has not been used by
big nations as a lever to influence the small ones. Summing up India's
attitude towards aid, Indira Gandhi said, "We want to do without aid....
It is not U.S. aid alone we want to do without, but all aid.... The
fiver-receiver relationship is never a happy one. we still need help
but without strings."
A new philosophy of aid was bom when the United Sates reached
an understanding with China and the Soviet Union in 1972. The talk of
containing communism and saving democracy became as innocuous as the
Internationale, U.S. has taken a realistic approach now, that develop-
ment assistance can play a part in boosting U.S. trade, money, and in-
vestments in the countries of the third world. In 1973 U.S. AID was
renamed the Mutual Development and Cooperation Agency (MDCA)
.
Some liberal leaders like Senator fulbright. Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relation Committee believed that "the disorder in our
financial house" was largely due to the accumulated effects of many
years of over-commitment abroad, including the foreign aid programme.
He said he thought that it was the zealous determination to control and
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shape the destinies of much of the world k ^n that had brought the United
States to a state of financial exhaustion.
The united States resumed direct aid to India in August, 1978
after a seven year break, signing agreements for three loans worth
.60
million. The agreements cover two loans, of ,30 million for medium
sized irrigation projects in Gujarat, and $28 million for the import
of anti-malaria insecticides, and a grant of ,2 million for the appli-
cation of science and technology to rural areas.
The united States suspended direct assistance to India in 1971
following the outbreak of a rebellion in Bangladesh which eventually
led to war between India and Pakistan and the break-up of Pakistan.
The two loans are repayable over 40 years with a 10 year grace
period, and will carry a two percent interest in the first 10 years and
three percent in the next 30 years.
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CHAPTER IV
SOME IRRITANTS IN INDO AMPPTP^ RELATIOM..
Indo-U.S. relations were reasonably good until 1971, and reached
a low point during the last eight Nixon-Kissinger-Pord years. The in-
ability Of the united States and India to wor. out a mutually acceptable
relationship has been one of the central features of .odern Asian poli-
tics, occasional episodes of cooperation between the world's two largest
democratic nations, such as occured when they were motivated by a similar
antipathy to China for more than a decade after 1959, have been over-
shadowed by the tension and antagoism that accompanied the Korean and
Vietnam wars, American emphasis on military alliances in Asia, and India's
close relations with the Soviet Union. These erupted into open hostility
during the Bangladesh upheaval in 1971 when India occupied by nearly ten
million refugees from East Pakistan, invoked the principal of Bengali
self-determination and dismembered its hostile neighbour. American sup-
port for Pakistan's national integrity won widespread support in the
United Nations, but the Nixon administration's attempt to use the nuclear-
powered carrier Enterprise as an instrument of gunboat diplomacy was a
dismal failure. Relations, between the United States and India came to
an all time low for some time after 1971.
President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi periodically asserted their desire
for friendly relations, but such proforma statements were again overshad-
owed by acts regarded as hostile by the other country. New Delhi main-
tained that the reference to Kashmir in the joint communique signed by
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President Nixon and Chou-En lai in 5i,=„„tm Shanghai in February 1972 was inter-
ference in india.s internal affairs.
-The United states regarded
.e„
Delhi's Silence over Morth Vietnam's 1972 invasion of South vietna.
coupled vith its condemnation of
..erican bor^ing as another example of
India's one sided reaction where Con^unis. is involved, it also regarded
Mrs. Gandhi's allegations in September 1972 that CIA manipulation of op-
position parties was behind widespread antigovem^ent disturbances as an
atte-pt to bla^e America for conditions arising out of her government's
failures.
The congress party in India has denounced Secretary of state
Kissinger and the CIA over the agency's involvement in the Chilean mili-
tary coup, which ousted Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens from the presidency.
The party also said that "some foreign powers may think this is a poten-
tial place for another experiment in Chile, yet Mr. Kissinger visited
New Delhi in October 1974, and for the first time publicly acknowledged
the end of the previous "cold war" approach to India.
^
He also assured India that the Central Intelligence Agency would
not interfere in the political situation there. Mr. Kissinger's visit
was largely designed to lift relations between India and the United
States, since resentments lingered in India, due to Washington's support
for Pakistan before and during the 1971 war that resulted in the creation
of Bangladesh.
Indo-U.S. relations have been confused because of a split of
•""
New York Times
, September 27, 1973, p. 3
2
New York Times
, November 3, 1974, p. 6.
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opinion in Indian government circles on the issue ^ acn . group of Indian
Officials vie„ the no bixUon U.S. assistance to Xn.ia in the sixties
With stron, aversion, because the. conside. it haa st.in,s attache.
Indian officials in Washington failed to respond to the Po.d Administra-
tion's readiness to assist India in copin, with her food e„er,ency.^
"Mrs. Gandhi was against ;^erican food aid at bargain prices." On the
other Side was a group of officials, who were bent on improving ties with
the united States, and were worried about leaning too far towards the
soviet union. This group includes Foreign Minister Singh, the staff of
the Indian Embassy in Washington and some of «rs. Gandhi's closest ad-
visers.' Those opposing such ties include several key figures in the
congress party and the more militant left-wingers among Mrs. Gandhi's
'
supporters. Mrs. Gandhi seemed to be siding with the hostile group, she
distrusted the United States and was far more fearful of it than of the
Soviet Union. Her distrust stemed from such factors as United States
support of Pakistan during the 1971 war that resulted in the formation
of Bangladesh; lingering resentment over American aid which Indians view
as humiliating.
In this chapter we shall deal with some of the issues, which have
upset relations between the two countries significantly. These issues
did not develop into any major conflict, but were responsible for the
3
New York Times
. September 27, 1973, p. 3.
4
Ibid.
5
C. Subramaniam, Ashok Mehta, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, all of whom
were her cabinet members. Nandini Satpathi, a young woman M.P. from
Orissa, and Dwarka Prasad Mishra, the powerful Chief Minister of Madhya
Pradesh-
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attitude Which decided
.a:or problems U.e U.S. economic assistance,
Indo-Pa.ista„ relations, the Indo-PaWstan war in X971, and Indo-M,eri-
can relations in general.
CIA
The toppling of governments unfriendly to Washington by helping
opposition political parties has been a favourite sport of the CIA.
Never before 1972 had an Indian prime minister warned the nation of the
grave danger posed by the CIA. Indira Gandhi criticised the CIA on two
occasions in 1972 and said that its activities were "on the increase and
we must continue our vigil. After the war with China in 1962, New
Delhi had sought the CIA's assistance for the limited purpose of getting
information on China. But after the New York Times disclosures on the
CIA's invovement in the overthrow of governments in Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries. New Delhi has kept a close watch on its activities in
India. A cabinet minister has said that New Delhi had evidence that the
CIA had helped a political party in Bombay."^ The CIA is believed to have
assisted some other political parties also. It had collected information
of India's nuclear programme, and in 1965 procured for the dosier on
Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri a comprehensive report of the analysis
g
of Shastri 's blood. What worried New Delhi more than the theft of
6
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cUnicaX
.epo^^s was t.e influence t.e CX. sou^.t to Have t.e social
economic and political institutions in India. The scare a.out t.e CIA
Showed how distrustful New Delhi was of the United States, and the de-
nunciation Of the CIA indicated how openly critical official New Oelhi
was Of Washington. ^ instance of the financing of anti-co:.unist par-
ties by the CIA was revealed in May 1973 when the Newjork^ re-
ported that Craha. Martin, the U.S. a^assador in Italy in 1970 and later
axnbassador in South Vietnam, had urged the CIA to restore its secret fi-
nancing to the conservative wing of the Christian Democratic party in
Italy and give $1 million to it. The request was turned down. But the
report said that until 1967 the CIA had been regularly financing the
Christian Democrats on the ground that it was only countering the Soviet
support to the communist party. India suspected that the United States
had a hand in the overthrow of the government of President Salvador
Allende in Chile in September 1973. Indira Gandhi warned Indians from
time to time of a similar danger of collusion betwen certain elements in
India and the outside forces which wished to topple her.
A more serious threat to India than these alleged activities
aimed against Indira Gandhi's government was the arming of nations un-
friendly to India by the United States. New Delhi was worried about
Washington's decision to sell $4 billion worth of arms to Iran, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. The appointment of Richard Helmes, a former chief of
the CIA, as ambassador to Iran, together with the proposal to induct
about 11,000 U.S. personnel into Iran was a dangerous portent especially
when the King of Iran had said that "we must see to it that Pakistan
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does not fan to pieces." mai. fearea that apart fro. the i„sta.iUty
the U.S. anns deal would create in West Asia, some of the anns raight be
used against her in a future war. However the rapproch^ent between
India and Iran in 1974 and the close ties established between the. after
Indira Gandhi's visit to Teheran in May, 1974 have .ade Iran's intentions
less suspect in New Delhi. The rift between Pakistan and Iran, which
came about as a result of Bhutto hobnobbing with Colonel Gaddaffi of
Libya when, the Shah of Iran disliked, has helped India to get over her
fear of Iran's military build-up.
The U.S. made an unusual move in naming Daniel Moynihan as am-
bassador to New Delhi. It was unusual because Moynihan was known to be
a critic of Nixon's policy on India. He was a member of the U.S. delega-
tion to the United Nations in December 1971 and had strongly criticized
Washington's policy towards India. A week after the war, he had said
that what happened in East Bengal "was done by stupid and arrogant men in
power" and it would have been surprising if India had not acted as she
did. In the appointment of Moynihan, a cross between Bowles and Gal-
braith, some observers detected a ray of hope. But others noted that
Bowles and Galbraith had found it hard to dispel areas of darkness in
Washington as far as India was concerned and Moynihan did not find the
task easier.
Allegations were made by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his recent
i^ook A Dangerous Place
,
to the effect that the CIA contributed money to
an Indian political party, in one instance making the payment directly
to Indira Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi, who later became Prime Minister, was
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president of the Congress Party at the time that the fund.•-nat cn t s were said to
have heen transferred to her to heip defeat the co^unist
,over„.ent of
Kerala state in i,5S.
.he co^unists were
.eaten h. an aUiance headed
Mr. candhi.s partv in an election that
.ear. she has denied the aiXe-
nation,
.ccordin, to Senator Moynihan, who was a^assador to
.ndia fro»
1973 to 1975, another contribution was ™ade to the party in an effort to
unseat a co„™^ist governnent in West Bengal state. It is unclear when
the alleged transfer was supposed to have taken place; the con^unists
won west Bengal elections in 1967 and 1969. were defeated in 1972 and
regained power in 1977. ^. „oynihan stood by these allegations even
When questioned by the Indian Foreign Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
during a visit to Washington recently.^
„.s. Gandhi has however denied
these allegations.-
Indian Reactions on
American Involvement in Vietnam
Before peace descended on Vietnam in January 1973 for two decades
India and the United states had found themselves in opposite camps over
the war in Vietnam. India had been more or less consistently critical,
often mildly, sometimes sharply, of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam
war. The United States could not understand how India, a poor and weak
nation to which it had given large sums of money as aid and shipped huge
quantities of food grains in times of dire need, could turn around and
9
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attac. the benefactor. Indira Candhi observed in February 1972 that
India wasnot,iven "to display
.latitude in any tangible sense for any-
thing." ° She .ade this remark half-hu.oro.sly, half-seriously when she
was as.ed whether India felt obliged to demonstrate gratitude to Moscow
for supporting her on Bangladesh. What made India criticise the United
States was not lack of gratitude but an overpowering sense of revulsion
against the senseless war the United States waged in Vietnam - a war
Which imperilled the freedom of Asian nations and brought unimaginable
destruction but which Nixon liked to call "one of the most unselfish
missions ever undertaken by one nation in the defence of another. "^^ '
The objective of the United States in South-East Asia has been
the containment of communism as well as the economic exploitation of
the wealth of the region. Nixon had said in 1954 that Washington should
fight communism in South-East Asia, because the rubber and tin of the
area were important to the United States. But in Vietnam these objec-
tives were observed, what the United States wanted to have was political
control of the area, and the Vietnam war had nothing to do with terri-
tory, trade, or access to raw materials . "^"^
President Kennedy was the one who finally got the United States
hopelessly involved in Vietnam. He had fumbled the Cuban invasion and
perhaps wanted to show that he could lead the United States to victory
10
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^""Radio broadcast on February 24, 1973, reported by The Times > Lon-
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at least in Vietnam. When Mehru
.et President Kennedy in Washington to-
wards the end of 1961, he appealed to the President not to send ^erioan
soldiers to Vietnam and enlarge the war. "The President talKed a good
deal .ore about Vietnam, but the Prime Minister remained unresponsive.""
The President, against the advice of Nehru, undertook a major military
build-up in south Vietnam, but at the time of Kennedy's death in Novem-
ber 1963, their number had increased to 15,500 as a result of the policy
of "one more step", each new step promising the success the previous one
had promised but failed to deliver.
The U.S. generals in Vietnam always made- Washington believe that
the war was being won by the United States. In 1962 Robert McNamara,
the secretary of defence, said: "We are winning the war." m March
1963, the defence department announced that the "comer had definitely
been turned towards victory in Vietnam."
India's criticism of the United States became rather muffled when
her ties with China were imparied in the early 1960 's. On April 1, 1965,
however, India and sixteen other non-aligned nations appealed to the
United States to "start such negotiations as soon as possible without
posing any preconditions so that a political solution" may be reached.
Lai Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minsiter, criticized the escala-
tion of the war in Vietnam and said that the proposals Johnson had made
to solve the Vietnam war were inadequate. On April 29, 1965, he said:
"There is hardly any point in the offer that he (Johnson) has made. The
14
Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days
,
Houghton Miffin Company,
Boston, 1965, p. 525.
183
first thing is that the bo:.tin,
.ust stop." mai.
build-up and the fearsome bo^in, of North Vietnam. In June 1965. the
New yor. Times appealed to President Johnson to give serious considera-
tion to What it called "the appeal fro. Indian Pri.e Minister shastri
for another pause in the bombing of North Vietnam." But President John-
son would not listen. The tempo of the troop build-up and the bombing
increased. The number of U.S. troops in Vietnam in August, 1965 was
125,000 and by December 1966 it rose to 400.000. The United States
realized too late that its real enemy in Asia was not international com-
munism but militant nationalism.
Until mid-1966 India had avoided sharp criticism of U.S. policy
in Vietnam. She had hoped to keep good relations with the United States,
but the deliberate escalation of the war and the toal disregard of the
human life changed New Delhi's attitude. In a radio broadcast in July
1966 Indira Gandhi expressed strong disapproval of the bombing of the
Hanoi-Haipong fuel depots. She wanted "the bitter and bloody war" to
end and said: "Recent events have regrettably added to the grave danger
of escalation that might embroil the world in a larger conflict. There
can be no military solution in Vietnam: there is no alternative to a
peaceful settlement. The parties must be brought to the negotiating
table within the framework of the Geneva agreement . ""'"^ A week later
she was more forthright in her condemnation of the United States. During
her visit to Moscow, the joint communique issued by the Soviet Union and
India on July 16, 1966 called for the immediate cessation of the bombing
15 ^The Statesman
, July 8, 1966.
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o. «o.th veitna.. Washington iodged what was aescribe. as a strong pro-
test against the reference to the
.nitea states in the joint co»unig.e
ana particularly objectea to the woras
"aggressive acti„„« . •<:iyyire sxv ons of imperialist
and reactionary forces .
"
in October 1966 maia was even .ore blunt in her criticise of the
united States. At the inauguration of the tripartite meeting of Tito.
Nasser ana Indira Ganahi on October 21, 1966. the Indian Prin,e Minister
Observed that the brutal ant tragic war in Vietna. should be ended before
it destroyed the entire country and spread and engulfed the world. She
suggested the holding of a peace conference simultaneously with the halt-
ing of the bombing, followed closely by cessation of hostilities "on all
sides throughout Vietnam." she asked Britain and the Soviet Union, the
two co-chairmen of the Geneva conference to convene a conference and
bring the parties to the conference table.
In 1967 India again appealed to the "peace-loving people and
government of the United States" to stop the bombing of North Vietnam
"unconditionally and indefinitely" in order to shift the Vietnam issue
from the battlefield to the conference table. In their numerous refer-
ences to Vietnam, Nehru, Shastri, and Indira Gandhi had seldom named the
United States as the aggressor. The usual appeal by India was that "the
bombing of North Vietnam should stop" and not that "the United States
should stop the bombing of North Vietnam." India referred to the with-
drawal of "foreign troops" without mentioning the United States. The
United States took objection even to this mild criticism. It chided
16
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India in February 1968 for being inactive as chairman of the ICC
licing Can^odia-s border to prevent infiltration into South Vietnam.
Cazr^odia had requested the ICC to investigate border violations and
Delhi's refusal to strengthen the con^ission to patrol the border between
Cambodia and Vietnam was resented by Washington.
But New Delhi tried to maintain a flexible stand on Vietnam, and
her criticism was not influenced by ideological considerations. She did
not hesitate to voice her disapproval of U.S. escalation of the war, nor
did she fail to welcome American peace moves. When President Johnson
announced on March 31, 1968 the suspension of bombing, India most heart-
ily welcomed it. Indira Gandhi hailed Johnson's "courageous initiative
contained in a speech of historic significance" and welcomed "Hanoi's
positive response to it."'''^
President Nixon, Johnson's successor entered the White House with
the pledge that he would seek an honourable end to the conflict in Viet-
nem, but Nixon took the war to Cambodia by bombing the country secretly.
From 1971 onwards India's reaction to the U.S. policy in Vietnam became
stiffer. The days of meek protests were over. In April 1972 Indira
Gandhi described the situation in Vietnam as a classic example of old
colonialism yielding place to new intervention.
When peace descended on war-ravaged Vietnam in 1973, India's two-
decade-old role as chairman of the ICC came to an end. U.S. displeasure
over India's attitude made Washington keep India out of the new interna-
tional supervision and control committee. North Vietnam's reported
17
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desire to have India in was frustrated by Washington
.
Pakistan as Irritant
m Indo - U.S. Relatione
Fro. the beginning, the United staes
.oved closer to those coun-
tries Which appreciated its values, motives and policies. It found that
the fight against co»,unis., Pakistan would be a more faithful friend
than India. President Tru:^n said in 1953, "Pakistan's friendship for
the west may become an important factor in giving stability to the near-
east. At the same ti^e Pakistan is a valuable ally in South Asia because
of its strategic location in the Indian ocean and its control of land
bases in Central Asia."
After Eisenhower became President, Truman's thesis was translated
into action. In May 1954 the United States and Pakistan signed a mutual
aid and security agreement. It made Pakistan a close ally of the United
States and a part of the Dulles dream of containing the Soviet Union by
building a defensive line stretching from western Europe to Japan. India's
refusal to become a part of this defensive line and be a partner in the
crusade against Moscow irked Washington. Nixon described the pact with
Pakistan as an "opportunity to build a counter-force to Nehru's neutralism
18
New Delhi noted that 8 of the 13 participatns at the Paris confer-
ence which dealt with a crucial area of Asia were non-Asians. Japan,
with a stake in the region, was also left out. A Japanese official said
a country like India had greater responsibilities and interests in the
region than many other countries participating in the conference. When
the question of site for the conference was under discussion, the North
Vietnamese were said to have suggested Paris. When Washington objected
to Paris, Hanoi proposed New Delhi. The U.S. objection to New Delhi
was even stronger and in the end Paris was accepted.
in the indi^ leader's own backyard." He also said that U.S. policy
Should be based "not on any fear of angerin, Mehru.""
.He U.S. ar^s
aid to Pakistan and the deliberate do™-,radin, of India by Washington
made Nehru distrust the United States.
The debate in the United Nations over the Kashroir issue in Janu-
ary 1957 Showed the basic U.S. resentment against New Delhi. India was
upset by the persistent U.S. attempts to help Pakistan, and side with
her on the Kashmir issue. Although the United States gave military aid
to Pakistan and supported her in the United Nations, it could not ignore
India. Nor could India go without U.S. assistance at that time. Presi-
dent Eisenhower is said to have stated after his visit to India and Paki
Stan in 1959, "There seems to be something in the chemistry of humans
that often determines on their first contact whether or not any two
easily become friends or are mutually repelled. From the very beginning
I conceived for President Ayub Khan a warm affection which still endures
We have already seen in the previous chapters how the United
States has tilted in favour of Islamabad, or equated India and Pakistan.
This tilt becomes clearer through the Anderson papers. The Washington
columnist Jack Anderson brought into open President Nixon's pro-Pakistan
policy. These papers are the true copies of the notes of minutes pre-
pared by U.S. Defense Department Senior officials in the secret meetings
of the White House Special Action Group during the fourteen day Indo-Pak
19
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was
war in 1,7.. .He ^eetin, „.3 o.e. „e„^ Kissinger
.„a
related to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971.
Mr. Kissinger always opposed Washington's policy based on the
syste. Of Military alliances and on the proposition that deterrence o,
aggression required the largest possible grouping of powers. He was sKepti-
oal Of the effectiveness of the military alliances sponsored by the
united states in Asia. He said that Pakistan's motive for obtaining U.S.
ar.s was not security against a co™„unist attack but protection against
India. 2^ He thought India had "the benefit of a well-trained civil ser-
vice and Of an experienced leadership group" and that of the new nations
India perhaps was in "the best position to resolve its choices wisely
2
1
and piirposefully.
"
After he became the chief of the national security council under
President Nixon, he found as other U.S. policy planners had found earlier,
that Pakistan could be used in furthering U.S. objectives in Asia. His
secret statement, supporting Pakistan and denouncing India, made in De-
cember 1971 after Pakistan had bombed Indain airfields, come as somewhat
of a surprise to many who had known him earlier. He was not the author
of the policy towards India, but he became a strong advocate of it. The
new element was secrecy. In an era dominated by multi-dimensional mass
communication systems, a fair amount of secrecy in diplomacy is necessary.
See Appendices 1, 2 & 3.
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ana t.e WUsonian
.U.^ open
.ipi.„.., UttU
.eXev.„ce. How-
ever, Kissinger made a virtue of secrecy.
in 1971 .i.on was t.e strategist and Kissinger
.as his tactician
He seemed to have convinced himself that for a short-term o.^ective
Nixon.s pro-Pa.istani stand was correct, and he
.ecame a wiUing instru-
ment of Nixon in his effort to thwart India's moves on Bangladesh, xt
was the White House
- more specifically President Nixon, who on December
4, 1971 authorized a statement which said: "India hears the major respon-
sibilities for the hostilities that have ensued. "^^
After India declared unilateral ceasefire, Nixon claimed that it
was his pressure on the Soviet Onion, which in turn put pressure on India,
that brought about the ceasefire. He said that the United States "in
communication with the Soviet Union, played a constructive role" in end-
ing the war. 25 New Delhi considered this as one of the most perverse
statements that came out of the White House on the crisis in December
1971. Indira Gandhi stated that when the battle in Bangladesh ended,
"it was we who decided unilaterally on a ceasefire," but the White House
kept repeating the claim that Nixon had saved Pakistan from being over-
run by India.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan President, also believed that
Pakistan was saved by Nixon. He told C.L. Sulzberger, the New York Times
columnist on foreign affairs, that the enemy's onslaught against West
Pakistan would have continued unabated if the United States had not given
24
New York Times
, April 27, 1972.
Interview with Time magazine, January 3, 1972.
190
a fir. ulti^tur,.
"The Soviet
.nion," said Bhutto,
".naerstood the sig-
nal ana then pressed India to accept a ceasefire. I know that this is
true. I have just been in Peking and chou-En-lai confirmed this to n,e."
Besides Chou-En-lai, Bhutto, and Nixon, so.e leaders in India also be-
lieved that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a hand in the ceasefire.
Atal Behari Vajpayee, the president of the Jan Sangh party suspected that
India declared the ceasefire as a result of pressure from Moscow. But
the Indian government has all along maintained that the ceasefire deci-
sion was entirely its own.
The U.S. moves against India in 1971 revealed to the world more
dramatically than ever before the gulf that separated official Washington
from New Delhi. During this period, for the first time India opposed
stoutly and, what was more, openly U.S. attempts to intimidate her. The
united States overlooked the genocide committed by West Pakistan in East
Bengal on the plea that it was an internal affair of Pakistan. It turned
a deaf ear to India's complaint that the massive influx of refugees into
India from East Bengal was a grave threat to her economy and political
stability. India was worried not so much by the threat of war by Paki-
stan as by the upheaval inside East Pakistan and its repercussions in
India. Kissinger himself had said a few years earlier that, "...some
states feel threatened not only by the foreign policy of other countries
but also, and perhaps especially, by domestic transformations" in other
4. • 26countries.
When the war broke out, even against the advice of the CIA, the
26
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White House insisted that- it- v.^.^at xt had oonvmcng evidence that India wanted
to seize Pa.istan-held te„ito^ in Kashmir and Justified its
.oves
against India on this ground. It refused to divulge the nature of the
evidence, when Kissinger was as.ed if he wanted the public to taKe on
faith alone a ^ajor justification for U.S. policy, he replied: "that is
correct.... „e will not produce the evidence since it would co.pron,ise
Other things.
"^"^
Nixon's mood, his pique, even his political philosophy do not
fully explain his opposition to India in 1971. There are other factors.
A major justification for the policy was the necessity not to upset his
efforts to befriend China. He found that Pakistan was not only less com-
plex and more easy to work with than India but also useful in his search
for a detente with China, just as earlier Presidents had found Pakistan
more useful than India in the cold war against the Soviet Union and
China. Pakistan had expressed the desire to be a broker between Wash-
ington and Peking even as early as 1964. Bhutto had said on August 21,
1964 that nothing would give Pakistan "greater satisfaction" than to see
a rapprochment between China and the United States and that "we will be
willing to undertake whatever limited role we can play in this matter."
One of the immediate reasons for Nixon's coldness towards India
in 1971 was his desire to have the support of Pakistan in establishing
28
contact with China. Nixon's firm support to Pakistan against India in
1971 underlined, among other things, his desire not to jeopardize his
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Visit to Pe.in. on 1972. ui.on himself ha. instructed Ceor.e Bush, thepe_ U.S. representative at the United Nations, to he fir. against
India. Bush na.ed India as the aggressor and said: "There is guite
clear aggression, it is obviously quite clear."
The Anderson papers disclosed how while official spokesmen of the
U.S. government were maintaining that the United States was following an
even handed policy towards India and Pakistan, President Nixon gave or-
ders that U.S. policy be tilted in favour of Pakistan. Another revelation
was that the United States government was seriously considering provision
Of military supplies to Pakistan through third countries. The Nixon ad-
ministration was therefore criticized for being anti-India. The White
House was pleased with the performance of George Bush, the U.S. represen-
tative at the united Nations, with its strong anti-India bias. In the
United Nations American and Chinese representatives worked in close co-
operation and there was great jubilation in Washington and Peking when
the general assembly voted in favour of a ceasefire. President Nixon
telephoned George Bush to express his deep satisfaction at the outcome of
the general assembly discussion. The U.S. efforts in the United Nations
to brand India as the aggressor were frustrated by the Soviet Union.
Nixon said that he regretted the failure of the Soviet Union to join the
vast majority of the membership of the United Nations who called for an
immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. Both the United States and
See President Nixon's annual report (1972) to the United State
Congress.
30
Lok Sabha Debates, March 16, 1972, vol. xi, no. 4, column 351.
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China wording in harmony and with the enthusiasm of a new friendship
.ade
bluff manoeuvres against India's land and sea frontiers. The U.S. and
China "found themselves virtually co-belligerent.
. .when they backed Paki-
stan... "^^ AS the fighting in East Bengal went against Pakistan and
Yahya Khan's troops were driven to the wall, both Washington and Peking
asked India on December 10 to have an i^^ediate ceasefire on the same day
the Nixon administration instructed Turkish pilots in Libya to be ready
to fly American jet planes to Pakistan, when Nixon ordered the task
force to sail into the Bay of Bengal, his intention was probably not only
to brow-beat India but also save East Bengal from being overrun by
India. During the war Washington was silent about the dispatch of the
Enterprise and the helicopter carrier Tripoli
, with a battalion of 800
marines, 7 destroyers and frigates - a force of 6,000 officers and men -
had moved into the Bay of Bengal. The U.S. ships were to be used,
according to Washington reports, to evacuate Americans from East Pakistan.
When the ships steamed into the Bay of Bengal, only 17 Americans were in
East Bengal. The real intention of the United States was revealed when
Jerry W. Fried Hein, a Pentagon spokesman"^"^ said on December 12 that the
U.S. fleet also served to establish an American presence there. James
Reston said that the President supported Pakistan because he saw "in the
subcontinent the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union. ""^"^
31
C.L. Sulzberger, The New York Times
,
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Washington Post
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The International Herald Tribune
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The White House then stonno^^ =.n ^cn pped all economic assistance to India,
vhile Pakistan continued to
.ooeive it in spite of public protests. The
White House tried to manipulate a situation through the United Nations
and other diplomatic pressures to stop India from liberating Bangladesh.
However due to Soviet assistance and her repeated vetoes in the Security
council, all United States - Chinese attempts were made fruitless. On
the instructions of the White House, the United states representative in
the Security Council, George Bush, branded India as an aggressor and
tried to put the entire blame on her Thf^ r7ni+-ori c+.=>+.^^oiic vju xier. me u ted States government could
not, however, stop the birth of Bangladesh. Mr. Nixon's tilt towards
Pakistan only increased the credibility gap, and damaged Indo-American
relations.
Jack Anderson in these papers has taken the President to task
for his conduct during the Indo-Pakistan war. In column after column
he has accused the White House for using deceitful methods towards India,
employing duplicity in diplomacy and snobbery in political behaviour
.
Indo-Soviet Treaty
On August 9, 1971, India and the USSR signed a treaty of peace,
friendship and cooperation for a period of 20 years. Even though the
treaty had been in consideration for almost two years, the situation in
Bangladesh and the impending United States-China thaw had promoted the
mutual desire of India and the 'USSR to challenge the new orientation in
35
See his columns m the Washington Post during the fourteen day
Indo-Pakistan war which started on December 3, 1971.
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A.nerican foreign policy. It «as a response to the announcement of the
secret Kissinger-Chou talks which were held in Peking during July 9-11,
1971. There seemed to be a need fnr- a ^i,~.i^r^^4.-u D a tor a diplomatic counter-weight
"against"
the United States and China.
With the start of the 1970 's two kinds of changes began to take
place. The first was the announcement of the Guam doctrine by Nixon in
February 1970. The two parts of which are relevant here are: first,
"...we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow
from them... the United States will keep all its treaty commitments," and
second, "a direct combat role for United States general purpose forces
arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or
when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases we shall
weigh our interests and commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of
our allies in determining our response."
The two parts are reconciled by the valid assumption, supported
by subsequent events, that for its own benefit (any benefits for South
East Asia being incidental in this context) the United States was going
to downgrade those of its interests in the area which could only be de-
fended by the use of conventional land forces in favour of those of its
commitments and interests, such as the defense of Japan against an overt
Chinese attack, which may justify the use of unconventional weapons. The
United States was thus extending to post-Vietnam Asia the philosophy it
had already applied to other parts of the world, that American interests
are better defended from the American fortress than from American bases
spread all over the world.
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The 1970 's saw a second major change, and that was the brief
Slno-soviet effort to deescalate the border dispute between them. This
gave rise to the triangle between Washington, Moscow and Peking, with
Snerioan experts speculating when the Soviet Union would make a pre-emp-
tive nuclear strike upon China, it was inevitable that Washington and
Peking should draw closer together. Peking and Washington were drawn to-
gether by their mutual opposition to Moscow. The United states would not
even hesitate to scuttle all its commitments in South East Asia to win
the major objective of tilting the global triangle against the Soviet
Onion. These commitments were incurred only as part of the game of con-
taining China in South East Asia was only a subsidiary aim which was
important because China was regarded as second to Russia. Since China
was now coming forward as the biggest bulwark against Russia, the United
States saw the possibility of fulfilling the highest aim of United States
foreign policy throughout the post-war period, that of building a deci-
sive combination against the Soviet Union by contemplating a Sino-Ameri-
can alliance.
India had therefore to make certain adjustments in her foreign
policy. American reasons for wanting a rapprochement with China are not
Asian either in origin or aim, they are global. This brought Russian
and India interests into a closer congruence than they were ever before.
No one can predict the future development of Sino-Russian rela-
tions. But all authoritative pointers indicate a continuing conflict,
36probably leading to a major clash. Nixon's efforts for a new relation-
36
Pran Chopra, "New Duet for Old: The CAll of the Region, The Hindu-
stan Standard, January 21, 1971.
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ship with Chi,na is in anticipaton of some such development, m the
future, India and the Soviet Union may have to consider the Sino-Soviet,
Sino-lndian and Indo-Pakistan frontiers to be closely interrelated, each
part equally sensitive to developments on any one of them.
India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, in presenting the Treaty
to the Lojj Sabha on August 9, 1971, described the treaty as a "deterrent
to any powers that may have aggressive designs on our territorial integ-
37
rxty and sovereignty."
The Treaty has been signed in a context which unified the local
and more immediately relevant aspects of the new configuration of inter-
national diplomacy. In this way the Treaty prohibits the Soviet Union
from giving any assistance to Pakistan which militates against Indian
interests. On the other hand it committed the Soviet Union to close and
active interest in seciaring the return of the Bangladesh refugees to
their homes. However the Treaty does not prohibit India or the Soviet
Union from trying to establish normal relations either with China or
Pakistan. But it does seem to prevent them from taking these relations
38
to such lengths as may amount to providing assistance.
There was a wide range of reaction in the Indian Press. The
Hindustan Times in an editorial stated:
In our judgement the Government has over-reacted to
the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the
37
Lok Sabha Debates , New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Volume
August 9, 1971, Column
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For a clearer analysis of the Treaty see Ashok Kapur, "Indo-Soviet
Treaty and the emerging Asian balance," Asian Survey , June 1972, v. XII,
No. 6, pp. 463-473; Also see Robert H. Donaldson, "India: The Soviet
Stake in Stability" Asian Survey , op. cit ., pp. 474-484.
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possibility and scale of Chinese intervention in anvsuch event, and the American attitude towards P^istanChina's global interests do not centre on PakiSn
traniVt' ''^""'^ ^^^^^^ ^° launch off orrans-Himalayan war to pull Islamabad's chastnuts outof a revolutionary fire. Were it to do so India has
thre^rlid in'S^'^^^ ^° ^^^^
^
hreat And m the remote possibility of their beinaoverwhelmed, the super powers, especially the Sovietunion could not afford to stand by idly L t^eir o^global interests. In other words, in a situation^
real crisis Soviet support would have been forth-
coming without a treaty. 39
The Indian Express in its editorial struck a happier note. It
stated:
The Indo-Soviet Treaty purports to be a treaty between
equals, not between a big power and a client state
and in keeping with India's policy of non-alignment
whose value as a "factor in the maintenance of uni-
versal peace and internal security" the Treaty speci-
fically stressed. 40
The Hindu stated:
While this strengthening of ties with Moscow is to
be welcomed, there is one important point which New
Delhi should not lose sight of. Apart from the un-
wisdom of putting all eggs in one basket, it will
be foolish for India to get into a situation where
it will have to consider every enemy of Russia as
its own enemy. If circumstances have created a
compulsive reason for New Delhi to sign the Treaty
with India, the other rising Asian Power. The
Pakistani threat of war is a problem for the immediate
present and the Treaty will no doubt help India to
meet that threat. But the bigger and more important
problem for India - possibly the most important is eco-
nomic development and assistance from the advanced
Western countries and Japan has been and will continue
to be invaluable in this sphere.
The Hindustan Times
, New Delhi, 10th August, 1971.
I
The Indian Express , New Delhi, 10th August, 1971.
The Hindu
,
Madras, 10th August, 1971.
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According to the opinion of see Inidans
.uch criticise o, the
indo-soviet Treaty could have been averted, or easily „et if sardar
swaran sin,h, the Indian foreign minister and his advisers had not
.ade
two serious mistakes.'*^
First they should have never claimed that the Treaty had been un-
der discussion for over two years and that India would be ready to sign
Similar pacts with other countries in the region. Second they should not
have accepted that part of the joint statement dealing with the problem
of Bangladesh. There was no need for a joint stateinent after the Treaty
was signed. It tended to strengthen the fear that the treaty will work
to the disadvantage of India just because it is the weaker of the two
parties.
The reaction in the American press was as varied. The New York
Times stated:
The Soviet-Indian Friendship accord signed in New
Delhi, strengthens the Soviet influence in the second
most populous nation in Asia and the world at the
expense of the United States. It could increase the
danger of a local war leading to a big power confron-
tation on the Indian subcontinent .. .By signing the
treaty with India, Kremlin has compromised any credit
it may have had in Islamabad thus reducing the
possibility of becoming a mediator, a role it played
so successfully at Tash Kent after the 1965 Indo-
Pakistan conflict. The United States government is
in no better position to serve as conciliator having
cast its lot so firmly with the Yahya regime.
The running theme in most of the editorials was almost the same.
42
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The Christian Science Monitor observed:
In allying itself with India in a 20 years friendshin
at China. m the diplomatic chess game, the treatyIS to some extent a countermove to Washington's
rapprochement with Peking. But apparently, it alsointended to avert the danger of the big powersbeing drawn into a war on the Indian subcontinent.^^
The Washington Post stated:
For Delhi the treaty, at least its timing, reflects not
a design for aggression but a passionate reaction to
American support to Pakistan.
. .For Moscow our hunch
is that the Kremlin has taken advantage of India's
distress to consolidate its own position in Delhi.
The Baltimore Sun also stated in its editorial that India in
signing its treaty with the Soviet Union was acting to deter Pakistan.
The United States policy of continuing military aid to
Pakistan, occurring along with the policy of seeking
normal relations with the mainland China, is a factor
in the developments that have brought India and the
Soviet Union together in a well dramatized public
embrace
... The United States, long a major supporter of
India, is cast, unhappily, and perhaps imprecisely,
on the side of Pakistan and China. This is an unnatural
position for the United States which in fact should -
and we believe does want to maintain close and friendly
relations with Indian and to preserve, at least, normal
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union... The sober-
minded diplomats must hope that India in signing its
treaty with the Soviet Union is acting to deter Pakistan
rather than to get ready for war.*^^
The United States authorities maintained a stiff upper lip over
the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. The administration thought that this
was a Soviet and Indian response to the Washington-Peking "ping-pong
44
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uprisings in the littoral states has enhanced the strategic importance of .
the ocean. The goal of all states involved is not "control of the Indian
ocean," but rather political influence on its shores. It thus appears
to be a skirmishing ground.
The real threat to peace in the Indian Ocean is from the main
super powers
- the Soviet Union, United States, and Britain. American
moves seem to be more hostile, particularly after the United States deci-
sion to dispatch the seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal. Washington
and London actually fear the increasing Russian naval presence in the
area. American apprehensions are based on the increasing budgetary pro-
visions for Defense by the Soviet Union, and the repeated visits of
Russian naval ships to the friendly coast in the Indian Ocean territory.
New power alliances are being made. The British sponsored five-power
• defense agreement and the Anglo-American plan to set up a communication
centre at the Diego-Garcia island are the most important pointers. Arming
the pro-western dictatorships in this area has also started. American
arms to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Australia and the British decision to
sell naval equipment to South Arabia falls in this category. On the
larger scale the United States is trying to divide this area into spheres
of influence. These politico-military postures are a threat to peace in
the area.
The United States, looking after abandoned British bases (if not
propoerty) has an old sea plane tender, and two destroyers at Bahrein.
It has two large communications stations in Ethiopia and Australia, and
is building an austere mid-oceanic facility at Diego-Garcia. It
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as
periodically exercises elements of the seventh fleet in the region,
part of what is called operating experience in a new theatre.
The Russians have no naval base in the Indian Ocean, but they
have increased their presence gradually. In contrast to American policy
the Russian attitude is to seek naval cooperation with the littoral states
of the Indian Ocean family. This cooperation may turn out to be strate-
gic importance, but for the present there is no evidence of any hostile
activity.
At present neither super power has made major basing investments
in the region. The United States has a decided military advantage in
the case of a U.S. -USSR confrontation, and ic can be expected that the
USSR will attempt to even the odds in the next several years. On the
other hand the political effect of this uneven military position is by
no means so easy to calculate. Thus when the U.S. Enterprise task force
moved into the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, the
Soviets moved a much smaller squadron into India. The Soviet Union de-
ployed its ships as a shield protecting India. The Indians welcomed
this, as the action of a faithful ally - and its political impact was
greater than would have been its military importance had the conflict
widened. Neither side used force, but in terms of political effect, the
USSR "won."
Naval displays are more than bluff and more than archaic symbolic
counters on a chess board, but they are less than the decisive increments
of a conflict. They are part of a pattern in which some forces committed
for limited gains, and others are held in reserve with a coalition of
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potential forces should the conflict widen. All powers would use their
fleets to sustain their allies, and where possible to e^olden the enemies
of hostile regimes.
Professor Wilcox suggests that the Indian Ocean will become even
more active as a skirmish zone when conflicts in the littoral states pre-
sent opportunities and problems of security management.'*^ These prob-
lems he suggest further will probably be "internationalized" with great
power participation either direct or indirect.
The role of Russian naval power in the Indian Ocean can be consi-
dered in several ways. There is firstly the strategic use of that power
in terms of the need to counter United States SLBM capability. The Rus-
«
sians having seen the deployment of Polaris A-2 and A- 3 submarines in the
Meditarranean are determined not to be caught in the Indian Ocean. The
Russian naval presence can also be seen as a kind of 'backup' to India's
role of containing China. It is also designed to interdict western oil
supplies. There is a possibility of Russians blockading or sinking wes-
tern oil tankers.
As a result of all this, the littoral states, are for the first
time beginning to see the Indian Ocean as a meaningful political entity.
Many of the littoral states are concerned that the Indian Ocean should be
neutralised or that it should become a "zone of disengagement."^^ In a
49
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speech on 8 Septe^er 1970 at the Lusaka Non-aligned Conference, the
Indian Pri.e Minister declared: "We would like the Indian Ocean to be
an area of peace and cooperation. Military bases of outside powers will
create tension and great power rivalry. "^^ ;^ong the resolutions adopted
by the Heads of the non-aligned state was one relating to the subject
"Adoption of a Declaration calling upon all states to consider and re-
spect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries
and competition as well as bases, conceived in the context of such rival-
ries and competition
- whether army, navy, or air force are excluded.
The are should also be free of nuclear weapons." (Resolution, 8.6)
In a statement in the Parliament on November 22, 1974, the then
External Affairs Minister, Y. Chavan, said, "The government reiterate
their deep concern and misgivings at these developments which are incon-
sistent with United Nations resolution declaring the Indian Ocean as a
zone of peace." Talking of the entry of the United States naval force
in the Indian Ocean, Mr. Bupesh Gupta^^ in the Rajya Sabha accused Dr.
Kissinger of "gunboat diplomacy" and wondered if Kissinger had informed
the government of India, of his government's intention of sending the
task force into the Indian Ocean. ^"^ The United States explanation is
that after 1973 's West Asian war the United States is publicly committed
to maintaining a naval force in the Arabian Sea to protect its interests
^^
Indian Express
,
September 10, 1970.
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and the oil lanes leading from the Persian Gulf. According to earlier
plans the United states was to send a task force every three months on a
rotational basis.
As the principal country, on the shores of the Indian Ocean,
India has vital interests in keeping the ocean an area of peace - free
from big power rivalry, a naval arms race, and from military bases.
Large scale naval manouveres only aggravate the existing tension created
by the establishment of military bases.
The super-power decision making is vitally influenced by certain
generalized concepts about the nature of the world and the nature of the
struggle in which they are engaged. Foremost amongst these concepts are
those of ' the total balance of power' and the 'power vacuum'. The opera-
tionalisation of these concepts leads to a situation wherein neither
side prepared to remove or scale down its presence in the Indian Ocean
for fear of 'creating a power vacuum,' and "destabilising the balance of
power"
.
Until the United States and USSR alter their conceptual frame of
reference nothing much will be achieved. The situation is made more com-
plex when concepts coincide with interests, for e.g. the Russian presence
in the Indian Ocean and the Russian support of India.
54
During the budget session (1972-73) of the Parliament the problem
in the mind of most members of Parliament was the eight Task Force of
the United States Seventh Fleet which was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal
at the last stage of the Indo-Pakistan war. The panic caused by the sud-
den United States presence in the Indian Ocean was relieved only by the
reassuring news of the arrival simultaneously of elements of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet closely following the furrows of Enterprise.
Declaration of Emergency in India, July 1975
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In 1966, two years after the death of her father the Congre.
party chose Mrs. Indira Gandhi, because the party members apparently
thought she would be easier to manipulate than a man. Three years later
Mrs. Gandhi remade the party in her own image, and since then has ruled
like an autocrat. In the nine years since she first became the Prime
Minister, Mrs. Gandhi has steadily tightened her hold on Indian politics.
In July, 1975, she declared a state of emergency and began arresting
thousands of its opponents.
American newspapers unanimously condemned Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi's mass arrests of opposition leaders and other dissidents. While
the New York Times observed that in India, "there was something in the air
56perilously like euphoria." Mrs. Gandhi's image was badly tarnished in
the American press and she lost credibility. Several newspapers saw
hypocrisy in her statements and have drawn parallels with the comments
of Mr. Nixon before his exit. Only Mrs. Gandhi they point out has gone
beyond what the American President said and did. In an editorial the
Christian Science Monitor wrote
:
She may honestly feel that her antidemocratic measures
are in the interests of preserving democracy, but
as one who has been quick to judge the actions of
other governments from outside, she ought to be parti-
cularly sensitive to the ominous impression conveyed by
her crackdown on dissidents. What the world sees in
India now is a leader convicted in court, staying in
^^Angus Deming with Loren Jenkins, "Making of an Autocrat," Newsweek ,
July 7, 1975.
56
New York Times, September 8, 1975,
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office through judicial grace while appealing the
conviction, and using her position of power to suppressthe voices against her. This does not look likedemocracy leadership to the world. 57
The New York Times proclaimed forthrightly that "For all practi-
cal purposes Prime Minsiter Indira Gandhi is today the dictator of
58
India." At the same time the paper has raised the question that is Mrs.
Gandhi claims popular support, why couldn't she have withstood the chal-
lenge of civil disobedience without taking repressive measures. However,
United States officials were ordered by Secretary of State Kissinger to
make no comments on developments in India
, which was officially called
an "internal matter" for Indians. The Times of London said that "While
allegations against Mrs. Gandhi of trying to set up a dictatorship had
earlier seemed excessive she has now taken a step leading exactly in
59
that direction." In France a front page editorial in La Monde said
that Mrs. Gandhi's suppression of her opponents "reflects the Prime Mini-
60
ster's personality and character." It added "Negru's daughter believes
herself invested with a historic mission and a legitimacy that defies
51democratic rule." The paper struck a note that was echoed in other
editorials, that India can no longer claim moral superiority over other
countries in her political actions.
57 . • .
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LeMonde declared, "Its declarations of democratic faith are no
less hypocritical than its discourses on the freedom of peoples when
Sikkim and Kashmir were annexed pure and simple."" The annexation of
Sikkim and the explosion of a nuclear device were also cited by The Times
of London as evidence of India's disregard of international conduct under
Mrs. Gandhi.
In its comments on the political developments in India, the Balti-
more Sun conceded that:
By making herself, at least for now a dictator, Mrs.
Gandhi has gone ahead where Nixon stopped short. She
has failed a serious test of devotion to her people's
freedom. Without rule of law, India could not have
the democracy Mrs. Gandhi proudly discussed in her 1975
New Year's message.
The Washington Post headlined its lead story saying "Gandhi Assumes
Dictatorial Rule: Arrests Mount. "^^
The Post also published an anlysis by Walter Schwartz of the Man-
chester Guardian saying:
Indian Prime Minsiter Indira must have been seriously
rattled to arrest Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji
Desai - her political seniors in more ways than one,
and to put them behind bars is to have played her last
card.^^
She was accused by several other columnists for Hitlerite and
Stalinists activities. William Buckley, Jr. of the Boston Globe wrote:
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Mrs Gandho. whose father refused to condemn Krushchev'sbloody suppressions in Budapest in 1956 early this yLrcongratu ated the Vietcong on their victory In AH 'China It cannot therefore be safely assumed that
'"^^^ ^^^^ distinguished father wincesat totalitarian excesses. 67
Mrs. Gandhi's retort is we are astonished that American
newspapers should lecture us on democracy while showing
all friendships earlier to Ayub Khan's military dictator-
ship in Pakistan and new communist China. ^8
The Globe quoted Mrs. Gandhi as saying:
Today (Americans) had the cheek to come and say that
"you are destroying democracy". We are not interested
in what these countries say. We are interested if
they are fair in their judgments, if they stick by
what they say. If they believe in democracy and that
other countries should be democratic, let then speak
up against ever authoritative regime in the world.
But do we hear any talk today, while there is euphoria
in the West about China? Is there any form of demo-
cracy in China? But nobody has a word to say.
Today those who are criticising us, if the country
was to be weakened they would say, "oh well we always
said that democracy wouldn't work in a country like
India and that is all. "69
However, four months after the emergency was declared, Mrs. Gandhi's
critics, including those in Washington, are taking a second look. William
Smith Chief of Time New Delhi Bureau gave his assessment of Indian democ-
racy under the emergency.
Despite New Delhi ' s undeniable lurch towards totali-
tarian rule and its suspension of certain civil
liberties, India remains strictly speaking a demo-
cracy. . .Even though some 30 opposition members are
in jail or under house arrest, Parliament continues
67
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to function
.Most observers agree that these mattersof no great interest to the majority of India's 600million people, who are more concerned about thefact tha the government has completely halted infla-tion down from 31% in September 1974] and thatIndia s three year old drought has ended (experts nowproject a bumper grain crop this fall)
. Indians wullong debate whether Mrs. Gandhi was justified in pro-claiming the emergency, but the Prime Minister haswon widespread support for seizing a rare opportunityto ram through a score of social reforms. ^0
India, United States and the Bomb
India in May 1974, announced its first nuclear explosion 328
feet under the great Indian desert. The Indian Atomic Energy Commis-
sion said the bomb was designed for peaceful purposes. This 'peaceful'
nuclear blast woke up critics in the international community to the idea
that there has been a misuse of foreign aid and foreign exchange resources
of a large order. It almost seemed as though the whole thing was prepared
secretly and done suddenly. This surprise nuclear test stirred angry
72comments m Western nations.
The national decision, i.e. whether to make nuclear weapons or
not is decided by concerns of national interest. The traumatic experience
of the Indian government, during the massive Chinese invasion of Indian
territory in 1962, the Pakistani aggression in 1965, and the Bangladesh
episode in 1971, indicated to her the importance of planned military
70
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preparedness in the future. Problems of national security have since
been accorded a high priority. So while Washington and Moscow were
trying to manage their political relationship and to carry on an insti-
tutionalized dialogue to control the strategic arms race, India with the
fourth largest military force in the world was contemplating the Bomb.^^
Early in 1968, after considerable hesitation, she refused to sign the
nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. By the beginning of 1970 press reports
were saying that, under pressure from Parliament and the pro-bomb lobby,
her leaders were considering cost estimates for a bomb program, and during
the summer the Atomic Energy Department announced a ten year program
which included a plan to develop rocket and space technology, guidance
systems and radar and missile tracking stations ."^"^ And in May 1974 she
announced the first nuclear blast.
A number of factors combined to bring about a change of policy.
Local conflicts were beginning to gain world wide significance, leading
to direct involvement in one form or another by the super powers. Since
the super powers have the technological and industrial base, and the re-
sources to corner the world's strategic market, they can influence the
capacity of most other countries for self defense. India gradually began
to realize that in any future confrontation affecting India's security,
she would be powerless to prevent the overriding super imposition of
73
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, January 1970, has many insights regarding recent developments in
India's nuclear policy.
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See statement of Dr. V.A. Sarabhai, Chairman of the Indian Atomic
Energy Department, in Indian News
,
Embassy of India, Washington, D.C.,
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one
,
own
great power interests. China is seen as the bigger, even though long
ter. threat, while Pakistan figures as the .ore active and i:^ediate
India had confined ner national security ai.s to the defense of her
territory, limited to conventional ir^ediate level requirements of de-
fense, India was not content with perpetuating this 'lower power,'
status Which implied seeking the shelter of a great or even middle power
umbrella, and therefore of having to surrender her sovereignty.
There has also been a growing awareness that India's national
interest may not always coincide with that of the super powers. After
the 1962 Sino-lndian debacle, India realized that in the future she could
not solely rely on American support and hardware, as America had its com-
mitments to Pakistan under SEATO. Hence in future' for military assistance
and weapons, it would have to depend of Russia and her own plants.
Then the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device in 1964, even
though it did not pose an immediate threat to India, created diplomatic
tension between the two countries. The explosion made its impact on sev-
eral countries in Asia. North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia were already
within the sphere of influence. A great admiration for the Chinese nuclear
explosion was noticed in Pakistan, since it regarded that the Chinese nu-
clear bomb would be to its advantage in its rivalry with India in the
context of India, Pakistan and China, Soviet system of interaction.
The Chinese bomb is an Asian bomb, and India's hope of posing as
the liberal alternative to China in Asia would be jeopardized if she
could not prove that she is not only as technologically advanced, but
also as determined as a nation.
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Even though China's possession of the nuclear bomb did not give
it any decisive advantage in its strategic position, it was felt that it
had definitely helped it to secure inununity from aggression. India thus
thought it necessary to strengthen its position both economically and
militarily in order to counter the growing danger posed by the Chinese
nuclear threat. This was done in spite of the pressure put on by the
United States of India, that it should not go nuclear.
The bomb thus became a 'mantra'. It was felt that if India de-
cided to make the bomb, it would not merely heighten the morale of the
nation, but also transform the attitude of its hostile neighbours ."^^ It
was asserted that there would be no economic breakdown, and that the very
proclamation of India's intention to become a nuclear power would lead
other countries to take India more seriously, and contribute signifi-
cantly to its internal stability. It was envisaged that India's nuclear
energy program could be accelerated without neglecting the development
of its conventional forces, and a balance growth of both nuclear and con-
ventional forces, and a balance growth of both nuclear and conventional
weapons was considered as the most profitable objective for the defense
of India.
Another factor was the public opinion in India. According to the
Institute of P\ablic Opinion in New Delhi, in 1968 over 75 percent of the
Indian public was in favour of taking the decision to produce nuclear
75
See Ashok Kapur, 'Nuclear Weapons and Indian Foreign Policy," The
World Today
,
September 1971. A.G. Noorani, "India and Asian Security,"
The World Today , March 1970. Dilip Mukhergee, 'India's Defence Perspec-
tives,' International Affairs, Octover 1968.
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weapons. The central
• theme is thus 'power' and not 'defense' - and
deterrence not so much for the defense of the motherland as for the ac-
quisition of power, in the international arena. The bid indeed was to
help India step into a new role of 'power'. With the likelihood of
Japan, West Germany and Israel to go nuclear, India had to recast her
present national security policies.
India had been in a position to explode a nuclear device since
late 1964, but was deterred by the vigorously, though privately expressed,
disapproval of the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides, India's
continuing dependence on shipment of food grains from the United States,
made it hard for her to run the risk of offending America. Another argu-
ment was the chance of nuclear proliferation, and the possibility that
Pakistan too might initiate a nuclear weapons program.
Critics in the West wondered how a poverty stricken country like
India could afford the luxury of a nuclear test. American officials in-
dicated disappointment at the Indian test. Referring to India's chronic
poverty and shortage of food, one Washington official said, "I don't see
76how this is going to grow more rice." The blast also prompted in the
77
United States, a review of aid to India. "If there isn't some cost to
India for doing this" an official said in a reference to possible curtail-
78
ment of United States aid, "other countries will go ahead."
The Indian reply is that long range needs must be balanced against
76Quoted from New York Times , op. cit ,
77
New York Times
,
May 27, 1974, p. 2.
78Quoted from New York Times, op. cit ,
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iimnediate pressures, that hunger will not vanish overnight, and that
nuclear energy in the long run will help India feed herself.
TO the next often repeated criticism, that India has foresworn
her moral stance of the nineteen fifties against nuclear weaponry, the
Indian reply is
:
The government has not ruled out the development of
nuclear weapons. Besides the nuclear test was in line
with India's diplomatic policy on arms control, and there
are no contradictions between the nation's statements
and actions. India signed the 1963 treaty banning tests
of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. But she refused
to sign the 1968 nuclear treaty designed to thwart the
spread of weapons, asserting that it discriminated against
non-nuclear powers had in effect failed to ask the super
powers to make major sacrifices. India then had the
freedom to pursue her nuclear experiments .80
The New York Times also quoted the India press saying that "the
western nations and the Soviet Union are being somewhat hypocritical be-
cause they have stocks of nuclear arms, whereas India has merely exploded
a small device.^''"
Critics had the apprehesion that the nuclear experiment may have
violated the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but the experiment was
carried out underground, while the Treaty prohibits explosions in the
atmosphere, under water and in outer space. Besides" India did not sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty which therefore is not binding on her. In
the process therefore, no bilateral or multilateral agreements were vio-
lated.
The Indian government justivied the experiment by saying that it
79
New York Times
,
May 27, 1974, p. 2.
80
Ibid .
^"""Ibid.
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was designed ,o. such peaceful purposes as »i„i„,
,,,,,
However, it did have political and strategic reasons, too.
J
CONCLUSION
The forcoin, chapters
.naKe it evident that there are a n^er
Of "interest clusters" e^eddea in the «.erican involvement in South
*3ia. one o, the historical reasons for the ^erioan concern with
south Asia lay not in the region itself, but in its relationship to
the broader ,lohal balance of power. Bntil the ^^d-lseO's the balance
of power issue remained a key factor underlying c.s. assistance both
to India and Pakistan, and the U.S. attitude towards Soviet influence
in these two states. The ,965 Indo-Pakistani war was a critical turning
point for the U.S.; the U.S. then stood aside as the Soviets assu„,ed
the role of regional peacemaker at the Tashkent Conference in ,966. By
that time, American involvements in Vietnam had deepened, and south
Asia's potential for disintegration, and its relevance to the cold war
had declined substantially.
Generally speaking, international relations are intergovernmen-
tal relations. Each government's public posture reveals its inner
calculations, their relative coercive capability, the self-interest of
nations and the elite who speak for them. The "middle" and "small"
powers also play the game of power politics as best as they can, de-
pending on options and constraints implicit in the international situ-
ation and the ingenuity of their policy makers. They are participants
in power politics even when they claim to be non-aligned, for non-
alignment is nothing other than a "tactical principle" designed to
obtain the greatest possible advantage from a given power configiiration.
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The great power having global interest., <=y udj. rests, is concerned with the
balance of a much larqer intfir-na+--i^ tg international system to whose preservation
the security interests of its small ally may at times, become irrele-
vant, ^erican foreign policy towards India is merely the application
Of this global strategy, and India figures only in so far as she
seen as an available instrument, or an unnecessary obstacle in the
IS
S(
— xiisL-iTument unnpnoao=.v.„ . ..
exe-
cution of that strategy.
Thus in terms of South Asia's salience to America's then accepted
"vital and global interests," developments which might directly or in-
directly affect the security and welfare of the U.S. through a connection
to the central U.S.
-Soviet balance, India and South Asia generally,
faded rapidly as critical sectors in the mid-1960 's. In recent years
South Asia has become peripherally important as European, Japanese and
American dependence upon Persian Gulf oil has increased. This interest
would expand were India to develop an interventionist capacity in the
Gulf, or enhance its ties with important Gulf states.
Another interest deriving from broader, global concerns, is the
role of India and Pakistan in the nuclear proliferation process. Were
one or both of these states to acquire a military nuclear system of
substance, the U.S. would be affected in a number of ways. If American
ties with Pakistan have been characterized by a concern with the security
and autonomy of a long time ally, those with India are considerably more
diverse. India's democratic traditions, its economic development, cul-
tural and academic groups, all have been important assets for a large
number of Americans.
American foreign policy towards India has for its basis two main
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Piua^s. The first piUa. happens to he ^.iUtar. pa.it. hetween Xn.ia
and Pakistan, and the second is economic aid through which the United
States tried to prevent the Soviet Union fro. achieving a dominant
position of influence in India,
.ajor obstacles in establishing
Closer links between India and the United States were the divisions of
the cold war, the unconditional U.S. support to Pakistan, India's
Closeness to the Soviet Union, her faith in non-alignment, and her
opposition to military alliances sponsored by the United States. Even
after the doctrinal rigidities of the cold war have dissolved and non-
alignment has become respectable in the United States the two countries
did not come closer till recently, what has kept them apart is the
fundamental psychological cleavage between them which came into bold
relief in 1971 when President Nixon gave unconditional support to
Pakistan. Since 1971 marks a watershed in the relationship between
the two countries, the crisis in the subcontinent in that year and its
impact on India's ties with the United States are carefully traced in
the work. After the short term objective of entering into a dialogue
with the Chinese leaders was achieved, Nixon was able to relax. After
his visit to Peking, he wrote friendly letters to Indira Gandhi, to
which she sent appropriate replies. In July 1972, he sent John Connally,
a close confidant, to India to talk to Indira Gandhi and tell her that
the United States had no ill will towards India. In November 1972,
Nixon authorized U.S. participation in the World Bank proposal for debt
rescheduling to India. India and the United States agreed that they
would cooperate on economic matters and leave political differences
aside for a while. In August 1973, Henry Kissinger stated that he
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wanted India and the United States to move towards a more mature
relationship, by removing many of the irritating legacies of the 1971
policies, and in this effort the then U.S. ambassador Daniel Moynihan
of course played a major role.
India occupies the most central and dominating position of the
subcontinent. This region of some 800 million people constitutes a
sizeable portion of the world's population. It makes a difference
whether the people's of the South Asia work out their problems amicably.
For a number of years the United States tried to play the con-
flicting role of a balancer, supplier and mediator. These efforts faded
after the 1965 war as the relevance of the region declined since the
Vietnam war. American interest in the subcontinent has been character-
ized by diversity, diffuseness and a high degree of indirectness, which
the subsequent chapters will clarify. These interests have been numerous,
they interact and influence each other to a high degree, and they often
are dependent upon extra-regional considerations. With the passage of
time global and regional variables have changed, so have the relations
between these two countries.
Indo-American relations have for decades been characterized by
tensions over issues in both regional and global affairs that are often
based on serious differences in perception and interest. India's voting
pattarns in the United Nations, and the country's "tilt" towards the
Soviet Union formalized in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friend-
ship and Cooperation.
India has achieved hegemony in a region which while not of crit-
ical importance to so called vital U.S. interests, is of concern to many
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Americans for strategic no]ii-ir>=,i, p l tical, economic and humanitarian reasons.
The U.S. recognition of India's regional hege^ny need not imply the
abandonment of egually legitimate ^^erican interests in, for instance,
the stability and security of Pakistan, nor is it to he expected that
Indian and ^erican viewpoints and objectives will always overlap. Yet
if the world's two largest democracies can transcend the resentments,
moralizing, and ideological hostility of the recent past, more coopera-
tive relations between the U.S. and India will contribute to the aim of
political and economic stability in the South Asia area.
Defense and military concerns play a critical role in shaping
India's relations with its neighbors and with outside powers. India
has substantial military industrial assets and a growing nuclear poten-
tial that enhances its geopolitical importance, since 1971, India has
increased the size of its frigate destroyer, and submarine fleet and
India may be expected to play a small but significant role in the Persian
Gulf and Indian Ocean areas which have gained in strategic importance
along with the increased European, Japanese and American dependence upon
the Persian Gulf oil.
President Carter did select India as one of the few stops on his
winter 1977/78 foreign tour and P.M. Desai came to Washington in the
summer of 1978. Mr. Carter enunciated most of the cliches ~ India as
the "largest democracy" in the world, the importance of democracy and
economic developments for all people and the natxire of the two countries
shared interests and obligations.
One of these indirectly recognized the dominant role of India
in South Asia, and gave some weight to the argxament that India was a
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countr. Of .lobal i„po.ta„ce. Key sentence. „e.e as follows:
in t^^l^'
"i^rS^^*^-
the two countries
super powers, India is ?hetr;:sr:f° he''
'°
countries. But each of „! ^^^^ °^
^ non-aligned
tion of its inLrn!^- f >^^=Peots the others concep-
that do s^arr'oiJdf «=P°-ib"ities and the values
i"^hS\L-£-~-^^
balance of payments, technology and other questions iwelcome your playing this world wide leadership "i;
.
The second document emerging from President Carter's visit was
the "Delhi Declaration" of January 3, 1978, signed by Carter and Desai.
Studies of strategic power in world politics commonly assign to
India the status of a middle power of some regional significance, but
little more. Two questions are central:
1) Is India an emergent power, in effect a country of substantial
strategic importance now, and of even greater potential impor-
tance?
2) If so what are the policy implications for the United States?
Skepticism concerning India's role in the world is enhanced by
the economic crises that have become a way of life in the subcontinent,
exacerbated by birth-death rates, that will lift India's population to
one billion by the end of the century. In addition to the economic
factors that are thought to reduce the country's effectiveness in main-
taining logistical support for a modern defense force, critics note that
India did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ; became a nuclear
power after the testing of an atomic device in the Rajasthan desert in
1974; has fought four wars with immediate neighbors in 30 years (Pakistan
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in 1947-43, X^es,
.aX.„cea in pa« the Ba„,la.e=H
.i.e.atlo„ „a. o.
1971
-
carried out with precision but by a iar,e maian force against
a .uch smaller, isolated Pakistani Ar^y i„ Hast Bengal,
. .3 for the
Sino-Indian border war of iPf;-? a*.1962, it was a debacle for India from any
point of view.
western perceptions of India take into account the factors out-
lined above, add the longstanding left-socialist inclinations o, see of
India's leaders; recall the political, social, and economic instabili-
ties of the country (exemplified by the Emergency of Indira Gandhi,
1975-77) and conclude that India is par excellence, a country that should
devote concentrated attention to its internal problems of political sta-
bility, social change, regional integration, and economic growth. India,
in this perspective has only a modest role to play in the realm of world
affairs
.
Criticism from outsiders has not deflected India from its recog-
nition of itself as a major nation that has achieved great power status.
Great power status can imply regional, continental or global influence.
At a minimum it means regional hegemony, which India in large part has"
acquired. The next stage — dominance in Asia — clearly is beyond its
grasp. Extra-regional influence however is possible for India, and indeed
now is exercised with moderate success. India's regional hegemony has
been slow in coming, for it was dependent upon the acquisition of a number
of capabilities. India has had to develop an awareness that these capa-
bilities exist and acquire the will to exercise power in such a way as
to achieve or maintain hegemony over regional competitors
.
Regional hegemony or dominance thus implies the existence of local
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Military preponderance over neighbors through the spectrum of forces, the
availability of non-military instruments of pressure (including induce-
ment and economic coercion)
,
the ability to influence the consequences
following upon domestic political weaknesses in rival regional states,
and a strategy of diplomacy that places regional dominance above other
Objectives. A state such as India, by virtue of its size, resources
and geographic location finds itself a great power in regional terms,
whether or not it seeks the label, and despite the fact that all of its
capabilities for regional dominance are not yet full secured.
The acquisition of extra-regional continental or global influence
will require other capacities. For India, it demands a firm regional
base in South Asia, since local hegemony is a prerequisite for broader
ambitions. The most important geopolitical factor of the subcontinent is
the central, dominating position of India. This region of some 800
million people constitutes a sizeable portion of the world's population.
It makes a difference whether the peoples of South Asia Work out their
problems and differences amicably and effectively.
India is one of the very few of the "poorer" nations of the world
with a substantial indigenous military manufacttaring capability. It is
fully comparable to China in this regard. This has several political
and strategic consequences.
India is on the verge of entering the arms export market in a
certain way. There already has been one major sale to the Persian Gulf
(50 tanks to Kuwait) , and attempts to sell MIG's or spare parts to Egypt.
India is beginning to design and construct a number of military items from
scratch. India's armed forces are large and more than adequate to meet
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most threats to Indian security.
For a number of years the United States tried to play the con-
flicting role of a balancer, supplier and mediator. These efforts faded
after the 1965 war, as the relevance of the region to U.S. interests was
thought to have declined as involvement in Vietnam grew. At that time
the soviet union took up the initiative holding out offers of supplies
and weapons to both states, if they agreed to forge a common front against
China. Pakistan refused, as it declined to yield its position on Kashmir,
and China became its leading weapons supplier for a number of years. In
all of these activities, the superpowers were concerned primarily with
using India and Pakistan as counters to the other superpowers or to China.
In terms of its relations with Pakistan, the minimum tests of
India's emergence as a great power would seem to be constituted by the
following
:
1) To maintain its military domination over Pakistan, but with
an increasing reliance upon an Indian technology and resource
base.
2) Successfully to deter or prevent external powers from building
up Pakistan's military machine to the point where it could
attack India with confidence.
3) To accomodate the genuine fears and concerns of Pakistan, thus
reducing Pakistan's motivation for opposing India.
It is a truism but appropriate to point out, that American in-
terests in South Asia are characterized by diversity, diffuseness, and a
high degree of indirectness. By this we mean that these interests are
numerous, that they interact and influence each other to a high degree,
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and th.t they often a,:e dependent upon extra regional considerations
With the passage of ti.e global and regional variables have changed.
Traditional subcontinental and border rivalries especially with Pakistan
and China re-nain active, but Pakistan now is developing closer ties with
Iran, Turkey and the Arab world with ^^ssible stronger links with the
U.S.S.R. to be forged in the future. India in turn is in the process of
negotiating improved accords with the People ^s Republic of china, over-
all subcontinental disputes are declining in intensity in part because
of a recognition of India's standing of dominance.
The termination of the 1975 state of emergency in India and the
restoration of full democratic freedoms were greeted with considerable
public support in the United States and helped the stage for the develop-
ment of a more cordial and closer relationship between the United states
and India, while differences remain, leaders in both countries express
confidence that these can be amicably managed.
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